Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV23574, Date: 2023-08-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV23574    Hearing Date: October 3, 2023    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

 

The Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by Defendants Chrysalis Center and Rickey Tyrone McPherson is GRANTED in part.

 

Both parties’ requests for sanctions are denied.

 

Background

 

This action arises out of a collision between an automobile and a pedestrian. Anna Ruth Bermejo (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she was hit by a vehicle driven by Rickey Tyrone McPherson (spelled “McQuerson” in the Complaint but “McPherson” in the answer) on August 24, 2020 near Ardmore Street in the City of Los Angeles. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1 & 11.) Plaintiff alleges that the accident occurred while McPherson was acting within the course and scope of work for his employer, Nonprofits United and The Chrysalis Center and that the vehicle was owned by The Chrysalis Center. (Id., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff then filed her Complaint alleging three causes of action on July 20, 2022.

 

Currently before the Court is a dispute regarding Defendants’ Request For Production of Documents No. 6, which asks for Plaintiff’s “cell phone records spanning 1 hour before the accident to 1 hour after the accident.” Defendants filed a motion to compel (and request for sanctions on May 25, Plaintiff filed an opposition (and request for sanctions) on July 24, and Defendants filed a reply on July 27. An informal discovery conference was held on September 8. The dispute was not resolved.

 

Legal Standard

 

The propounding party may bring motions to compel further responses to interrogatories or requests for production if it believes (1) the responses received are evasive, or (2) incomplete, or (3) if the objections raised are meritless or too general. (CCP §§ 2030.300(a), 2031.310(a).) A respondent has the burden to justify objections in response to a motion filed to compel further responses. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) On a motion to compel further responses to a document request, the propounding party must show “good cause” for the request. (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1). The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories or a document request, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §§ 2030.300(d), 2031.310(h).)  

 

Discussion

 

Defendants argue (in summary) that there is good cause to order the production of the requested documents– Plaintiff’s cell phone records for a period of two hours – so that Defendants can assess whether Plaintiff was on the phone and distracted at the time of the accident.

 

Plaintiffs argue (in summary) that the request is an unwarranted invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy under the circumstances, including what Plaintiff considers to be clear evidence of Defendant’s liability.

 

California’s Constitutional right to privacy protects against the unwarranted, compelled disclosure of various private or sensitive information regarding one’s personal life.¿ (Britt v. Superior Court (1978)20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.) In Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, and other cases, the California Supreme Court has established “a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.) First, a party asserting a privacy right must establish “a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Id., citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 35-37.) In response, the party seeking the information may raise “whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves,” and “the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Id., citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 37-40.) The court must then “balance these competing considerations.” (Ibid.) The party seeking the information need not, however, establish a “compelling interest” unless the disclosure would be “an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.” (Id. at p. 556.)

 

First, under the Williams and Hill framework, a party objecting to discovery must establish a legally protected privacy interest and a reasonable expectation of privacy. Here, Plaintiff has done so. Plaintiff’s cell phone records are protected by the right to privacy, and she has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in these records.  Compelled disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a serious intrusion into Plaintiff’s right to privacy.

 

At this point, under Williams and Hill, the party seeking the information must identify the “legitimate and important countervailing interests” that disclosure would serve. For example, the party seeking the information may attempt to show that the discovery is “directly relevant” to the claims or defenses in dispute and is “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Lantz v. Super. Ct. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854.) Here, Defendants have done so. Even if it is true, as Plaintiff contends, that Defendant is primarily responsible for the accident (and of course the Court makes no finding in that regard), the evidence sought is directly relevant to the issue of comparative negligence. Indeed, although in this case Defendants are not required to show a “compelling interest” in the disclosure, they have done so.

 

Plaintiff has not identified any feasible alternatives that would serve the same interests and diminish the loss of privacy.

 

Finally, under the framework set out in Hill and reaffirmed in Williams, the Court must balance the “competing considerations” of the serious intrusion into Plaintiff’s privacy and Defendant’s legitimate need for the information. This balancing of competing considerations is necessarily a difficult and delicate task, and it is particularly challenging here as the Court does not know what the requested records will reveal: it may be, for example, that Plaintiff was not on her cell phone at the time of the accident. But some uncertainty is inherent in the process, as discovery is about learning what the facts are.

 

On balance, the Court finds that some compelled disclosure is appropriate, but not the full scope of what Defendants request. As the issue in dispute is whether Plaintiff was on her phone and potentially distracted at the time of the accident, the Court will GRANT the motion in part and limit the compelled disclosure to the time period beginning at 20 minutes before the accident and ending 20 minutes after the accident.

 

The Court DENIES both parties’ requests for sanctions. The motion is granted in part and denied in part, and as to the arguments made that were unsuccessful, the Court finds that the unsuccessful party acted with substantial justification.

 

Conclusion

 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to compel a further response to Request for Production No. 6 is GRANTED in part.

 

Plaintiff is ORDERED to produce responsive documents within her possession, custody, or control to Defendants within 30 days of notice of this order, limited to the time period beginning at 20 minutes before the accident and ending 20 minutes after the accident.

 

Both parties’ requests for sanctions are DENIED.

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.