Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV09022, Date: 2023-12-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV09022 Hearing Date: February 15, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion for Determination of Good Faith
Settlement filed by Defendant Abel Reyna.
Tentative
The motion is denied without prejudice.
Background
This case arises out of a
vehicle collision that occurred on March 13, 2021. On March 14, 2022, Piruza
Balyan, as an individual and as successor in interest to Decedent, Edgar
Akopovich Kocharyan (“Plaintiff”), filed a complaint against the City of Log
Angeles, County of Los Angeles, Abel Reyna, and Does 1 to 100, asserting causes
of action for Statutory Liability/Dangerous Condition of Public Property; Negligence
and Motor Vehicle Negligence; and Wrongful Death.
No answers have been filed.
On January 10, 2024,
Defendant Abel Reyna (“Reyna”) filed a motion for determination of good faith
settlement.
According to the proof of
service filed with the motion, only counsel for Plaintiff was served.
No opposition has been
filed.
Legal Standard
In a case involving two or more alleged joint
tortfeasors, a party may seek a court order under Code of Civil Procedure
section 877.6 determining that a settlement between the plaintiff and one or
more of the alleged tortfeasors is in good faith. A judicial determination of
good faith “bar[s] any other joint tortfeasor … from any further claims against
the settling tortfeasor … for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or
comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”
(Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(c).)
In evaluating whether a settlement has been
made in good faith, courts consider the following factors, as set forth by the
California Supreme Court in the landmark case Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d
488:
1) “a rough approximation of
plaintiffs’ total recovery”;
2) “the settlor’s proportionate
liability”;
3)
“the amount paid in settlement”;
4) “the allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs”;
5) “a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement
than he would if he were found liable after a trial”;
6) the settling party's “financial
conditions and insurance policy limits”;
7) any evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to
injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”
(Id. at 499.) “Practical
considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of
information available at the time of settlement.” (Ibid.)
The “good faith” concept in Code of Civil
Procedure section 877.6 is a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts
the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of
nonsettling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced. (Rankin v. Curtis
(1986) 183 Cal. App. 3d 939, 945.) Accordingly, under Tech-Bilt, the party asserting the lack of “good faith” may meet
this burden by demonstrating that the settlement is so far "out of the
ballpark" as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the
statute. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.) Such a demonstration
would establish that the proposed settlement was not a “settlement made in good
faith” within the terms of section 877.6. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court explained that Code of
Civil Procedure section 877.6 is designed to further two equitable policies:
1)
encouragement of settlements; and
2) equitable
allocation of costs among joint tortfeasors.
(Ibid.)
Those policies would not be served by an
approach which emphasizes one to the virtual exclusion of the other. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, a settlement will not be found in good faith unless the amount is
reasonable in light of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of
liability. (Std. Pac. of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp. (1986) 176 Cal.
App. 3d 577, 589.) Or, as the California Supreme Court has stated, a
“defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a
reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling
defendant’s liability to be.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.)
When a motion seeking a determination under
Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is not opposed, the burden on the moving
parties to show that the settlement was made in good faith is slight. (City
of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261
[holding that a “barebones motion” including a declaration setting forth “a
brief background of the case is sufficient”].)
When a good faith motion is contested,
however, the moving parties have the initial burden of producing evidence in
support of the requested good faith determination. (Id. at pp. 1261-1262.)
“Section 877.6 and Tech-Bilt require an evidentiary showing, through expert
declarations or other means, that the proposed settlement is within the
reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.” (Mattco Forge v.
Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1351.) “Substantial
evidence” is required. (Id. at p. 1352.) A declaration from a settling
defendant’s attorney that states, in conclusory fashion, that the client has little,
or no share of the liability may not be sufficient. (Greshko v. County of
Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834-35; see also 3 Weil & Brown,
California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023)
¶¶ 12:774, 12:872-873.)
The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the
party opposing the good faith determination.
The “party asserting a lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof
on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
877.6(d); see also 3 Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:875.)
Discussion
On March 13,
2021, Reyna allegedly was speeding and lost control of the vehicle he was
driving and collided with Edgar Akopovich Kocharyan (“Decedent”), was standing
in a parking lot. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Decedent died at the scene of the accident.
(Id.) Plaintiff seeks damages for economic damages, non-economic
damages, loss of Decedent’s training and guidance, funeral and burial expenses,
special and general damages, incidental damages, consequential damages, pre-
and post-judgment interest, and cost of suit. (Id., Prayer for Relief.)
Reyna
requests the settlement made among him, Hellen Luna (the owner of the vehicle
he was driving), and Plaintiff be determined to have been made in good faith. Pursuant
to the settlement agreement, Reyna and Ms. Luna have paid or will pay Plaintiff
$20,000, their full insurance policy limit, in exchange for full releases.
It is
unclear, however, what Reyna is seeking in this motion. An order that a
settlement has been made in good faith binds only those who are served with the
motion; those individuals or entities do not necessarily need to be named parties,
but the moving party must give notice of the motion to known non-settling joint
tortfeasors who are “likely” defendants.” (See Singer v. Super. Ct.
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 875, 895.) Importantly, section 877.6, subdivision (c), does
not operate to bar indemnity or contribution claims by individuals or entities
who are not given notice. (Gackstetter v. Frawley (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th
1257, 1273; Britz v. Dow Chemical Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 177, 181;
see also 3 Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:860.)
Here, Reyna
has given notice only to Plaintiff, and not to any non-settling joint tortfeasors.
As a result, the order that Reyna seeks would bind no one. It would be nothing
more than an improper advisory, abstract opinion.
Accordingly,
the motion is denied without prejudice. If Reyna seeks a good faith settlement
determination in the future, Reyna must serve at least one non-settling joint
tortfeasor.
Conclusion
The
Court DENIES the motion for determination of good faith settlement without
prejudice.
Moving
Party is ordered to give notice.