Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV04053, Date: 2025-05-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV04053    Hearing Date: May 29, 2025    Dept: 29

Morales v. County of Los Angeles
23STCV04053
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant LAFC Partners, LLP and Major League Soccer, LLC 

Tentative

The motion for summary judgment of Defendant LAFC Partners, LLP is granted.

The motion for summary judgment of Defendant Major League Soccer, LLC is denied as moot, as this defendant has already been dismissed from the action.

Background 

Plaintiff Maria Diaz Morales (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on August 18, 2022, a dangerous condition in or around Banc of California Stadium, located at 3939 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, California, caused her to trip, fall, and sustain injuries. 

On February 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action, asserting causes of action for a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835, vicarious liability, premises liability, and negligence against Defendants County of Los Angeles (“County”), City of Los Angeles (“City”), State of California (“State”), Major League Soccer, LLC (“MLS”), Exposition Park, LAFC Partners, LLP (“LAFC”), and Does 1 through 100.

In April and May 2023, LAFC, MLS, State (on its own behalf and on behalf of erroneously named defendant Exposition Park), and City filed Answers to the Complaint.  

On June 9, 2023, the Court sustained County’s demurrer and granted Plaintiff leave to amend.

On June 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”).  In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: (1) dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835, against County, City, State, and Does 1 through 50; (2) premises liability, against MLS, Exposition Park, LAFC, and Does 51 through 75; and (3) negligence, against MLS, Exposition Park, LAFC, and Does 76 through 100.

In July and August 2023, LAFC, MLS, State, and City filed Answers to the FAC.

On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained County’s demurrer and granted Plaintiff leave to amend.

On February 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).  In the SAC, Plaintiff again asserts three causes of action: (1) dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835, against County, City, State, and Does 1 through 50; (2) premises liability, against MLS, Exposition Park, LAFC, and Does 51 through 75; and (3) negligence, against MLS, Exposition Park, LAFC, and Does 76 through 100.

In March and April 2024, County, LAFC, MLS, State, and City filed Answers to the SAC.

On September 23, 2024, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed County.

On November 18, 2024, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed MLS.

On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff amended the SAC to name Everpark, Inc., as Doe 1.

On May 9, 2025, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed City.

Currently before the Court and set for hearing on May 29, 2025, is a motion for summary judgment filed on October 3, 2024, by MLS and LAFC.

No opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Request for Judicial Notice

MLS and LAFC request judicial notice of Plaintiff’s SAC, the Los Angeles Coliseum Event Calendar for August 18, 2022, and the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum’s address of 3911 S. Figueroa Street in Los Angeles.

The Court takes judicial notice of the SAC under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). 

The Court takes judicial notice of the address of the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h).

MLS and LAFC provide no authority for judicial notice to be taken as to the schedule of events for the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, and provide no argument as to which code section could apply. Accordingly, the request for judicial notice of the event schedule is denied.

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that while this motion was pending, Plaintiff filed a request to dismiss MLS.  Accordingly, the motion of MLS is moot. 

The Court proceeds now to the merits of the motion of LAFC.

Exposition Park is bounded by Exposition Boulevard on the north, Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard on the south, Figueroa Street on the east, and Vermont Avenue on the west. Defendant’s Undisputed Material Fact [DUMF], No. 1.) Exposition Park is owned by the Sixth District Agricultural Association, an institution of the state of California. (DUMF, No. 2.) BMO Stadium is located at 3939 Figueroa Street in Los Angeles within Exposition Park. (DUMF, No. 3.) The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum is in Exposition Park at 3911 South Figueroa Street. (DUMF, No. 4.) BMO Stadium was leased to LAFC from University of Southern California in 2015. (DUMF, No. 5.) LAFC does not own or control the internal street within Exposition Park. (DUMF, No. 10.)

On August 18, 2022, Plaintiff traveled to Exposition Park to attend a music festival at the Coliseum. (DUMF, Nos. 12, 14.) No events were sponsored at or by the BMO Stadium. (DUMF, No. 13.)

While Plaintiff was in Exposition Park on the day of the music festival, Plaintiff contends she tripped and fell on “metal strip car stoppers.” (DUMF, No. 15.) The stoppers are located on South Coliseum Drive. (DUMF, No. 17.) LAFC’s leased property does not include the Coliseum where Plaintiff was headed or the incident area with the stoppers where Plaintiff tripped and fell. (DUMF, No. 19.) LAFC was not involved in installing the metal stoppers on Exposition Park Drive. (DUMF, No. 20.)

Plaintiff states in her amended special interrogatories responses that she tripped on the metal strip in the parking lot while walking to the stadium. (Exh. C, No 1.)

In the ground lease between University of Southern California and LAFC, Exhibit A to the lease provides the site plan.  (Exh. D.) The site plan shows the sports arena premises. (Ibid.) The area does not include any of the adjacent parking lots to the premises. (Ibid.) However, on Exhibit F to the lease, there does appear to be a VIP parking lot within the confines of the premises. (Ibid.) The VIP parking area is located adjacent to a second parking lot which abuts Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard. (Ibid.)

Brian Thomas, senior director of event services for the Stadium Operations Department for LAFC, is responsible for the direct oversight of the day to day operations, safety & security, guest experience, ticketing, and traffic/parking planning. (Exh. E, Thomas Decl., ¶ 3.) Thomas states that Exhibit A to the lease is an accurate representation fo the BMO Stadium property perimeter. (Id., ¶ 5.) The lease of BMO Stadium has not extended to encompass the internal streets within Exposition Park; permits are required to use the internal streets. (Id. ¶ 7.)  LAFC has not taken part in the installation, maintenance, or upkeep of the anti-reversal grates at issue in this case, which are located on South Coliseum Drive. (Id., ¶ 8.) On August 18, 2022, LAFC did not hold or sponsor an event at BMO Stadium. (Id., ¶ 9.)

LAFC brings this motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication to the following issues:

(1)  The Second Cause of Action for Premises Liability fails as LAFC did not own or control the area;

(2)  The Second Cause of Action for Premises Liability fails as LAFC did not have a duty to Plaintiff in the adjacent incident area;

(3)  The Second Cause of Action for Premises Liability fails because the stoppers are not dangerous;

(4)  The Second Cause of Action for Premises Liability fails because any danger the stoppers posed was open and obvious;

(5)  The Third Cause of Action for Negligence Fails because LAFC did not owe Plaintiff a duty;

(6)  The First Cause of Action under Government Code section 835 is inapplicable to LAFC; and

(7)  The First Cause of Action under Government Code section 835 fails because it is predicated on Plaintiff’s Premises Liability claim.

Plaintiff’s SAC brings the second and third causes of action for premises liability and negligence against LAFC.

First Cause of Action (Dangerous Condition of Public Property)

LAFC is not named as a defendant in the First Cause of Action in the SAC.

Second and Third Causes of Action (Premises Liability and Negligence)

The basic elements of a cause of action for negligence and for premises liability are the same: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court.¿¿(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.)

The general rule governing duty is set forth in Civil Code section 1714: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) This establishes what the California Supreme Court has described as the “default rule” that every person has a legal duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.)

Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their [customers’] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) Although a business owner “is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.)

The duty to keep premises safe (or warn) generally applies to areas that a defendant owns, operates, occupies, manages, or controls. “A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control.” (Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134.) “Where the absence of ownership, possession, or control has been unequivocally established, summary judgment is proper.” (Ibid.) The defendant need not have a legal right to possession of the premises; it is sufficient if there is a showing that the defendant exercised control over the premises in which the dangerous or hazardous condition was present. (Alcarez v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1162-1163.) Liability can also extend to an injury that occurs offsite – if it is caused by a dangerous or hazardous condition on property that is owned, possessed, or controlled by defendant. (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1159.)

Here, LAFC has presented evidence that it did not own, possess, or control the area in which Plaintiff’s accident occurred.  (DUMF, Nos. 1-5, 10, 12-15, 17, 19, 20; Thomas Decl., ¶¶ 3-9.)  This is sufficient to meet LAFC’s initial burden, as a defendant moving for summary judgment to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that there are triable issues of fact on these causes of action.  Plaintiff has not opposed the motion or otherwise made such a showing.

Accordingly, LAFC’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant LAFC Partners, LLP.

The Court DENIES AS MOOT the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Major League Soccer, LLC.

Moving party is to give notice.