Judge Steven A. Ellis, Case Number: 23STCV05000, Date: 2023-08-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV05000, Date: 2023-08-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV05000 Hearing Date: August 21, 2023 Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

Defendant Margaret Wambach Ludwig’s unopposed motion to strike is GRANTED in part with 30 days leave to amend.

Legal Standard

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

Meet and Confer

The motion to strike is accompanied by the declaration of Sally L. Schubert which satisfies the meet and confer requirement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5.)

Legal Standard

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)

To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.)

Discussion

Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint praying for punitive damages, arguing the Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action which would give rise to punitive damages.

Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts showing that defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice to support Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory, devoid of ultimate facts demonstrating Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud.

Plaintiff asserts as follows:

11. At all times mentioned in this complaint, defendant MARGARET WAMBACHLUDWIG, was driving and operating the automobile UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A SUBSTANCE, (despicable conduct) with the consent, permission, and knowledge of defendant MARGARET WAMBACHLUDWIG or authorized agents.

12. On APRIL 28, 2021, defendant MARGARET WAMBACHLUDWIG negligently operated a certain automobile, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A SUBSTANCE, (despicable conduct) and, as a proximate result of that negligent operation, collided with plaintiff. MARGARET WAMBACHLUDWIG knew that “probable serious injury” would result from their decision to be under the influence and drive. (Footnote included). At the aforementioned time and place mentioned herein above, Defendants, and each of them, negligently entrusted, maintained, controlled, managed, drove, manufactured, operated, repaired, distributed, inspected, and repaired said automobile so as to cause their vehicle, or the vehicle carrying them, to collide and come into direct contact with Plaintiff; thereby causing Plaintiff to suffer and sustain sever injuries and damages.

The Court finds these allegations insufficient as to malice, oppression, or fraud.

Thus, the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages (item 6 on page 5) is GRANTED. Defendant has otherwise not shown any basis to strike the other identified portions of the Complaint.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damage is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.