Judge Steven A. Ellis, Case Number: 22STCV37586, Date: 2024-06-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV37586, Date: 2024-06-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV37586 Hearing Date: June 21, 2024 Dept: 29

Motion to Quash filed by Specially Appearing Defendant Honda Motor Company, Ltd.

Tentative

The hearing on the motion is CONTINUED.

BACKGROUND

On November 30, 2022, Deborah Joe and Kenneth Mack (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Lillian Swanson; American Honda Motor Company, Inc.; North American Honda; Honda Motor Company, Ltd; and Does 1 through 50 for negligence stemming from an automobile accident occurring on December 30, 2020.

On April 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed with the Court proof of service of summons on Honda Motor Company, Ltd by personal service on “Koy Saechao – CSC Agent for Service – Person Authorized to Accept.”

On May 23, 2024, Specially Appearing Defendant Honda Motor Company, Ltd. (“HMC”) filed this motion to quash service of summons. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on May 31, 2024. No reply has been filed.

Also on May 23, Defendant American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (“AHMC”) filed an answer to the complaint. The next day, on May 24, AHMC filed an amended answer.

LEGAL STANDARD

Proper service of a summons on each defendant is a constitutional and statutory requirement in all civil actions. Without proper service (or, for example, consent or waiver), a court does not acquire jurisdiction over a defendant, and in general any judgment rendered against the defendant is void. (E.g., Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 371; County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1231.)

A corporate entity may, in general, be served through its designated agent for service of process; any other person authorized to accept service; its chief executive officer, chief financial officer, president, vice president, secretary or assistant secretary, treasurer or assistant treasurer, or controller; or its “general manager.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 416.10, subds. (a) & (b).)

The Code of Civil Procedure provides for service on a defendant within the State of California by four basic methods: (1) personal service; (2) substitute service; (3) service by mail and acknowledgement of receipt; and (4) service by publication. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 415.10, 415.20, 415.30, 415.50.)

For a defendant located outside of California but within the United States, service may be made using any of these methods, any method authorized by the law of the place where the person is served, or by certified mail with a return receipt. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 413.10, subd. (b) & 415.40.)

For a defendant located outside of the United States, the rules are slightly more complicated. The United States and more than 80 other countries are signatories to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (the “Hague Service Convention”). Where the Hague Service Convention applies, it preempts state law with regard to service of process, and the parties must comply with the procedures for service set forth in the Convention. (Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk (1988) 486 U.S. 694, 699, 705; Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 137-138; Code Civ. Proc., § 413.10, subd. (c).)

Where the Hague Service Convention does not apply, service may be made using any of the four methods for service in California, or by certified mail with a return receipt. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 413.10, subd. (c) & 415.40.) Alternatively, service may be made “as directed by the court in which the action is pending,” or by any method authorized by the law of the place where the person is served “if the court before or after service finds that the service is reasonably calculated to give actual notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 413.10, subd. (c).)

A defendant may challenge service through a motion to quash service of the summons filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10. “When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413; see also, e.g., Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.)

DISCUSSION

HMC moves to quash service of the summons, arguing that service was improper because it is a Japanese company, that it has not designated an agent for service of process in California, and that any service on it must be through the Hague Convention.

(Notably, HMC does not present any facts in support of this motion (not even admissible evidence that it is based in Japan), but Plaintiff does not challenge HMC’s factual assertions, and, in any event, Plaintiff has the burden of showing the facts to establish proper service.)

Plaintiff argues that it properly served HMC through service in California on AHMC. When a foreign corporation is properly served through its local subsidiary or agent, the service is valid and effective, and the Hague Convention procedures do not apply. (Volkswagenwerk, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 707-708.) Under California law, both before and after the Volkswagenwerk decision, a local subsidiary of, or distributor for, a foreign company is deemed to be the foreign company’s “general manager,” and proper service on the local subsidiary is treated as valid service on the foreign company. (Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 77, 83-84; Yamaha Motor Co. v. Super. Ct. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 264, 274; see also Falco v. Nissan North America (C.D. Cal. 2013) 987 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1076-1078 [applying California law]; 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (2023), ¶ 4:320.)

Plaintiff asserts that AHMC is a “wholly owned subsidiary of” HMC. (Opp. at 4:20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that AHMC is “the exclusive distributor of all Honda vehicles … in California and throughout the United States.” (Id. at 4:21-23.) And Plaintiff asserts that it is “undisputed that [AHMC] is the exclusive distributor of all Honda products in the United States.” (Id. at 5:3-4.) But saying it is so does not make it so. Plaintiff has the burden of proof on this motion, and there is no evidence of any of this in the record.

If in fact AHMC is a subsidiary or distributor for HMC, and if Plaintiff served HMC through service on AHMC, Plaintiff might well have a strong case for the Court to deny HMC’s motion. Absent evidence, however, the Court cannot resolve this motion.

Accordingly, the Court CONTINUES the hearing on this motion so that the parties can present evidence to the Court in support of, or in rebuttal to, the currently unsupported factual assertions in Plaintiff’s opposition.

CONCLUSION

The Court CONTINUES the hearing on this motion.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.