Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV02163, Date: 2025-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV02163    Hearing Date: January 8, 2025    Dept: 29

Meidan v. City of Los Angeles
23STCV02163
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Phyllis Hirsh

Tentative

The motion is denied as moot.

Background

On February 1, 2023, Mordechai Meidan (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against City of Los Angeles (“City”), Phyllis Hirsh (“Hirsh”), and Does 1 through 25, asserting causes of action for general negligence and premises liability arising out of an alleged trip and fall on the sidewalk at or near 6520 San Vicente Boulevard in Los Angeles on July 21, 2022.

On July 28, 2023, City filed an answer and cross-complaint against Hirsh and Roes 1 through 10.

On October 12 and 13, 2023, Hirsh filed an answer to the complaint and a cross-complaint against City and Noes 1 through 10.

On October 17, 2024, Hirsh filed a motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s complaint.

On November 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request to dismiss his claims against Hirsh without prejudice. Dismissal was entered on November 27, 2024.

On December 19, 2024, City filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, stating that the motion should be denied as moot.

Hirsh filed a reply to City’s opposition on December 27, 2024.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, Defendant Phyllis Hirsh died on March 27, 2024. (Wenger Decl., ¶ 2.) Nothing has been filed by any party under Code of Civil Procedure sections 377.40 through 377.50 (relating to causes of action against a decedent) or sections 377.30 through 377.35 (relating to causes of action of a decedent). It is entirely unclear to the Court the authority, if any, under which this motion was filed on October 17, 2024.

In any event, Plaintiff dismissed his complaint against Defendant Hirsh on November 26, 2024. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment as to the complaint is moot. This is not a matter that falls within the narrow class of cases in which a dismissed defendant can continue to litigate a motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

The Court DENIES AS MOOT the motion for summary judgment filed by (or on behalf of) Defendant Phyllis Hirsh.