Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV11406, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT  (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2)

Communicating with the Court Staff re the Tentative Ruling 1. Please notify the courtroom staff by email not later than 9:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion. The email address is SSCDEPT29@lacourt.org. Please do not use any other email address. 2. You must include the other parties on the email by "cc." 3. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the Subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENT UNLESS BOTH SIDES SUBMIT ON THE TENTATIVE.  4. Include the words "SUBMISSION BUT WILL APPEAR" if you submit, but one or both parties will nevertheless appear. 5. For other communications with Court Staff a. OFF-CALENDAR should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed to have a matter placed off-calendar. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) date of proceeding. b. CASE SETTLED should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed that the case has settled for all purposes. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) whether notice of settlement/dismissal documents have been filed; (c) if (b) has not been done, a date one year from the date of your email which will be a date set by the court for an OSC for dismissal of the case. c. STIPULATION should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have stipulated that a matter before the court can be postponed. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) what proceeding is agreed to be postponed e.g. Trial, FSC; (c) the agreed-upon future date; (d) whether all parties waive notice if the Court informs all counsel/parties that the agreed-upon date is satisfactory. This communication should be used only for matters that are agreed to be postponed and not for orders shortening time. 6. PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT STAFF DEAL ONLY WITH SCHEDULING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS AND DO NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF ANY CASE. (UPDATED 6/17/2020) 
IMPORTANT:  In light of the COVID-19 emergency, the Court encourages all parties to appear remotely.  The capacity in the courtroom is extremely limited.  The Court appreciates the cooperation of counsel and the litigants. 
ALSO NOTE:  If the moving party does not contact the court to submit on the tentative and does not appear (either remotely or in person), the motion will be taken off calendar.  THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL NOT BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.

Case Number: 22STCV11406    Hearing Date: June 4, 2025    Dept: 29

Cadle v. City of Los Angeles
22STCV11406
Motion to Enforce Settlement filed by Plaintiffs Morna Cadle and Linda Cox.

Tentative

The motion for entry of judgment is denied.

The request for sanctions is denied without prejudice.

Background

On April 4, 2022, Morna Cadle and Linda Cox (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against City of Los Angeles (“City”), County of Los Angeles, LAPD Officer Armen Shahinian, and Does 1 through 100 for negligence, vicarious liability, and negligence (permissive user) arising out of a vehicle accident on November 10, 2021 on Vanowen Street near Sylmar Avenue in Los Angeles.

On January 23, 2023, City filed an answer.

On July 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement of the entire case.

On May 8, 2025, Plaintiffs filed this motion to enforce the settlement and enter judgment against City under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.  Plaintiffs also seek sanctions.

No opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides in relevant part:

“(a) If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.

(b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following:

(1) The party.

(2) An attorney who represents the party.

(3) If an insurer is defending and indemnifying a party to the action, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the party’s behalf.  This paragraph does not apply if the party whom the insurer is defending would be liable under the terms of the settlement for any amount above the policy limits.”

Because of the summary nature of a proceeding to enforce a settlement agreement under section 664.6, and because settlement of a lawsuit implicates a substantial right of a litigant, strict compliance with the statutory requirements is required.  (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985; Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.)  Before the Legislature amended the statute effective as of January 1, 2021, “parties” under section 664.6 meant the litigants themselves, not their attorneys.  (See Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586.)  In any event, however, for a settlement agreement to be enforceable under section 664.6, all “parties” (as that term is defined in the statute) must sign, including the party seeking to enforce the agreement and the party against whom enforcement is sought.  (J.B.B. Investment Partners, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.) 

If the settlement leaves material terms wanting, or confusing, the settlement cannot be enforced through the section 664.6 summary proceeding.  (Compare Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445 [finding parties never agreed to the means that were material to the settlement, including what role an independent manager was to play regarding management of a trust property, and whether the trust should be qualified as a QTIP, thereby indicating that there was no meeting of the minds as to the material terms] with Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355 [holding trial court’s decision to extend closing date for vendor’s agreement to repurchase house did not create a material term and was within court’s power because the closing date had passed by the time the motions came on for hearing and a new closing date was necessary to grant the relief sought by both parties].)  Nonetheless, when the “parties intend that an agreement be binding, the fact that a more formal agreement must be prepared and executed does not alter the validity of the agreement.” (Blix St. Records, Inc. v. Cassidy (2010) 191 CA4th 39, 48.) 

It is possible for parties to have an enforceable settlement agreement that is not subject to the summary enforcement proceedings of section 664.6 (including, for example, an enforceable oral agreement to settle or an agreement that is signed by an authorized representative who has the power to bind the party but is not listed in subdivision (b) of the statute).  In those circumstances, a party seeking to enforce the agreement must proceed through other means, such as a separate civil action, an amendment to the answer to add a new affirmative defense, and/or a motion for summary judgment, rather than through the summary procedures of section 664.6.  (See generally Weddington Productions v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809 [“Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.”].)

In ruling on a motion brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, the court acts as a trier of fact.  The court may consider any admissible evidence, including documents, declarations, and oral testimony.  (Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533; 3 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (2024), ¶¶ 12:977-12:978.6.)

Discussion

On March 28, 2024, Plaintiffs and City agreed to settle this action in exchange for a payment of $120,000. (Ghozland Decl., ¶ 2.) At City’s direction, Plaintiffs executed and delivered to City a signed release; Plaintiffs also filed a notice of settlement and, pursuant to the agreement with City, refrained from any further litigation.  (Id., ¶¶ 3-4 & Exh. A.)  

More than fourteen months have passed, but City has failed to pay Plaintiffs the agreed upon settlement amount.  (Id., ¶ 5.)  Despite representations by City’s counsel that the “paperwork” for approval had been submitted and was “in process” dating back to July 2024, counsel for City informed the Court on May 7, 2025, that the settlement had not yet been submitted to the City Council for approval.  (Id., ¶¶ 6-11.)

Plaintiffs now move for entry of judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

The Court must deny this motion.  Plaintiffs have not produced a written settlement signed by both sides or any other writing signed by a representative of City constituting an unconditional agreement to the settlement terms.  This is required.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a); see also J.B.B. Investment Partners, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.)  Rather, the release is signed only by Plaintiffs, and the email correspondence with counsel for City reflects that the settlement agreement was conditioned on approval through the standard process, including (ultimately) approval by the City Council.

Whether the extraordinary delay by City constitutes a separate, compensable breach of contract is not before the Court and cannot be adjudicated through a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

Plaintiffs also seeks sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.  That request is denied without prejudice on procedural grounds, as Plaintiffs have improperly combined the request for sanctions under section 128.5 with their motion to enforce the settlement.  Under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, subdivision (f)(1)(A), a “motion for sanctions under this section shall be made separately from other motions or requests.”  In addition, and independently, Plaintiffs do not provide sufficient evidence to calculate an amount of monetary sanctions under section 128.5, which are to be measured by “the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a).)

Conclusion

The Court DENIES the motion to enforce the settlement and enter judgment filed by Plaintiffs Morna Cadle and Linda Cox.

The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions.

Moving Party is ORDERED to give notice.