Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV08605, Date: 2023-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08605 Hearing Date: December 6, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
The motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend.
Background
This matter arises from an auto accident that
occurred on December 14, 2021. Plaintiff Carissa Molina (“Plaintiff”) filed the
complaint in this action on April 18, 2023, asserting one cause of action for
negligence against Defendants Alfredo Angel Reyes, Sara Contreras, and Does 1
through 20.
On October 31, 2023, Defendant Sarah
Contreras (erroneously sued as Sara Contreras) (“Defendant”) filed this motion to
strike the portions of the prayer for relief in Plaintiff’s Complaint seeking
attorney’s fees and punitive damages.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.
Legal
Standard
A motion to strike challenges “any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) In ruling
on a motion to strike, the court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded
facts in the complaint or other pleading.
(Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)
Meet and Confer
Counsel for Defendant has filed a declaration
showing that Defendant failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the
moving party. (Ng Decl., ¶ 3 & Exh.
A.) That is sufficient. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3)(B).
Discussion
Attorney’s Fees
Defendant argues
that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that support Plaintiff is entitled to
attorney’s fees.
The general rule
is that “attorneys' fees are not recoverable in personal injury or wrongful
death actions.” (Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 59, 81.) As set forth in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021, “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by
statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at
law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties
to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter
provided.”
Plaintiff has
stated no basis for the recovery of attorney’s fees in this action. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion
to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees.
Punitive Damages
“‘In
order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth
the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code
section 3294.” (Today IV’s Inc. v. Los Angeles County MTA (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.) Civil Code section 3294 provides that on non-contract
causes of action, plaintiffs may recover punitive damages when they prove “by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Oppression”
is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust
hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is defined as “an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) “Malice” is
defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) The term “despicable,” which is used
in the definition of “oppression” and “malice” refers to actions that are
“base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v.
Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th
847, 891.) In general, punitive damages
are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in
blatant violation of law or policy. (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017.)
To
show that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others,” it is not enough to establish negligence, gross
negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal.
App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the
defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury
could infer that he knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury
to others.” (Id. at p. 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient
for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant’s conduct was “despicable,”
defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College
Hosp., Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)
In a complaint, the plaintiff must allege specific facts showing
that the defendant has been guilty of malice,
oppression or fraud. (Id. at p. 721.) The basis for punitive damages
must be pleaded with particularity; conclusory allegations devoid of any
factual assertions are insufficient. (Smith v. Super. Ct. (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.; see also Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc.
v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.)
General allegations that a defendant consumed alcohol before an accident
or appeared to be under the influence, without more, are not enough to state a
claim for punitive damages. (See Taylor
v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 [specific facts alleged with particularity];
Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82 [same].)
Here, Plaintiff
fails to allege facts with particularity to support the claim for punitive
damages. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages.
Leave to Amend
As this is the first ruling on the adequacy of the
pleading, and the defect is one of particularity in pleading, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiff leave to amend.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND.
The Court strikes items 5 and 6 in the prayer for
relief. (Complaint, at p. 4.)
The Court GRANTS
Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 14 days of notice of this
ruling.
Defendants
are ORDERED to respond to Plaintiff’s operative pleading by the later of (a) 28
days from notice of this order or (b) 21 days from service of any amended
complaint.
Moving party
is ordered to give notice.