Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV06894, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV06894    Hearing Date: November 15, 2024    Dept: 29

Campbell v. Joseph
22STCV06894
Plaintiff’s motion to vacate dismissal

Tentative

The motion is granted.

Background

On February 24, 2022, Macy Lea Campbell (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Nathaniel Joseph, Keante James Hoyett, and Leilani Fuller, and Does 1 through 30, asserting causes of action for negligence and negligent entrustment arising out of an alleged automobile accident on March 30, 2020.

 

On filing, the case was assigned a Final Status Conference date of August 10, 2023, and a trial date of August 24, 2023.

 

Plaintiff did not appear at the Final Status Conference or trial.  Based on Plaintiff’s failure to appear at trial, the Court dismissed the entire action without prejudice on August 24, 2023.

 

On October 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion to vacate the order of dismissal.

No opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides for both discretionary and mandatory relief from dismissal.

As to discretionary relief, the statute states: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  (Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subd. (b).)

The statute also provides for mandatory relief from dismissal, default, or default judgment:

“whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect … unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” 

(Ibid.)

 

A request for discretionary relief under section 473, subdivision (b), must be made (subject to certain exceptions) “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months.”  (Ibid.)  A request for mandatory relief must be made within six months.  (Ibid.)

After the expiration of the six month period of section 473, subdivision (b) (or when for any other reason there is no statutory basis to obtain relief), courts have “the inherent authority to vacate a default and default judgment on equitable grounds such as extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake.”  (Bae v. T.D. Service Co. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 97; see also, e.g., Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981-982.)

“Extrinsic fraud” generally involves some act that kept the party seeking relief “in ignorance of the action or proceeding” or “fraudulently prevented” the party “from presenting his claim or defense.”  (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471; see also, e.g., Bae, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 97.) 

“Extrinsic mistake” is defined broadly and encompasses “almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.”  (In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342; see also, e.g., Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 981.)  There need not necessarily be a mistake “in the strict sense.”  (Park, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 342.)  But a mistake is intrinsic, and not extrinsic, when “a party’s own negligence allows the … mistake to occur.”  (Kramer v. Traditional Escrow (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13, 29.)  Intrinsic mistakes relate to the merits of the case, such that granting relief would improperly allow a party to relitigate the case.  (Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal. 3d at pp. 472-73.)  Examples of intrinsic mistakes, or intrinsic fraud, are perjury, failing to complete discovery, or failing to prepare adequately for trial.  (Ibid.)

Courts apply a stringent, three-part test for equitable relief pursuant to the inherent authority of the court.  A party seeking relief on equitable grounds must show (1) “a satisfactory excuse”; (2) “a meritorious case”; and (3) "diligence in seeking” relief.  (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 982; see also, e.g., Kramer, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 29; 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (2024), ¶ 5:435.)

Discussion

Plaintiff requests the dismissal of her complaint be vacated on equitable grounds.  The Court applies the three-part stringent test for equitable relief set forth in the case law.

 

First, the Court finds that this case fits comfortably within the broad definition of extrinsic mistake.  Because of external circumstances unrelated to the process of the case, Plaintiff’s attorney lost track of the trial date.  (Aziev Decl., ¶¶ 9-11.)  This had the effect of depriving Plaintiff of the opportunity to litigate her case on the merits.  This is a classic case of neglect – and specifically excusable neglect.  This was not an intrinsic mistake or the result of any negligence by Plaintiff herself.  (See Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 471-473; Manson, Iver York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 47; see also Sporn v. Home Depot USA (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1301 [referring to papers that were “lost, stolen, forwarded to the wrong person, or eaten by the dog”].)  Extrinsic mistake is a satisfactory excuse supporting relief on equitable grounds. 

 

Second, without making any ruling on the merits, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence for the Court to conclude that she has a potentially meritorious case.  (Aziev Decl., ¶¶ 1-3, 12.)

 

Third, the Court finds that Plaintiff acted diligently in seeking relief once the mistake was discovered.  (Aziev Decl., ¶ 11.)

 

Accordingly, the motion is granted.

 

Conclusion

 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to vacate, on equitable grounds, the dismissal of this action.

 

The Court VACATES the Order of Dismissal Entered on August 24, 2023.

 

The Court SETS a TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE in approximately 45 days.

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice.