Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV14593, Date: 2024-07-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV14593 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles.
Tentative Ruling
The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Background
On May 3,
2022, Margaret Ann Gottfried (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against City of
Los Angeles (“City”), Westchester County Homeowners Association (“Westchester”),
and Does 1 to 50 for general negligence and premises liability arising out of an
incident on May 4, 2020, in which Plaintiff alleges that she tripped and fell
on a raised or broken sidewalk concrete at or near 20700 Wells Drive in
Woodland Hills.
On May 24,
2022, Westchester filed an answer to the complaint.
On June
13, 2022, City filed an answer and cross-complaint against Westchester and Roes
1 through 20. Westchester filed an answer to the cross-complaint on July 21,
2022.
On January
12, 2024, City filed this motion for summary judgment. No opposition has been
filed.
On May 14,
Westchester filed a joinder to the motion for summary judgment; the joinder was
taken off calendar on July 26.
Legal Standard
“The purpose of
the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each cause
of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment
or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting
facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
A plaintiff or
cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has
met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show
that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party opposing
a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon
the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the
specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of
material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in
favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th
384, 389.)
Discussion
In her
Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she was injured as a result of a dangerous
condition on a public sidewalk located near 20700 Wells Drive in Woodland Hills.
As
set forth in Government Code section 835, there are four elements for such a
claim:
“[A] public entity is
liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the
plaintiff establishes [1] that the property was in a dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, [2] that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous
condition, [3] that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable
risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and [4] either: (a) A
negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or¿(b) The
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition
under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”
(Gov’t
Code, § 835; see also, e.g., Tansavatdi v. City of
Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 653; Thimon v. City of Newark (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 745, 753.)
Here, City moves
for summary judgment on the grounds (1) that the defect in the sidewalk was
trivial, rather than a dangerous condition; and (2) that City did not have
actual or constructive notice of the defect.
The term “dangerous
condition” means a “condition of property that creates a substantial (as
distinguished from a minor,¿trivial¿or insignificant) risk of injury when such
property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that it¿will be used.”¿(Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a); see
also Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 754.)¿ “Public property is in a dangerous condition within the meaning of
section 835 if it is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a
way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself.” (Cordova v.
City of Los Angeles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1099, 1105.)
“The existence of a
dangerous condition ordinarily is a question of fact, but the issue may be
resolved as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.”
(Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. College Dist.¿(1984) 36 Cal.3d 799,
810; accord Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 110; Nunez
v. City of Redondo Beach (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 749, 757.)
Plaintiff has the burden of proving the
existence of a dangerous condition and each element of a cause of action under
Government Code 835. A court may not presume that there was a dangerous
condition merely because the plaintiff was injured. (Sambrano v. City of San
Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225, 241 [describing such an argument as
“reason[ing] backwards”].)
“A condition is not
dangerous within the meaning of the statute unless it creates a hazard to those
who foreseeably will use the property ... with due care. Thus, even though
it is foreseeable that persons may use public property without due care, a
public entity may not be held liable for failing to take precautions to protect
such persons.”¿(Matthews v. City of Cerritos¿(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380,
1384.) “The condition of the property involved should create a
‘substantial risk’ of injury, for an undue burden would be placed upon public
entities if they were responsible for the repair of all conditions creating any
possibility of injury however remote that possibility might be.”¿(Fredette¿v.
City of Long Beach¿(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 130, fn.5; accord Nunez,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 758.)
Government Code section 830.2 provides that a condition is not a
“dangerous condition” under the Government Claims Act:
“if the
trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff,
determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of
such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding
circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition
created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property
was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that
it would be used.”
(Gov. Code, § 830.2.) This statutory principle is sometimes
referred to as “the trivial defect doctrine.”
It is impossible to
maintain public walkways in perfect condition. (Stack, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at pp. 109-110; Nunez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 758; Kasparian
v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 26.) The
Government Claims Act is not intended to make public entities “insurers”
against injuries arising from trivial defects. (Stack, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at p. 109; Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.) Rather,
the trivial defect doctrine shields public entities from liability for
“minor, trivial, or insignificant” defects. (Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104; Kasparian, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 27.)
This is not to say that it
is impossible for a member of the public to trip, fall, and sustain injuries as
a result of a defect that is trivial. (See Nunez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 759-760.) But the duty of care of a public entity (or a private
landowner) does not extend to protecting pedestrians or other members of the
public from minor or trivial defects. (Id. at pp. 757, 759.)
“The trivial defect
doctrine is not an affirmative defense. It is an aspect of duty that a
plaintiff must plead and prove.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p.
1104; accord Nunez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.)
“In appropriate cases, the
trial court may determine ... whether a given walkway defect was trivial
as a matter of law.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104.) “‘Where
reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion—that there was no
substantial risk of injury—the issue is a question of law, properly resolved by
way of summary judgment.’” (Id. at pp. 1104-1105 (quoting Caloroso v.
Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 929).) “If, however,
the court determines that sufficient evidence has been presented so that
reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect presents a substantial
risk of injury, the court may not conclude that the defect is trivial as a
matter of law.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.)
In cases involving
allegedly dangerous conditions on a sidewalk or other walkway, courts generally
begin their analysis by considering the size of the defect. The size of the
height differential, rise, or other defect is in many cases the “most
important” factor. (Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 111; see also,
e.g., Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105 [stating that size of
defect “may be one of the most relevant factors”].) As the Court of Appeal has
explained, however, “[i]n determining whether a given walkway defect is trivial
as a matter of law, the court should not rely solely upon the
size of the defect.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105 [emphasis
in original].) “[A] tape measure alone cannot be used to determine whether the
defect was trivial.” (Caloroso, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 927.) Rather,
a “court should consider other circumstances which might have rendered the
defect a dangerous condition at the time of the accident.” (Huckey,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.)
“These other circumstances
or factors include whether there were any broken pieces or jagged edges in the
area of the defect, whether any dirt, debris or other material obscured a
pedestrian’s view of the defect, the plaintiff’s knowledge of the area, whether
the accident occurred at night or in an unlighted area, the weather at the time
of the accident, and whether the defect has caused any other accidents.” (Ibid.)
In addition, the Court may also take into account, as part of its consideration
of the totality of the circumstances, whether the defect was open and obvious to
a person exercising due care and whether there were signs warning a person
acting with due care about the danger. (Fredette, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 131-132.)
“In sum,
‘[a] court should decide whether a defect may be dangerous only after
considering all of the circumstances surrounding the accident that might make
the defect more [or less] dangerous than its size alone would suggest.’” (Huckey,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105 [quoting Caloroso, supra, 122
Cal.App.4th at p. 927]; accord Nunez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.)
Here, City argues the defect in the sidewalk is trivial as a matter of
law. The height of the defect is, at its
maximum, one and three eighths of an inch.
(Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [DSUMF], No.
14.) The accident occurred during
daylight hours (at approximately 8:30 am) on what Plaintiff herself described
in her deposition as a “beautiful day.”
(DSUMF, Nos. 1, 3.) There is no
evidence of any obstruction of the defect.
(DSUMF, Nos. 4, 8-11.) There is
no evidence that there had been prior accidents at the site of the defect. (DSUMF, No. 20.)
The Court has reviewed
all of the admissible evidence in the record.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court concludes that City
has met its initial burden on summary judgment of presenting facts to show that
the element of the existence of a dangerous condition in Plaintiff’s claim
under Government Code section 835 “cannot be established.”
(Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
This shifts the
burden to Plaintiff to show that there is a triable issue of material fact as
to the existence of a dangerous condition.
(Ibid.) Plaintiff has not filed
any opposition to the motion and so has not done so.
Accordingly, the
Court concludes that there is no triable issue as to any material fact on the element
of the existence of a dangerous condition.
City has shown that, as a matter of law, the condition was a trivial
defect, and that therefore it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
City’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
Conclusion
The Court
GRANTS the motion of Defendant City of Los Angeles for summary judgment.
Moving party is to
give notice.