Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV03706, Date: 2024-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03706    Hearing Date: October 24, 2024    Dept: 29

Tinner v. Vilchez
23STCV03706
Motion of Defendant City of Los Angeles to Contest Application for Good Faith Settlement Determination

Tentative

The motion of Defendant City of Los Angeles is granted.

 

The application for a good faith settlement determination is denied without prejudice.

 

Background

On February 21, 2023, Kecia Tinner (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Hugo Vilchez, Hugo Vilchez Trust, City of Los Angeles (“City”), County of Los Angeles (“County”), and Does 1 through 100 for premises liability and dangerous condition of public property arising out of an alleged trip and fall occurring on April 8, 2022.

On October 10, 2023, the County was dismissed as a defendant.

On March 14, 2024, Hugo Vilchez and Hugo Vilchez Trust (collectively “Owners”) filed an answer and cross-complaint against City and Roes 1 through 20.

On April 2, 2024, City filed an answer and cross-complaint against Owners and Zoes 1 through 20.

On September 4, 2024, Owners filed a notice of settlement and application for determination of good faith settlement. Additional documents in support of the application were filed on September 9.

On September 18, 2024, City filed this motion to contest Owners’ application for determination of good faith settlement. Owners filed an opposition on October 11.

Legal Standard

In a case involving two or more alleged joint tortfeasors, a party may seek a court order under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 determining that a settlement between the plaintiff and one or more of the alleged tortfeasors is in good faith. A judicial determination of good faith “bar[s] any other joint tortfeasor … from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor … for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(c).)

In evaluating whether a settlement has been made in good faith, courts consider the following factors, as set forth by the California Supreme Court in the landmark case Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488:

               1) “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery”;

               2) “the settlor’s proportionate liability”;

               3) “the amount paid in settlement”;

      4) “the allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs”;

5) “a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial”;

               6) the settling party's “financial conditions and insurance policy limits”;

7) any evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”

(Id. at 499.) “Practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Ibid.)

The “good faith” concept in Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of nonsettling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced. (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal. App. 3d 939, 945.) Accordingly, under Tech-Bilt, the party asserting the lack of “good faith” may meet this burden by demonstrating that the settlement is so far "out of the ballpark" as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.) Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a “settlement made in good faith” within the terms of section 877.6. (Ibid.)

The Supreme Court explained that Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is designed to further two equitable policies:

1) encouragement of settlements; and

2) equitable allocation of costs among joint tortfeasors. 

(Ibid.) 

Those policies would not be served by an approach which emphasizes one to the virtual exclusion of the other. (Ibid.) Accordingly, a settlement will not be found in good faith unless the amount is reasonable in light of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. (Std. Pac. of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 589.) Or, as the California Supreme Court has stated, a “defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.)

When a motion seeking a determination under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is not opposed, the burden on the moving parties to show that the settlement was made in good faith is slight. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261 [holding that a “barebones motion” including a declaration setting forth “a brief background of the case is sufficient”].)

When a good faith motion is contested, however, the moving parties have the initial burden of producing evidence in support of the requested good faith determination. (Id. at pp. 1261-1262.) “Section 877.6 and Tech-Bilt require an evidentiary showing, through expert declarations or other means, that the proposed settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.” (Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1351.) “Substantial evidence” is required. (Id. at p. 1352.) A declaration from a settling defendant’s attorney that states, in conclusory fashion, that the client has little or no share of the liability may not be sufficient. (Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834-835; see also 3 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶¶ 12:774, 12:872-873.) 

The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the party opposing the good faith determination.  The “party asserting a lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6, subd. (d); see also 3 Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:875.)

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that she was injured on April 8, 2022 when she tripped and fell on uneven sidewalk at 8001 S. Hoover Street in Los Angeles. (Complaint, ¶¶ 16-17.) The property adjacent to the sidewalk was owned by Owners. (Id.)

Owners settled with Plaintiff for $5,000 and filed an application for determination of good faith settlement. (Izurieta Decl., ¶ 9.) City filed this motion contesting the application.

The Court must now consider and weigh the various factors set forth in Tech-Bilt and its progeny to determine whether the Owners’ settlement with Plaintiff is a good faith settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.

1.               Rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery.

There is a complete failure of proof on this issue. The Court has received no information from either Owners or City regarding a rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery.  Is it $10,000? $10,000,000? The Court is left to guess.

2.               The settlor’s proportionate liability.

The parties contest this issue. Owners contend that they have no liability. City argues that this is speculation and that Owners altered the sidewalk on 806-812 W. 80th Street in Los Angeles, just around the corner from 8001 S. Hoover Street. (Kahramanian Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Owners respond that although Plaintiff first stated that she at 810-812 W. 80th Street, her testimony now is that the location of the fall was at 8001-8003 S. Hoover Street. (Opposition, Izurieta Decl., ¶ 3.) If true, Owners argue, this would show that the work they conducted around the corner was not a cause of the incident. (Id., ¶ 6.)

3.               The amount paid in settlement.

Owners have agreed to pay Plaintiff $5,000. (Izurieta Decl., ¶ 9.)

4.               The allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs.

As there is only one plaintiff, this factor does not apply here.

5.               A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial

This factor supports a good faith determination.

6.               The settling party’s financial conditions and insurance policy limits.

In their opposition, Owners contend that they have a policy limit of $500,000. (Opposition, Izurieta Decl., ¶ 12.)

 

7.               Any evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.

City does not specifically address this factor in its motion. In the application, Owners contend that the settlement was reached in a good faith manner through open, arms-length negotiations. (Izurieta Decl., ¶ 13.) Owners attach a copy of the Section 998 Offer to Compromise from Plaintiff. (Exh. B.)

Taking all of these factors into account, the Court finds that there has been a failure of proof on the good faith settlement issue. Without having at least some evidence regarding the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries, and potential recovery, the Court cannot conduct the required examination of each of the Tech-Bilt factors.

Where, as here, the request for a good faith determination is contested, the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the party opposing the good faith determination. (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6, subd. (d).) But the party seeking the good faith determination has the initial burden of producing evidence in support of the request. (City of Grand Terrace, supra, at pp. 1261-1262; see also Greshko, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 834-835; see also 3 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶¶ 12:774, 12:872-873.) 

Owners have not carried their initial burden of producing evidence in support of the request. Accordingly, City’s motion to contest is granted, and Owners’ application for a good faith settlement determination is denied without prejudice.

Conclusion

 

The Court GRANTS the motion of City of Los Angeles to contest and DENIES, without prejudice, the application of Defendants Hugo Vilchez and Hugo Vilchez Trust for a determination of good faith settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.

 

Counsel for City is ordered to give notice.