Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV06222, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT  (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2)

Communicating with the Court Staff re the Tentative Ruling 1. Please notify the courtroom staff by email not later than 9:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion. The email address is SSCDEPT29@lacourt.org. Please do not use any other email address. 2. You must include the other parties on the email by "cc." 3. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the Subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENT UNLESS BOTH SIDES SUBMIT ON THE TENTATIVE.  4. Include the words "SUBMISSION BUT WILL APPEAR" if you submit, but one or both parties will nevertheless appear. 5. For other communications with Court Staff a. OFF-CALENDAR should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed to have a matter placed off-calendar. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) date of proceeding. b. CASE SETTLED should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed that the case has settled for all purposes. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) whether notice of settlement/dismissal documents have been filed; (c) if (b) has not been done, a date one year from the date of your email which will be a date set by the court for an OSC for dismissal of the case. c. STIPULATION should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have stipulated that a matter before the court can be postponed. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) what proceeding is agreed to be postponed e.g. Trial, FSC; (c) the agreed-upon future date; (d) whether all parties waive notice if the Court informs all counsel/parties that the agreed-upon date is satisfactory. This communication should be used only for matters that are agreed to be postponed and not for orders shortening time. 6. PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT STAFF DEAL ONLY WITH SCHEDULING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS AND DO NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF ANY CASE. (UPDATED 6/17/2020) 
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ALSO NOTE:  If the moving party does not contact the court to submit on the tentative and does not appear (either remotely or in person), the motion will be taken off calendar.  THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL NOT BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.

Case Number: 22STCV06222    Hearing Date: October 23, 2024    Dept: 29

Staben v. Providence Little Company of Mary Medical Center – Torrance

22STCV06222
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Reza Askari, M.D.

TENTATIVE

The motion is GRANTED.

Background

On February 18, 2022, Diana Staben and Miles Staben (by and through his Guardian Ad Litem Roberto Staben) (collectively “Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Providence Little Company of Mary Medical Center – Torrance, Jon Yamamoto, M.D. (“Yamamoto”), Kenneth Holliman, OB (“Holliman”), Reza Askari, M.D. (“Askari”), Providence Health System – Southern California, Denise Akimi Ishimaru, M.D. (“Ishimaru”), Jennifer Chu, M.D. (“Chu”), Coastal Perinatal Center, Inc. (“CPC”), Vikas Sachar, M.D. (“Sachar”), and Does 1 through 50, asserting one cause of action for negligence/medical malpractice arising out of Plaintiff Diana Staben’s labor and delivery of Plaintiff Miles Staben.

On August 10, 2022, Providence Health System – Southern California was dismissed.

On September 8, 2022, Providence Health System – Southern California dba Providence Little Company of Mary Medical Center – Torrance (“Providence”) filed an answer.

On September 19, 2022, Sachar and CPC filed an answer. They were subsequently dismissed.

On October 5, 2022, Yamamoto filed an answer.

On October 14, 2022, Askari filed an answer.

On October 24, 2022, Holliman filed an answer.

On November 18, 2022, Ishimaru and Chu filed an answer.

On August 9, 2024, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to name AMN Healthcare Services, Inc. as Doe 1.

On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name AMN Healthcare, Inc. as Doe 2.

As it relates to the matter set for hearing on October 23, Defendant Askari filed this motion for summary judgment on August 7, 2024. No opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Discussion

Defendant Askari moves for summary judgment on the grounds that he met the standard of care when treating Plaintiff Diana Staben and was not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs’ injuries.

Plaintiffs’ claims against Askari arise from three prenatal appointments, on January 18, 25, and February 8, 2021, and a C-Section procedure on February 20, 2021. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“DSUMF”), Nos. 5 & 15.) For each of the prenatal appointments, Plaintiff Diana did not present a need for immediate medical attention. (DSUMF, Nos. 8, 11, & 14.) Plaintiff Diana’s c-section procedural was uneventful, with no complications. (DSUMF, No. 16.)

In a medical negligence action, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of [the] profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420; Simmons v. West Covina Medical Clinic (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 696, 701-02.) “Both the standard of care and defendants’ breach must normally be established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008), 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

A medical professional breaches the duty of professional care by failing to act in accordance with the prevailing industry standard of care. (See Folk v. Kilk (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 176, 186.) “The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony …, unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman.’” (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 410.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that it was more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of care.” (Johnson v. Super. Ct. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.) “When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports [the] motion with expert declarations that [their] conduct fell within the community standard of care, [the defendant] is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-985.) An expert declaration, if uncontradicted, is conclusive proof as to the prevailing standard of care and the propriety of the particular conduct of the health care provider. (Starr v. Mooslin (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 988, 999.)

Here, Defendant Askari presents the declaration of James A. Macer, M.D., who is specializes in the field of Obstetrics and Gynecology and has been board certified since 1985. (Macer Decl., ¶ 1.) Dr. Macer is familiar with the standard of care in the medical profession that applies to physicians within the community. (Id., ¶ 4.)

Dr. Macer has reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records. (Id., ¶ 3.) Based upon that review, Dr. Macer opines that Defendant Askari acted at all relevant times within the standard of care related to his care and treatment of Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 8.) Dr. Macer also opines that no action or inaction by Askari caused or contributed to the injuries of which Plaintiffs’ complain. (Ibid.)

Dr. Macer’s opinion testimony is “evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case cannot be established.” (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 879.) The expert opinion testimony of Dr. Macer is evidence that Defendant Askari complied with his duties under California law and the standard of care for a reasonably careful medical professional under similar circumstances.

With this evidence, Defendant Askari has satisfied the initial burden of showing that one or more elements of the causes of action in the complaint cannot be established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) This shifts the burden to Plaintiffs to show that there is a triable issue of one or more material facts as to the causes of action. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition, and thus, have not met their burden.

Accordingly, the Defendant Askari’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Reza Askari, M.D.

Moving Party is ordered to give notice.