Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV15798, Date: 2025-04-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV15798    Hearing Date: April 23, 2025    Dept: 29

Yadegar v. Sarathchandra
22STCV15798
Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment

Tentative

The motion is denied.

Background

On May 11, 2022, Farid Yadegar (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Panditha Sarathchandra (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 20 for motor vehicle negligence arising out of an accident on May 14, 2020.  At the time the complaint was filed, Plaintiff was representing himself in pro per.

On November 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement of entire case.

On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a substitution of attorney, with Igal Saidian taking over as counsel.

On February 2, 2024, Defendant filed an answer.

On May 15, 2024, the Court set trial for April 28, 2025.

On August 2, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to compel and ordered Plaintiff to respond to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production (served on March 6, 2024) within 30 days.

Plaintiff did not comply with that order.

On October 25, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions, finding that the failure to respond to discovery was willful and prejudicial.  The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s causes of action against Defendant (and subsequently dismissed, without prejudice, the causes of action against the Doe defendants).

On November 4, 2024, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion to set aside the order granting the motion for terminating sanctions and the resulting judgment. Defendant filed an opposition on April 9, and Plaintiff filed a reply on April 16.

This case was initially assigned to Department 30.  On May 13, 2024, when Department 30 closed, the case was reassigned to Department 32 (Hon. Anne Hwang).  Following entry of judgment, Department 32 closed; when this motion was filed, the case was reassigned to Department 29.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides for both discretionary and mandatory relief from dismissal.

As to discretionary relief, the statute states: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  (Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subd. (b).) Where such an application for discretionary relief is made, the motion must be accompanied by a copy of the answer or pleading proposed to be filed; “otherwise the application shall not be granted.”  (Ibid.)  A request for discretionary relief must be made (subject to certain exceptions) “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months.”  (Ibid.) 

The statute also provides for mandatory relief from dismissal, default, or default judgment:

“whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect … unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” 

(Ibid.)

A request for mandatory relief must be made within six months.  (Ibid.)

Discussion

Plaintiff moves to set aside the order granting the motion for terminating sanctions (dated October 25, 2024) and the resulting judgment (entered November 4, 2024).

The Court (Hwang, J.) granted Defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions in October 2024 after twice sanctioning Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel for misuse of the discovery process (in July and August 2024); after issuing an order in August 2024 compelling Plaintiff to respond to Defendant’s form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production, all served in March 2024; and after Plaintiff violated that order.  The Court applied an escalating approach to sanctions, but Plaintiff remained in violation of his obligations under the Civil Discovery Act.  The Court found that Plaintiff’s ongoing misuse of the discovery process, stretching back to early April 2024 and continuing for a prolonged period of more than six months, was willful and prejudicial and dismissed Plaintiff’s case.  Other than providing some responses to requests for admission, Plaintiff had as of October 2024 provided essentially no discovery responses at all.

The Court understands that Plaintiff’s counsel endured horrible family circumstances in August 2024.  (Saidain Decl., ¶¶ 1-2.)  The Court understands that due to a calendaring error, Plaintiff’s counsel was not aware of the correct date for the hearing on the motion for terminating sanctions – and did not learn of the correct date until the day before the hearing.  (Id., ¶¶ 3-9.)

This was an attorney “mistake” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

But the order granting terminating sanctions, the resulting dismissal, and the resulting judgment, were not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake.  The Court did not enter the order for terminating sanctions based on the failure of Plaintiff’s counsel to file an opposition to the motion.  Plaintiff’s counsel appeared on October 25, 2024, and was in fact heard.  The Court granted the request for terminating sanctions because of the long pattern of discovery abuse, beginning in early April 2024 and continuing through late October 2024.

Because the attorney’s mistake was not the cause of the dismissal, the request for relief under section 473, subdivision (b) is denied.

The Court need not reach, and does not reach, Defendant’s other arguments in opposition to the set-aside motion.

Conclusion

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order granting the motion for terminating sanctions (dated October 25, 2024) and the resulting judgment (entered November 4, 2024).

Counsel for Defendant is ordered to give notice.