Judge Steven A. Ellis, Case Number: 22STCV21034, Date: 2025-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV21034, Date: 2025-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV21034 Hearing Date: April 7, 2025 Dept: 29

Nieto v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Authority
22STCV21034
Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint

Tentative

The motion is granted.

Background

On June 28, 2022, Maria Yolanda Nieto (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Los Angeles Metropolitan Authority (“Metro”), Andrew Peterson (“Peterson”), Hermanto NG (“Ng”), and Does 1 through 25, asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence arising from an accident on August 28, 2021.

On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) as Doe 1.

On December 4, 2023, Uber filed an answer to the complaint.

On December 7, 2023, Ng filed an answer to the complaint.

On January 3, 2024, the Court sustained Metro’s demurrer, with leave to amend.

On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence (including under Government Code section 815.2) and general negligence.

On February 26, 2024, Ng filed an answer to the FAC.

On February 28, 2024, Uber filed an answer to the FAC.

On June 14, 2024, the Court overruled the demurrer of Metro and Peterson and granted in part (with leave to amend) the motion to strike of Metro and Peterson.

On August 9, 2024, Metro and Peterson filed an answer to the FAC.

On March 4, 2025, Metro and Peterson filed this motion for leave to file a cross-complaint against Ng.

Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 10 and a supplemental declaration in opposition to the motion on March 18.

Ng filed an opposition on March 24.

Metro and Peterson filed replies on March 28.

Legal Standard

The Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes between compulsory and permissive cross-complaints.

A compulsory cross-complaint, under Code of Civil Procedure section 426.30, is one that asserts (1) a “related cause of action”; (2) that a party against whom a “complaint” has been filed and served has against the “plaintiff”; and (3) that exists as of the time the answer to the “complaint” is served. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a).)

As used in section 426.30, a “related cause of action” is defined as “a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c).) “Complaint” is defined to include a cross-complaint, and “Plaintiff” is defined as “a person who files a complaint or cross-complaint.” (Id., subds. (a) & (b).)

Subject to the exceptions set forth by statute, if a party fails to assert fails to assert a related cause of action against the plaintiff that exists as of the time the party answers the complaint, “such party may not thereafter in any other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause of action not pleaded.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a).)

A permissive cross-complaint, in contrast, may include a much broader group of pleadings. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 428.10, in a permissive cross-complaint a party may assert an unrelated cause of action “against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.10, subd. (a).) Alternatively, in a permissive cross-complaint a party may assert a “cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such a person is already party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.” (Id., subd. (b).) Cross-complaints for contribution or indemnity against new parties fall within the definition of a permissive cross-complaint in section 428.10.

A party must file a compulsory cross-complaint at the same time as (or before) the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a).) If a party fails to do so, and then later on seeks leave to file the cross-complaint, the court “after notice to the adverse party, shall grant, upon such terms as may be just to the parties, leave to amend the pleading, or to file the cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the cause acted in good faith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.50.) The “good faith” standard must “be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action.” (Ibid.)

A party must file a permissive cross-complaint before the court has set a date for trial, or, if the causes of action in the cross-complaint are asserted against “any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her,” at or before the party files the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50, subds. (a) & (b).) If a party fails to do so, and then later on seeks leave to file the cross-complaint, the court may grant leave “in the interests of justice.” (Id., subd. (c).)

Discussion

Metro moves for leave to file a cross-complaint against Ng. (Peterson is also identified as a moving party, but the proposed cross-complaint, attached to the moving papers, asserts causes of action by Metro only, not Peterson.)

The Court begins with a threshold issue.

All parties assume that the proposed cross-complaint is compulsory, subject to forfeiture or waiver if it is not timely asserted. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30.) But the proposed cross-complaint is not compulsory; it is permissive.

As set forth above, under Code of Civil Procedure section 426.30, subdivision (a), a cross-complaint is compulsory if it: (1) asserts a “related cause of action”; (2) that a party against whom a “complaint” has been filed and served has against the “plaintiff”; and (3) that exists as of the time the answer to the “complaint” is served. As is relevant here, the term “complaint” includes a cross-complaint and the term “plaintiff” includes any party who filed a complaint or cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subds. (a) & (b).)

Here, Metro seeks leave to file a cross-complaint against Ng. Ng is not a “plaintiff” within the meaning of section 426.30: he has not filed a complaint or a cross-complaint in this action.

Accordingly, the proposed cross-complaint is permissive, and the “interests of justice” standard applies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50, subd. (c).)

On this record, the Court finds that allowing the filing of the proposed cross-complaint at this time is in the interests of justice. The causes of action asserted in the proposed cross-complaint arise out of the same accident as the causes of action in the FAC. The interests of efficiency and judicial economy are served by allowing the resolution of all claims between the parties involving this accident in a single proceeding.

Given the liberal policy in allowing amended pleadings and cross-complaints and the close relationship between the claims in the complaint and those in the proposed cross-complaint, the motion is granted.

In granting the motion for leave, the Court is not expressing any views on the merits of the causes of action in the proposed cross-complaint or of the defenses thereto.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Metro’s motion for leave to file the proposed cross-complaint.

The Court GRANTS Metro leave to file the cross-complaint attached to the moving papers by no later than April 17, 2025.

Moving Party to give notice.