Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV32748, Date: 2024-03-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV32748 Hearing Date: March 4, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lennox
School District
Tentative
The
Court will hear from counsel.
Background
This case arises out of an incident on January
24, 2022, in which Plaintiff Javier Martinez (“Plaintiff”) alleges that he was
injured after he tripped on a broken, raised, and uneven portion of a concrete
sidewalk located in front of 10417 Felton Avenue in Inglewood. On October 5,
2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting a dangerous condition on public
property under Government Code section 835 against Lennox School District
(“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 20.
On December 15, 2022, Defendant filed its
answer and a cross-complaint against Roes 1 through 20.
On January 22, 2024, Plaintiff named City of
Inglewood as Doe 1.
On December 18, 2023, Defendant filed its
motion for summary judgment and supporting evidence. Plaintiff filed his opposition,
evidence, and objections on February 20, 2024. Defendant filed its reply on
February 28, 2024.
Legal Standard
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment
is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in
order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact
necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c),
“requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary
judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits
or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact
within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento
(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each cause of action as framed by the
complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or
more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there
is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf
v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action
or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)
A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for
summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of
proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of
action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling
the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the
burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party opposing a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or
denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts
showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material
fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive
evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Evidentiary
Objections
Each party
objects to some of the evidence presented by the other. Evidence presented in
support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment must be
admissible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d); Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne LLC (2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 541-43.) The court
must “consider all of the
evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have
been made and sustained.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
Plaintiff
presents five objections to Defendant’s evidence. The Court OVERRULES
Objections Nos. 1-4. Objection No. 5 is not an objection to evidence, and so no
ruling is required.
Discussion
Plaintiff
asserts a cause of action for a dangerous condition on public property under
Government Code section 835. As set forth in the statute, there are four
elements for such a claim:
“[A] public entity is
liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the
plaintiff establishes [1] that the property was in a dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, [2] that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous
condition, [3] that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable
risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and [4] either: (a) A
negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or¿(b) The
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition
under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”
(Gov’t
Code, § 835; see also, e.g., Tansavatdi v. City of
Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 653; Thimon v. City of Newark (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 745, 753.)
Defendant argues that the accident in question occurred
on a sidewalk abutting its property, but not on its property. Those who own,
possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in
managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.
(Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) But
“[a] defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous
condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control. Where the
absence of ownership, possession, or control has been unequivocally
established, summary judgment is proper.” (Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134.)
The law
regarding the liability of landowners with regard to defects or dangerous
conditions on sidewalks abutting their property is well established in numerous
appellate cases. “Under
the common law, a landowner does not have any duty to repair abutting sidewalks
along a public street, and does not owe any duty to pedestrians injured as a
result of a defect in the sidewalks.” (Jordan v. City of Sacramento
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1490 (citing Schaefer v. Lenahan (1944) 63
Cal.App.2d 324, 325).) By statute, specifically Streets and Highways Code
section 5610, abutting property owners have an obligation to repair defects in
the sidewalk, regardless of whether they created the defects. (See Jones v.
Deeter (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.) Nonetheless, the so-called
“Sidewalk Accident Doctrine” provides that abutting property owners have no
duty to members of the public in tort law, and are not liable to members of the
public, unless the property owner created the defect or exercised dominion or
control over the abutting sidewalk. (Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 244, 255; Jordan, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1490-91 [Section 5610 “imposes a duty of repair on the abutting property owners
for defects in sidewalks, regardless of who created the defects, but does not
of itself create tort liability to injured pedestrians or a duty to indemnify
municipalities, except where a property owner created the defect or exercised
dominion or control over the abutting sidewalk”]; see also Contreras v. Anderson
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 188, 196; Jones, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 802-803.)
Thus, for more
than 150 years the general rule has been that “in the absence of a statute, a
landowner is under no duty to maintain in a safe condition a public street or
sidewalk abutting his property.” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p.
255.) “[A] person’s ownership or occupancy of property, without more, is
insufficient to impose a duty to maintain abutting, publicly owned property. (Id.
at p. 256; see also Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38
Cal.3d 112, 134 [“A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or
dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control.”]; Williams v.
Foster (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 510, 521 [“we are unwilling to find the duty to
maintain the sidewalk established by section 5610 is owed to members of the
public in the absence of clear and unambiguous legislative language, especially
in view of the long-standing judicial determination that abutters ordinarily
have no such duty”].)
This
general rule of no duty has an important exception: when the abutting property
owner has “exercised control” over the otherwise public property. (Lopez,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 255.) For this exception to apply, the abutting
owner must take some affirmative action regarding the public property, such as
when the abutting owner has “created [the] hazard” or has asserted “dominion
and control over the … publicly owned property by effectively treating the
property as its own.” (Id. at p. 256.)
The
Court will hear from counsel. In particular, and without limitation, the Court
would like to hear from counsel on the following issues:
1.
Is paragraph 5 of the Declaration of Herlinda Bazan sufficient to satisfy
Defendant’s initial burden of proof as a defendant party moving for summary judgment?
2.
If so, has Plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to create a triable
issue of material fact?
3.
Does the Inglewood Municipal Ordinance at issue provide for tort
liability (like the municipal cited in the Gonzales v. City of San Jose case
upon which Plaintiff relies)?
4.
If so, does it matter that the abutting property owner here is a
public entity, in contrast to the private land owner in Gonzales?