Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV11450, Date: 2024-11-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV11450 Hearing Date: November 14, 2024 Dept: 29
Ramos v. MSR Aero Properties, LLC
22STCV11450
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
TENTATIVE
The
motion of Defendant AIM Aero Properties, LLC for summary judgment is granted.
Background
On April 5, 2022, Jose Ramos
(“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against MSR Aero Properties, LLC (“MSR Aero”) and
Does 1 through 10, asserting causes of action for general negligence and
premises liability arising out of a slip and fall on April 10, 2020.
On September 6, 2022, MSR Aero filed
an answer.
On November 22, 2023, the Court,
at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed all causes of action in the complaint
asserted against MSR Aero.
On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed
a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In
the FAC, Plaintiff asserted causes of action for general negligence and
premises liability against AIM Aero Properties, LLC (“Defendant”) and Does 2
through 10.
On June 11, 2024, Defendant filed
an answer to Plaintiff’s FAC.
On the same day, June 11, 2024, Defendant filed
this motion for summary judgment. The hearing was initially set for September
13, 2024.
On August 30, 2024, Plaintiff applied ex parte
to continue the hearing date so that certain discovery could be completed. The Court granted the application and continued
the hearing to November 14, 2024.
No opposition has been filed.
Legal Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ...
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
A plaintiff or
cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has
met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show
that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply
“rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Request
for Judicial Notice
Defendant
requests Judicial notice of Plaintiff’s FAC, excerpts from the lease between
Dynamo Aviatio, Inc. and Defendant, and Plaintiff’s response to Defendant MSR
Aero Properties, LLC’s Request for Admissions.
As each
of these documents is attached to the Declaration of John R. Hanson, and no
objection has been asserted to the authentication of these documents by Mr. Hanson
(and declarant Christopher Rabadi also authenticates the lease agreement), the
request for judicial notice is denied on the ground that it is
unnecessary. The FAC, the lease
excerpts, and the discovery responses are part of the summary judgment record
as Exhibits A, C, and D to the Hanson Declaration.
Discussion
Plaintiff
was injured when he slipped and fell at his workplace on April 10, 2020. (FAC, pp. 4-5; Defendant’s Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 1.)
The accident occurred at 9601 Mason Avenue, Unit A, in Chatsworth (the “Premises”). (FAC, pp. 4-5; DSUMF, No. 3.) Plaintiff was employed by non-party Dynamo
Aviation, Inc. (“Dynamo”). (DSUMF, No. 2;
Rabadi Decl., ¶ 6; see also FAC, pp. 4-5.)
Defendant
owned the Premises. (DSUMF, No. 3.) Defendant and Dynamo entered into a ten-year commercial
lease agreement, effective January 15, 2020, in which Dynamo leased the Premises
from Defendant. (DSUMF, Nos. 4-6; Hanson
Decl., Exh. C.). The lease delegated the
responsibility to maintain and repair the Premises to Dynamo. (DSUMF, No. 7; Hanson Decl., Exh. C, ¶ 32;
Rabadi Decl., ¶ 5.) During the lease,
Defendant retained only a limited right of entry into the Premises upon Dynamo’s
default. (DSUMF, No. 8; Hanson Decl.,
Exh. C, ¶ 20; see also Rabadi Decl., ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff
alleges that he slipped on a puddle of water that had accumulated on the floor due
to a leak in the roof of the Premises.
(FAC, pp. 4-5.) Neither Dynamo
nor Defendant was aware of any roof leak prior to Plaintiff’s accident. (DSUMF, Nos. 11-13; Rabadi Decl., ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff
asserts causes of action for general negligence and premises liability against
Defendant.
The basic
elements of a cause of action for negligence and for premises liability are the
same: (1) the existence of a legal duty;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown
v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions
for the court.¿¿(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; Annocki¿v.
Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.)
Defendant, in this motion for summary
judgment, make one argument: that as a commercial landlord, it had no duty to remedy
an allegedly dangerous condition as to which it had no notice.
The general rule
governing duty is set forth in Civil Code section 1714: “Everyone is
responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter
has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or
herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) This establishes what the California
Supreme Court has described as the “default rule” that every person has a legal
duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of
others.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.)
Those who own,
possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in
managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.
(Annocki¿v.
Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If
a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise
ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their
[customers’] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the
harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)
“It is well established in
California that although a [property] owner is not an insurer of the safety of
its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in
keeping the premises reasonably safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26
Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) “A plaintiff alleging injuries based on a
dangerous condition must prove the defendant either: (1) created the dangerous
condition, or (2) knew or should have known of the dangerous condition.” (See Peralta
v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036; see also Ortega,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) “[A] defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law if the plaintiff fails to show that the dangerous condition
existed for at least a sufficient time to be discovered by ordinary care and
inspection.” (Id. at p. 1207.) “The owner must inspect the premises or
take other proper action to ascertain their condition, and if, by the exercise
of reasonable care, the owner would have discovered the condition, he is liable
for failing to correct it.” (Ibid)
Courts in California have
developed special rules that apply where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to hold a
property owner/landlord liable for a dangerous condition on leased premises:
“All landowners,
including landlords, must use reasonable care to protect people who come onto
their property. For landlords, reasonable care ordinarily involves making sure
the property is safe at the beginning of the tenancy, and repairing any hazards
the landlord learns about later. … Because a landlord has relinquished
possessory interest in the land, his or her duty of care to third parties
injured on the land is attenuated as compared with the tenant who enjoys
possession and control. Thus, before liability may be thrust on a landlord for
a third party’s injury due to a dangerous condition on the land, the plaintiff
must show that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in
question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition.”
(Stone
v. Center Trust Retail Properties (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608, 612
[citations omitted]; see also, e.g., Day v. Lupo Vine St., L.P. (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 62, 69; Garcia v. Holt (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 600, 604
[referring to this principle as a “bright line” rule]; Salinas v. Martin (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 404, 412 [same]; Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44
Cal.App.3d 504, 510 [“the public policy of this state generally has precluded a
landlord’s liability for injuries to his tenant or his tenant’s invitees from a
dangerous condition on the premises which comes into existence after the tenant
has taken possession”].)
The
duty to “see that the premises are reasonable safe” applies at the outset of a
tenancy and also at the time of an “agreement to renew a lease or relet the
premises.” (Burroughs v. Ben’s Auto Park (1945) 27 Cal.2d 449, 453-454;
see also Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134.) At least
in part, that is because on renewal (in contrast to during the lease) the
landlord has the right to enter the premises and can, without disrupting the
tenant’s occupancy, inspect the premises and remedy any dangerous condition
that is present. (Burroughs, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 454; Portillo,
supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134; see also Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210
Cal.App.3d 771, 781 [“At the time the lease is executed and upon renewal a
landlord has a right to re-enter the property, has control of the property, and
must inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous
conditions.”].)
Here, Defendant
was a commercial landlord of the Premises.
(DSUMF, No. 4.) Dynamo, the
lessee, had exclusive possession of the Premises effective as of January 15,
2020. (DSUMF, No. 4; Hanson Decl., Exh.
C; Rabadi Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.) Neither Defendant nor Dynamo, the lessee,
was aware of any roof leak prior to Plaintiff’s accident. (DSUMF, Nos. 11-13; Rabadi Decl., ¶ 7.) During the lease, Dynamo had the exclusive
duty and responsibility to maintain the Premises at its sole expense. (DSUMF, No. 7; Hanson Decl., Exh. C, ¶ 32; Rabadi
Decl., ¶ 5.)
On these facts,
Defendant had no duty to Plaintiff to address the alleged leak in the roof of
the Premises. Defendant was a landlord,
its lessee was in possession, and Defendant had no knowledge of the alleged
leak (and no right to enter the premises to fix the leak even if it had such
knowledge, which it did not).
Defendant has satisfied its initial burden on
summary judgment of showing that duty, one of the elements of each cause of action
in the FAC, “cannot be established.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2). This shifts
the burden to Plaintiff to show that there are triable issues of fact as to
duty. (Ibid.) Plaintiff has not done so, or filed any
opposition.
Accordingly, the motion is granted. Defendant has shown, on this record, that it
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Conclusion
The Court
GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Moving
Party is to give notice.