Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV26283, Date: 2025-01-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV26283 Hearing Date: January 6, 2025 Dept: 29
Rosas v. Dewees
22STCV26283
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jason and Viola Chapman.
Tentative
The motion is granted.
Background
On
August 15, 2022 Santos Rosas, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against David
W Dewees, Susan E Dewees, and Does 1 through 50, asserting causes of action for
negligence and premises liability arising out of an alleged trip and fall on
December 23, 2021, on property located on Goleta Street in La Verne, California.
On
December 6, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Don’s Ceilings &
Walls Incorporated (“DCWI”) as Doe 1.
On
December 21, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Jason Matthew
Chapman and Viola Chapman (collectively “Defendants”) as Does 2 and 3.
On the
same day, Plaintiff filed a request to dismiss, without prejudice, David W
Dewees and Susan E Dewees.
On March 21, 2023, Defendants filed
an answer to the complaint.
On May 9, 2023, Defendants filed a
cross-complaint against DCWI and Roes 1 through 25.
On August 17, 2023, the default of DCWI
was entered on Defendants’ cross-complaint.
On October 11, 2023, Defendants filed
a motion for summary judgment.
On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”), asserting causes of action for negligence per se, negligence
and premises liability.
On January 16, 2024, Defendants filed an answer to the
FAC.
On February 29, 2024, Defendants filed an amended motion
for summary judgment.
No opposition has been filed.
On December 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a substitution of
attorney. Plaintiff is now a self-represented litigant.
Legal
Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ...
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
A plaintiff or
cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has
met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show
that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply
“rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Discussion
Defendants
owned the home at issue, located on Goleta Street in La Verne. (FAC, ¶ 16;
Defendants’ Amended Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 1.) Defendants
hired Defendant DCWI to perform certain work on a ceiling at the home. (FAC, ¶
16; DSUMF, No. 2.)
DCWI, a
licensed contractor, hired Plaintiff, a general labor, as an employee. (FAC, ¶¶
11-12; DSUMF, Nos. 3-4.) Plaintiff was among the employees of DCWI who
performed work at Defendants’ home. (FAC, ¶ 17.)
On
December 23, 2021, Plaintiff was working at the home and tripped or fell coming
down a ladder; Plaintiff suffered serious injuries as a result. (FAC, ¶ 20;
DSUMF, Nos. 5, 11-12.)
Based on
these facts, Plaintiff asserts in the FAC three causes of action against
Defendants: (1) negligence per se; (2) negligence; and (3) premises liability.
Negligence
Per Se – Failure to Provide Workers’ Compensation
Plaintiff
alleges DCWI did not carry workers’ compensation insurance. (FAC, ¶¶ 13-14.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges, DCWI’s
licensed was automatically suspended by operation of law (specifically Business
and Professions Code section 7125.2). (See FAC, ¶ 15.) And as a result of
the suspension of DCWI’s license, Plaintiff alleges, Defendants became the
statutory employer of Plaintiff under Labor Code section 2750.5. (FAC, ¶ 18.)
As Defendants also did not carry workers’ compensation insurance, Plaintiff
alleges that he may pursue this cause of action against Defendants under Labor
Code sections 3706 through 3709, with the negligence of Defendants presumed
under section 3708. (FAC, ¶ 22.)
As
Plaintiff testified at deposition, however, the day of the accident was the
first day that Plaintiff had performed any work at Defendants’ home. (DSUMF,
No. 6.) Plaintiff had worked at the home for only approximately three hours
prior to the accident. (Ibid.)
“The law is now well settled that a worker hired by an unlicensed
contractor who in turn has been hired by a homeowner does not come within the workers' compensation system,
despite the contractor's unlicensed status, when the worker has not worked 52
hours or earned $100 within 90
days prior to the date of the injury specified in section 3352, subdivision
(h).”
(Vebr v. Culp (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1052; see
also Labor Code, § 3352, subd. (a)(8).)
This matter mirrors the facts of Vebr. In Vebr,
defendant homeowners hired a painting company that held itself out as licensed.
The company, however, failed to maintain workers’ compensation insurance, which
caused its license to be automatically revoked under Business and Professions
Code section 7125.2. The court noted “when an employee of a contractor is
injured, and the contractor is unlicensed and uninsured at the time of injury,
the injured employee's recourse may be against not only the contractor, but
also against the landowner who hired the contractor, as an additional employer.”
(241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1051–1052.) But in Vebr the court found that the
plaintiff had worked less than 52 hours in the 90 calendar days prior to the
injury.
Accordingly,
Defendants have met their initial burden, as a party moving for summary
judgment, of presenting facts to show that one or more of the elements of this
cause of action “cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) This shifts the burden to
Plaintiff to show that there are one or more triable issues of material fact. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff, however, has not opposed the motion or otherwise discharged that
burden.
Thus, Defendants have shown that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the negligence per se cause of action
in the FAC.
Negligence and Premises Liability
The basic elements of a cause
of action for negligence and premises liability are the same: (1) the existence
of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and
(4) resulting damages. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11
Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
994, 998.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the
court. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; Annocki v.
Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.) Those
who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise
ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an
unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)
Defendants
argue there is no evidence that they breached a duty owed to Plaintiff.
Defendants were not present at the property when the accident occurred, did not
oversee or direct the work, did not communicate with Plaintiff, and did not
provide the ladder or other tools and materials for the project. (DSUMF, Nos.
13-18.) An employee of DCWI, perhaps Plaintiff himself, placed plastic on the
floor and over bricks installed in front of the fireplace, obscuring the bricks
and difference in elevation from view. (DSUMF, Nos. 9-10.)
As
Plaintiff descended the ladder, his view was obscured by the plastic that had
been placed there by an employee of DCWI. (DSUMF, Nos. 11-12.)
On these
undisputed facts, Defendants have met their initial burden, as a party moving
for summary judgment, of presenting facts to show that one or more of the
elements of the negligence and premises liability causes of action “cannot be
established.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to show that there are
one or more triable issues of material fact. (Ibid.) Plaintiff, however,
has not opposed the motion or otherwise discharged that burden.
Thus, Defendants have shown that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the negligence and premises
liability causes of action in the FAC.
Defendants’
motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.
Conclusion
The
Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Jason Chapman
and Viola Chapman.
Moving
Party is to give notice.