Judge Steven A. Ellis, Case Number: 22STCV26481, Date: 2025-03-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV26481, Date: 2025-03-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV26481 Hearing Date: March 19, 2025 Dept: 29

Krawczyk v. Luciomontes
22STCV26481
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative

The motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Background

On August 16, 2022, Antoni Krawczyk filed a complaint against Alejandro Luciomontes, Priority Tow, LLC, and Does 1 through 20 for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence arising out an incident on April 4, 2021, in which plaintiff was a pedestrian on Pacific Coast Highway near Busch Drive in Malibu and was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant Luciomontes.

On August 30, 2022, Daniel Krawczyk filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Alejandro Luciomontes, Priority Tow, LLC, and Does 1 through 100, asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence (wrongful death), survival action, and declaratory relief. In the FAC, Daniel Krawczyk alleges that he is the son and successor-in-interest of Antoni Krawczyk, who died on or about April 4, 2021, as a result of the accident.

On December 12, 2022, Priority Tow, LLC filed an answer.

On March 29, 2023, Alejandro Lucio Montes filed an answer.

On October 8, 2024, a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed. The SAC adds Adam Krawczyk as a plaintiff. In the FAC, Daniel Krawczyk and Adam Krawczyk allege that they are the sons and successors-in-interest of Antoni Krawczyk.

On February 14, 2025, Priority Tow, LLC and Alejandro Lucio Montes (collectively “Defendants”) filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings, challenging the causes of action in the SAC asserted by Plaintiff Adam Krawczyk. Plaintiff Adam Krawczyk filed an opposition on March 3, 2025, and Defendants filed a reply on March 11.

(Because Daniel Krawczyk and Adam Krawczyk have the same last name, the Court refers to them by their first names, “Daniel” and “Adam.” This is done for ease of reference and is commonly done when parties share the same last name; no disrespect or excessive familiarity is intended.)

Legal Standard

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) “The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322; accord Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 494; Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730, 735; Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216; see also 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [2024] ¶ 7:275.)

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. If an amended pleading is filed, the responding party shall meet and confer again with the party who filed the amended pleading before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the amended pleading.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Id.)

Discussion

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to Adam’s claims against them. Defendants argue Adam’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

“As a general rule, subsequent amendments to a pleading will “relate back” to an earlier, timely filed pleading if they (1) rest on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality, as the original [pleading]. Subsequent amendments that might relate back encompass amendments adding new causes of action between previously named parties, adding new defendants, and, as is pertinent here, adding new plaintiffs.”

(Engel v. Pech (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1236 [citations omitted].) Generally, a new plaintiff’s “claims do not relate back if the new plaintiff is seeking to “enforce a[ ] right” “independent” of the right asserted by the previously named plaintiff(s).” (Id. at p. 1237.)

Defendants challenge three causes of action asserted by Adam in the SAC. For ease of reference, the Court begins with the second cause of action (for wrongful death). Then the Court considers, together, the first cause of action (for motor vehicle negligence) and third cause of action (for survival) together.

Second Cause of Action (Negligence/Wrongful Death)

When a person dies because of the wrongful act or neglect of another, California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 establishes an independent statutory cause of action for the decedent’s spouse, domestic partner, children, and certain other individuals. The plaintiffs in a wrongful death action may generally recover for “[1] the financial benefits the heirs were receiving at the time of death, [2] those reasonably to be expected in the future, and [3] the monetary equivalent of loss of comfort, society and protection.” (Corder, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 661; see also, e.g., Soto v. Borgwarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165, 198-199; Nelson v. County of Los Angeles¿(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 793.) But “recovery is not available in wrongful death actions for the grief or sorrow attendant upon the death of a loved one.” (Corder, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 662; accord Nelson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.)

The Court of Appeal has explained:

“Because each wrongful death claimant must show the nature of his or her loss as a result of the decedent's death, the addition of an omitted heir to a wrongful death action after expiration of the limitations period as to the omitted heir necessarily inserts a new cause of action that seeks to enforce an independent right.”

(San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1552–1553.) As a result, when a new plaintiff is added, “the relation-back doctrine will not apply.” (Id. at p. 1553.)

Accordingly, based on the allegations in the SAC, Adam’s second cause of action for wrongful death is barred by the statute of limitations. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the second cause of action.

As this is Adam’s first attempt to plead a wrongful death cause of action, and there could be a basis for tolling, the motion is granted with leave to amend.

First and Third Causes of Action (Motor Vehicle Negligence and Survival)

In the First and Third Causes of Action, Adam asserts causes of action as a successor-in-interest to the decedent. These are survival causes of action.

“A survivor claim is also a statutory cause of action; however, unlike a wrongful death claim, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedent's cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedent's personal representative or successor in interest. … There is but one survivor cause of action belonging to the decedent that is brought on behalf of the decedent by the decedent's personal representative or successor in interest.”

(San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.)

The addition or substitution of a new successor-in-interest does not tender new claims or issues or causes of action and does not seek to enforce a new or independent right. When one successor-in-interest files a timely survival claim, the subsequent amendment to add an additional successor-in-interest relates back to the initial filing. (Ibid.)

Accordingly, Adam’s survival causes of action, as set forth in the SAC, are not time barred.

(Defendants also argue about what damages may be recovered in a survival action, but a motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer, cannot be used to attack part of a cause of acion.)

The motion is denied as to the first and third causes of action.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Adam’s Second Cause of Action in the Second Amended Complaint (for wrongful death).

The Court GRANTS Adam leave to amend by no later than March 28, 2025.

The Court DENIES the remainder of Defendant’s motion.

The Court ORDERS Defendants to give notice.