Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV12059, Date: 2025-01-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV12059    Hearing Date: January 21, 2025    Dept: 29

Rivera v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
23STCV12059
Motion for Judgment on Pleadings Filed by City of Los Angeles

Tentative

The motion is denied.

Background

On May 30, 2023, Elio Vallecillo Rivera (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”) and Does 1 through 20 asserting a cause of action for “negligence and statutory liability” arising out of an incident on September 19, 2022, in which Plaintiff alleges that he was injured while riding on or exiting a bus.

On July 21, 2023, Metro filed an answer to the complaint.

On September 20, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name City of Los Angeles (“City”) as Doe 1.

Plaintiff failed to submit a timely claim to Metro under the Government Claims Act.  On November 17, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for permission to file a late tort claim.

On January 4, 2024, City filed an answer to the complaint and also filed a cross-complaint against Metro and Does 1 through 10.

On February 2, 2024, Metro filed an answer to City’s cross-complaint.

On June 4, 2024, the Court granted Metro’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in relation to the complaint.  On August 7, 2024, the Court entered judgment in favor of Metro and against Plaintiff on the complaint.

On November 18, 2024, City filed a request to dismiss its cross-complaint against Metro.

On November 6, 2024, City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The motion was noticed for hearing on December 2, 2024.  On November 7, the Court denied City’s ex parte application to shorten time on the hearing.  On December 2, the Court denied City’s motion, on procedural grounds, as the notice of the motion was untimely.

On December 4, 2024, City filed this new motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 8, 2025.

Trial is scheduled for February 19, 2025.

Legal Standard

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) 

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)  “The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322; accord Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 494; Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730, 735; Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216; see also 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [2024] ¶ 7:275.) 

California practice recognizes two types of motions for judgment on the pleadings.  First, there is a statutory motion, which must be filed within certain time limits and which is subject to a statutory meet-and-confer requirement.  Second, there is a nonstatutory motion for judgment on the pleadings, which “may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself.”  (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.)    

Discussion

City brings this nonstatutory motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the allegations against it (as Doe 1) in the complaint are insufficient to state a cause of action.  In ruling on this motion, the Court must apply the same standard as it would in ruling on a demurrer.  All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleading.  (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)  The Court must “liberally construe the pleading” and “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context.”  (Id. at p. 105.)  Even “improbable” facts alleged in the pleading must be accepted as true.  (Id.  at pp. 104-105.)

City’s argument is that Plaintiff’s injury occurred while Plaintiff was riding or exiting a bus operated by Metro.  In support of this argument, City cites various documents, of which City requests that the Court take judicial notice, and City argues that it and Metro are separate legal entities. 

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not filed a proper request for judicial notice, which should be a separately filed and captioned document.

In any event, even if the Court were to take judicial notice of the documents cited (which the Court declines to do), it would not change the result.  Plaintiff has alleged (among other things) that City (as Doe 1) owned, leased, or rented the bus at issue and authorized Metro to transport Plaintiff in the bus.  (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-12.)  On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must accept these allegations as true.  Even if Metro is also a cause of Plaintiff’s injuries, and even if Metro is the primary cause of Plaintiff’s injuries, this does not absolve City of all potential liability.    

Accordingly, the motion is denied.

Conclusion

The Court DENIES City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Moving Party is ORDERED to give notice.