Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV31873, Date: 2024-12-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV31873 Hearing Date: December 4, 2024 Dept: 29
Celis-Salas v. Los Angeles Unified School District
22STCV31873
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication
Tentative
As a threshold matter, the Court notes
that it has not been able to review the two video clips submitted with the
moving papers. Counsel is requested to
be prepared to display those videos at the hearing.
The Court will hear from counsel on the
issue of whether the Court should consider (or disregard) the evidence
submitted with LAUSD’s reply.
The Court’s tentative ruling is that the motion
is denied.
Background
This case arises out of a tragic set of
circumstances in which (as is alleged) a minor child, Giancarlo Calvo, died on
November 17, 2021, following one or more fights with other students at school
that had occurred in the prior period of approximately three weeks.
On September 29, 2022, Plaintiffs Elvia
Celis-Salas and Carlos Calvo (“Plaintiffs”) filed the Complaint in this action
against Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”), and Does 1 through 100,
asserting causes of action for (1) Negligence, (2) Negligent Hiring, Retention,
Supervision and Training, and (3) Wrongful Death arising out of the injuries to
and death of Giancarlo.
LAUSD filed its Answer on November 7, 2022.
On October 9, 2023, the Court granted LAUSD’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, with leave to amend.
On November 7, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The FAC
asserts causes of action for (1) Survival Action (negligence); (2) Survival
Action (negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training); and (3)
Wrongful Death. The first two causes of
action are brought by Plaintiff Celis-Salas as successor-in-interest to the
decedent Giancarlo Calvo. (FAC, ¶¶
21-22, 33-34.) The third cause of action
is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs on their own behalves. (Id., ¶ 47.)
On January 5, 2024, the Court sustained LAUSD’s demurrer
to the first and second causes of action in the FAC without leave to amend and
granted LAUSD’s motion to strike the request for prejudgment interest in the
FAC without leave to amend.
On January 16, 2024, LAUSD filed its Answer to the FAC.
On May
17, 2024, LAUSD filed this motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative,
for summary adjudication. LAUSD also filed a request for judicial notice. Six days later, on May 23, 2024, LAUSD filed
additional evidence in support of the motion.
Plaintiffs
filed an opposition on November 20.
LAUSD
filed a reply, and additional evidence in support of the motion, on November
27.
Legal
Standard
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a
mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether,
despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the
trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other
inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function
of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of
the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose
whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant
moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the
cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense
to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)
A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary
adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to
show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved
each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the
cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff
or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or
cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication
may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must
instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material
fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To
establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must
produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Request for Judicial Notice
LAUSD requests that the Court take judicial notice of the FAC and the notice
of the Court’s ruling sustaining the demurrer to the first and second causes of
action in the FAC. That request is
granted.
Discussion
In the
FAC, Plaintiffs assert one remaining cause of action against LAUSD, for the
wrongful death of their child, Decedent Giancarlo Calvo.
LAUSD
moves for summary judgment on that cause of action. In the alternative, LAUSD seeks summary
adjudication of the following issues: (1) that Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action for
Wrongful Death is premised only upon the duty to supervise its students; (2)
that Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action for Wrongful Death is without merit
because Plaintiffs cannot establish any breach of duty in that there was a
reasonable supervision plan in place and no history of violence between Decedent
Giancarlo Calvo and Eddie Martinez; (3) that Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action
for Wrongful Death is without merit because Plaintiffs cannot establish that
any breach of duty caused any injuries in that the fight was a spontaneous act
and Plaintiffs cannot establish that any amount of supervision would have
prevented it from happening; (4) that LAUSD is entitled to discretionary
immunity for the supervision plan in place at Venice High School on October 29,
2021; and (5) that Plaintiff cannot establish any negligent hiring, retention,
supervision, or training of an employee because the School District did not
breach any duty in hiring, retention, supervision, or training of any employee,
which caused Plaintiffs’ damages.
Facts
The Court begins with to
the facts in the record, only some of which are summarized here.
On
October 29, 2021, Giancarlo Calvo (“Decedent”) and Eddie Martinez (“Martinez”)
were involved in a fight on the campus of Venice High School. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 5.) At the time,
both Decedent and Martinez were students.
(DSUMF, No. 4.) The fight
occurred behind the Auto Shop Building, in or near an area in which
construction was underway. (DSUMF, No.
5.) More specifically, the fight
occurred to the east of the Auto Shop Building.
(Hairston-Truitt Decl., ¶ 14 & Exh. B; Headrick Decl., Exh. E.)
Plaintiffs
allege that Decedent was attacked “without provocation.” (FAC, ¶ 12.)
Both Cynthia Headrick, who was then Principal at Venice High School, and
Yavonka Hairston-Truitt, who was then Assistant Principal at Venice High School
in charge of Discipline/Dean’s Office, testified that they did not have any
actual prior knowledge that a fight would occur between Decedent and Martinez
on October 29, 2021. (Headrick Decl., ¶¶
5-7; Hairston-Truitt Decl., ¶¶ 3, 16-17.)
But there is evidence in the record that the fight between Decedent and
Martinez was related to an earlier fight on the Venice High School campus
between two other students, Brian Aquino (a friend of Decedent) and Anthony
Martinez (a friend of Martinez).
(Plaintiffs’ Exh. H [Carrasco Depo., at 69:2-4]; Plaintiffs’ Exh. L
[Headrick Individual Depo.], at 59:4-60:6.)
Martinez
had no prior incidents of fighting at school.
(DSUMF, No. 8.) There was no
prior history of fighting or other incidents between Decedent and
Martinez. (DSUMF, No. 9.)
Elwin
Segovia was one of the students at Venice High School who witnessed the fight. Segovia testified:
“I saw a
lot of people going into the – next to the baseball field and next to the
football field. So I saw a lot of people
running toward there so, for me being very curios, I went there and I started
recording.
Because
every time, like, there is – sometimes there’s a lot of people running to one
direction, a lot of people think it’s like a fight or just something is going
on, so I just pulled out my phone, and I started recording.”
(Segovia
Depo., at 31:17-32:3.) (Excerpts from the Segovia Deposition appear in the
record as LAUSD’s Exhibit 3 and Plaintiffs’ Exhibit I.) Segovia stated that the fight had already
started by the time he arrived, and he saw it through to the end of the fight. (Segovia Depo., at 32:4-10, 34:17-19.) Segovia estimated that that he observed, and
recorded, the fight for approximately 35 seconds. (Segovia Depo., at 18:16-20, 34:9-14.) Segovia stopped recording “after Giancarlo
[Decedent] and Eddie [Martinez] backed away from each other.” (Segovia Depo., at 34:20-23.)
Segovia
estimated that there were approximately “20 or 25 students” watching the
fight. (Segovia Depo., at 35:10-14.) There were no LAUSD faculty or employees
present. (Segovia Depo., at 35:15-18.)
After
the fight, Segovia testified, “Everybody started running away” when another
student told a supervisor and “we saw, like, three supervisors, and all the
students fled away.” (Segovia Depo., at
39:7-12.) Segovia stated that Decedent
did not run away, however, because he was “badly injured” with a “nose
bleed.” (Segovia Depo., at
39:12-21.) The supervisors, who were
wearing neon green vests, arrived approximately five seconds after Segovia
stopped recording the fight. (Segovia
Depo., at 41:8-17, 43:2-12, 47:9-19; see also DSUMF, No. 11.)
Decedent
was admitted to the hospital on November 11, 2021. (PSAMF, Nos. 8, 26.) Decedent underwent emergency surgery that day
and died on November 16, 2021. (PSAMF,
Nos. 28-29.)
As of
October 29, 2021, Venice High School had a supervision plan in place for the
campus throughout the day, including lunchtime.
(DSUMF, No. 13.) The plan was designed
by then-Assistant Principal Hairston-Truitt based on her experience and
discretion. (DSUMF, No. 14.)
Pursuant
to the supervision plan, the campus was monitored by approximately 22
supervisors, including administrators, aides, a school police officer,
counselors, deans, and other staff.
(DSUMF, No. 15.) According to
Hairston-Truitt, “Supervisors were placed in most areas around campus, primarily
in areas where students were known to congregate.” (Hairston-Truitt Decl., ¶ 12; see also DSUMF,
Nos. 16-17.) “The supervisors would be
responsible for student supervision, security, and helping to ensure campus
safety. They would circulate in the area
to which they were assigned.”
(Hairston-Truitt Decl., ¶ 13.)
Supervisors
were assigned to the north of the Shop Building (between the Shop Building and
the East Building), to the west of the Shop Building (between the Shop Building
and the Cafeteria), to the south of the Shop Building, and to the northeast of
the East Building (which is directly to the north of the Shop Building). (Hairston-Truitt Decl., ¶ 15 & Exh.
B.) There were no supervisors assigned
to the east of the Shop Building.
(Ibid.) Hairston-Truitt
testified, “Students were not known to congregate in this area.” (Id., ¶ 14.)
The supervisor assigned to the northeast of the East Building, however,
would have “general views of the rear [i.e., the east] of the Shop
Building.” (Id., ¶ 15.)
From the
start of the 2021-2022 school year through October 29, 2021, LAUSD was aware of
twelve “altercations” at the Venice High School campus, some of which occurred
outside of regular school hours. (Plaintiff’s
Statement of Additional Material Facts [“PSAMF”], No. 3.) There were multiple Instagram accounts where
videos of fights at the school were posted.
(PSAMF, Nos. 50-52.)
According
to Hairston-Truitt, the general practice after a fight occurs includes the
following: (1) to separate the students; (2) to obtain medical attention if
needed; (3) to assign staff to start parent communication; (4) to make an
effort to calm the students involved; (5) to obtain oral and/or written
statements from the students involved in the fight; (6) to obtain written
statements from other witnesses; (7) to release the students to their parents
or keep the students in the office for safety purposes; (8) to develop a safety
plan; and (9) to determine consequences. (Plaintiff’s Exh. O [Hairston-Truitt
Depo., at 97:15-99:24.)
LAUSD
did not notify Plaintiffs (Decedent’s parents) about the fight. (PSAMF, No. 8.) LAUSD claims that it was not aware of the
fight until after Decedent was hospitalized on November 11, 2021. (PSAMF, No.
9.)
Motion for Summary Judgment
LAUSD makes essentially three
arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Third
Cause of Action in the FAC for the wrongful death of Decedent: (1) that
Plaintiffs cannot establish any breach of duty (Mem. at pp. 14-18); (2) that
Plaintiffs cannot establish causation (Mem. at pp. 18-20); and (3) that the
principle of discretionary immunity applies here and bars Plaintiffs’ claims
(Mem. at pp. 20-22).
The Court notes that although
any tort cause of action against LAUSD (or any other public entity) must be
rooted in a statute, both LAUSD and Plaintiffs use the common law elements of
negligence to frame their arguments. The
Court also takes the same approach.
The elements of a common law
cause of action for negligence are: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of
that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown v. USA
Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Romero v. Los Angeles Rams (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 562, 567.)
Duty
Beginning with the issue
of duty, it is well established that schools have a legal duty to exercise reasonable care
in protecting students against known or reasonably foreseeable risks. (Dailey
v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747; Thompson
v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1372; Brownwell
v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 787, 798.) This
includes a duty to use ordinary care in the supervision of students. (Hoyem
v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 513; Dailey,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 747; J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123, 139.) But schools are not guarantors of the
physical safety of students and are not strictly liable for any injury suffered
by students on school grounds. (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 513; Dailey,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 747; Thompson, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1371-72.)
A plaintiff need not “prove
that the very injury which occurred must have been foreseeable by the school
authorities.” (J.H., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.) The negligence
of school authorities “is established if a reasonably prudent person would
foresee that injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in the
absence of [additional] safeguards.” (Ibid.; see also M.W. v. Panama
Buena Vista Union School (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 516-517.)
Foreseeability must be “determined in light of all the circumstances.” (J.H.,
supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 146; M.W., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p.
519. Whether “an unreasonable risk of harm was foreseeable under the particular
facts of a given case” is a question of fact for the jury; it becomes an issue
of law that can be resolved in favor of the school district only if no reasonable
finder of fact, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff, could find that the risk of harm was foreseeable. (M.W., supra, 110
Cal.App.4th at p. 516; see also J.H., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.)
Defendant
contends that it did not breach its duty of reasonable supervision as (1) there
were adequate supervision measures on the day of the fight and (2) there was no
indication a fight would breakout between Decedent and Martinez.
As to
the second point, it is undisputed that LAUSD had no prior knowledge that
Decedent and Martinez would fight on October 29, 2021. (Headrick Decl., ¶¶ 5-7; Hairston-Truitt
Decl., ¶¶ 3, 16-17.) There had been no
prior incidents of fighting or altercations between Decedent and Martinez. (DSUMF, No. 9.)
But that
second point frames the issue far too narrowly.
The question, as it relates to breach, is not whether it was reasonably
foreseeable to LAUSD that these two students would fight on this particular
day. Rather, the issue is whether it was
reasonably foreseeable LAUSD that injuries of this general type – from fighting
– would be likely in the absence of additional supervision. (See J.H., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p.
146; M.W., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 516-517.)
As to
the first point, the Court concludes that the evidence on the adequacy of the
supervision measures is not as one-sided as LAUSD contends. There is evidence in the record that, if
credited by the trier of fact, would support the reasonable inference that
there was a problem with student fighting on the Venice High School campus at
this time. (PSAMF, Nos. 3, 50-52.) LAUSD had a supervision plan in place, but
there were no supervisors present in the area on campus east of the Shop
Building, which is where the fight occurred.
(Hairston-Truitt Decl., ¶¶ 14-15 & Exh. B.) Before the fight, “a lot” of students –
approximately “20 or 25 students” – ran toward the area of the fight. (Segovia Depo., at 31:17-32:3, 35:10-14.) And yet it appears that no LAUSD personnel
noticed this large gathering of students, no LAUSD personnel were present, and
no LAUSD personnel investigated. (Segovia
Depo., at 35:15-18; see also Hutak Decl., ¶ 6.)
On this record, viewing the
evidence in the light most favor able to the nonmoving parties, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in their favor, the Court concludes that the trier of
fact could reasonably find that LAUSD failed to meet its mandatory duty to
supervise students adequately. The trier of fact could find that LAUSD’s
failure to monitor the area on campus east of the Shop Building, even though a
large crowd of students had gathered there, fell below the ordinary standard of
care. Of course, the trier of fact could
also reasonably find the opposite, but there are triable issues of fact as to
breach on the Third Cause of Action in the complaint. On this record, the Court cannot conclude, as
a matter of law, that LAUSD fulfilled its duty to exercise reasonable care in
protecting students against known or reasonably foreseeable risks or that LAUSD
fulfilled its duty to exercise reasonable care in the supervision of students.
Causation
Turning to the separate
element of causation, the law on this point is clear. Even when a plaintiff
proves breach, the plaintiff cannot recover for negligence absent evidence
“that it was more probable than not that, but for the [defendant’s] negligence,
the [injury] would not have occurred.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001)
25 Cal.4th 763, 775. “Proof of causation cannot be based on mere speculation,”
and a “mere possibility of such causation is not enough.” (Ibid.; see
also Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 419, 435 (“speculative possibility” of causation is not sufficient)
Where, as here, Plaintiffs
allege that Decedent was injured in an assault, Plaintiffs must show, with
“direct or circumstantial evidence,” that “the assailant took advantage of the
defendant’s lapse … in the course of committing his attack, and that the
omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” (Saelzler, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 779.) “[W]here a school fails to provide supervision and an
injury results from conduct that would not have occurred had supervision been
provided, liability may be imposed.” (Thompson, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1372.) But the mere existence of an attack and resulting injury, by
themselves, do not prove causation. (Ibid.)
At trial, Plaintiffs, of
course, will have the burden of proof on causation (and the other elements of
their cause of action). But on summary
judgment, LAUSD must satisfy the
initial burden of presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the
cause of action ... cannot be established.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
On this record, LAUSD has not met this initial burden. Indeed, LAUSD presents no facts to show that
Plaintiffs cannot establish causation; nothing in LAUSD’s Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts addresses the causation issue, and in its Memorandum
of Points and Authorities LAUSD argues only the general legal standards, not
how those standards apply in this case.
As a result, it is unclear to the Court what LAUSD’s argument is on the
causation issue: for example, is LAUSD arguing that there is no causal
relationship between the fight and Decedent’s death, that there is no causal
relationship between LAUSD’s breach and the occurrence of the fight, or both?
Moreover, even if LAUSD had
met its initial burden, there is evidence in the record that shows that there
are triable issues of disputed facts on the causation issue. Plaintiffs present evidence that, if credited
by the trier of fact, would support a reasonable inference that the injuries
that Decedent sustained in the fight caused, or were at least a substantial
factor in bring about, Decedent’s death.
(See PSAMF Nos. 26-49 and supporting evidence.) And Plaintiffs present evidence that, if
credited by the trier of fact, would support a reasonable inference that the
fight, and Decedent’s resulting injuries, would never had occurred if LAUSD had
met its burden of ordinary care and provided adequate supervision of the
students of Venice High School at the date and time of the incident. (Hutak Decl., ¶ 6.)
Statutory
Immunity
LAUSD also
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because its student supervision plan
for the Venice High School campus was formulated and designed in the exercise
of discretion by then-Assistant Principal Hairston-Truitt, and public employees
and public entities are entitled to immunity for discretionary acts or
omissions under Government Code sections 820.2 and 815.2, subdivision (b).
Plaintiffs
allege that LAUSD failed to supervise its students. The duty of a school district to supervise
students is a mandatory duty, not a discretionary one. Accordingly, Government Code section 815.6,
rather than section 820.2, applies here.
(See Gutierrez v. County of Monterrey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897-900.)
LAUSD
cites no case law for its novel proposition that it is immune from liability for
failure to meet its mandatory duty to supervise students. Six decades (or more) of case law is to the
contrary. Abstract statements about the
exercise of discretion by school district personnel are not sufficient do not
abrogate the well-established principle that school districts can be held
liable for the failure to supervise.
LAUSD’s Alternative Requests for Summary
Adjudication
In the
alternative, LAUSD seeks summary adjudication of five issues: (1) that Plaintiffs’ sole cause of
action for Wrongful Death is premised only upon the duty to supervise its
students; (2) that Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action for Wrongful Death is
without merit because Plaintiffs cannot establish any breach of duty in that
there was a reasonable supervision plan in place and no history of violence
between Decedent Giancarlo Calvo and Eddie Martinez; (3) that Plaintiffs’ sole
cause of action for Wrongful Death is without merit because Plaintiffs cannot
establish that any breach of duty caused any injuries in that the fight was a
spontaneous act and Plaintiffs cannot establish that any amount of supervision
would have prevented it from happening; (4) that LAUSD is entitled to
discretionary immunity for the supervision plan in place at Venice High School
on October 29, 2021; and (5) that Plaintiff cannot establish any negligent
hiring, retention, supervision, or training of an employee because the School
District did not breach any duty in hiring, retention, supervision, or training
of any employee, which caused Plaintiffs’ damages.
Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides that a party may move for summary
adjudication “as to one or more causes of action with an action, one or more affirmative
defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty.”
The Court denies LAUSD’s
requests as to the second, third, and fourth issues identified in the motion,
for the reasons stated above.
The Court denies LAUSD’s
requests as to the first and fifth issues identified in the motion on the
grounds that they are not a proper subject of summary adjudication of issues under
section 437c, subdivision (f)(1).
Conclusion
The Court
DENIES Los Angeles Unified School District’s motion for summary judgment or, in
the alternative, summary adjudication of issues.
Moving
Party is to give notice.