Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV23574, Date: 2023-08-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV23574 Hearing Date: October 3, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
The Motion
to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by Defendants Chrysalis Center and Rickey
Tyrone McPherson is GRANTED in part.
Both
parties’ requests for sanctions are denied.
Background
This
action arises out of a collision between an automobile and a pedestrian. Anna
Ruth Bermejo (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she was hit by a vehicle driven by
Rickey Tyrone McPherson (spelled “McQuerson” in the Complaint but “McPherson”
in the answer) on August 24, 2020 near Ardmore Street in the City of Los
Angeles. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1 & 11.) Plaintiff alleges that the accident
occurred while McPherson was acting within the course and scope of work for his
employer, Nonprofits United and The Chrysalis Center and that the vehicle was
owned by The Chrysalis Center. (Id., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff then filed her
Complaint alleging three causes of action on July 20, 2022.
Currently
before the Court is a dispute regarding Defendants’ Request For Production of
Documents No. 6, which asks for Plaintiff’s “cell phone records spanning 1 hour
before the accident to 1 hour after the accident.” Defendants filed a motion to
compel (and request for sanctions on May 25, Plaintiff filed an opposition (and
request for sanctions) on July 24, and Defendants filed a reply on July 27. An
informal discovery conference was held on September 8. The dispute was not
resolved.
Legal
Standard
The propounding party may bring motions to compel
further responses to interrogatories or requests for production if it believes
(1) the responses received are evasive, or (2) incomplete, or (3) if the
objections raised are meritless or too general. (CCP §§ 2030.300(a),
2031.310(a).) A respondent has the burden to justify objections in response to
a motion filed to compel further responses. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) On a motion to compel further responses
to a document request, the propounding party must show “good cause” for the
request. (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1). The court shall impose a monetary sanction
under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person,
or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further
response to interrogatories or a document request, unless it finds that the one
subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §§ 2030.300(d),
2031.310(h).)
Discussion
Defendants argue
(in summary) that there is good cause to order the production of the requested documents–
Plaintiff’s cell phone records for a period of two hours – so that Defendants
can assess whether Plaintiff was on the phone and distracted at the time of the
accident.
Plaintiffs
argue (in summary) that the request is an unwarranted invasion of Plaintiff’s
privacy under the circumstances, including what Plaintiff considers to be clear
evidence of Defendant’s liability.
California’s
Constitutional right to privacy protects against the unwarranted, compelled
disclosure of various private or sensitive information regarding one’s personal
life.¿ (Britt v. Superior Court (1978)20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.) In Williams
v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, and other cases, the California Supreme
Court has established “a framework for evaluating potential invasions of
privacy.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.) First, a party
asserting a privacy right must establish “a legally protected privacy interest,
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances,
and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Id., citing Hill,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 35-37.) In response, the party seeking the
information may raise “whatever legitimate and important countervailing
interests disclosure serves,” and “the party seeking protection may identify
feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that
would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Id., citing Hill, supra, 7
Cal.4th at pp. 37-40.) The court must then “balance these competing
considerations.” (Ibid.) The party seeking the information need not,
however, establish a “compelling interest” unless the disclosure would be “an
obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.” (Id.
at p. 556.)
First, under
the Williams and Hill framework, a party objecting to discovery
must establish a legally protected privacy interest and a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Here, Plaintiff has done so. Plaintiff’s cell phone records
are protected by the right to privacy, and she has an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in these records. Compelled disclosure of the
requested documents would constitute a serious intrusion into Plaintiff’s right
to privacy.
At this point,
under Williams and Hill, the party seeking the information
must identify the “legitimate and important countervailing interests” that
disclosure would serve. For example, the party seeking the information may
attempt to show that the discovery is “directly relevant” to the claims or
defenses in dispute and is “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Lantz
v. Super. Ct. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854.) Here, Defendants have done
so. Even if it is true, as Plaintiff contends, that Defendant is primarily
responsible for the accident (and of course the Court makes no finding in that
regard), the evidence sought is directly relevant to the issue of comparative
negligence. Indeed, although in this case Defendants are not required to show a
“compelling interest” in the disclosure, they have done so.
Plaintiff has not identified any feasible
alternatives that would serve the same interests and diminish the loss of
privacy.
Finally, under
the framework set out in Hill and reaffirmed in Williams, the
Court must balance the “competing considerations” of the serious intrusion into
Plaintiff’s privacy and Defendant’s legitimate need for the information. This
balancing of competing considerations is necessarily a difficult and delicate
task, and it is particularly challenging here as the Court does not know what
the requested records will reveal: it may be, for example, that Plaintiff was
not on her cell phone at the time of the accident. But some uncertainty is inherent
in the process, as discovery is about learning what the facts are.
On balance, the
Court finds that some compelled disclosure is appropriate, but not the full
scope of what Defendants request. As the issue in dispute is whether Plaintiff
was on her phone and potentially distracted at the time of the accident, the
Court will GRANT the motion in part and limit the compelled disclosure to the
time period beginning at 20 minutes before the accident and ending 20 minutes
after the accident.
The Court
DENIES both parties’ requests for sanctions. The motion is granted in part and
denied in part, and as to the arguments made that were unsuccessful, the Court
finds that the unsuccessful party acted with substantial justification.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendants’
motion to compel a further response to Request for Production No. 6 is GRANTED
in part.
Plaintiff is ORDERED
to produce responsive documents within her possession, custody, or control to
Defendants within 30 days of notice of this order, limited to the time period beginning
at 20 minutes before the accident and ending 20 minutes after the accident.
Both parties’ requests
for sanctions are DENIED.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice.