Judge Steven A. Ellis, Case Number: 23STCV13237, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV13237, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13237 Hearing Date: November 7, 2024 Dept: 29

Blackwell v. Wesix QOZ, LP
23STCV13237
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Amendment to Cross-Complaint

Tentative

The motion to strike is DENIED.

Background

On June 9, 2023, Yolanda Blackwell (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against 3751 Wesix QOZ, LP; 3751 Wesix QOZ, LLC (collectively “Defendants”); and Does 1 through 100, asserting a cause of action for premises liability arising out of an alleged trip and fall on June 18, 2021, on premises located at 3751 West Sixth Street in Los Angeles. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7-11.)

On September 6, 2023, Defendants filed an answer to the complaint. On the same day, they filed a cross-complaint for indemnity, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief against Roes 1 through 50.

On October 10, 2024, Defendants amended the cross-complaint to name United States Postal Service as Roe 1.

On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion to strike the amendment to Defendants’ cross-complaint. Defendants filed an opposition on October 25. No reply has been filed.

Trial is scheduled for June 11, 2025.

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, “Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides as follows:

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded facts in the complaint or other pleading. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

“Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 474 provides, in relevant part:

“When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint …, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly .…”

In general, an amendment to a pleading to provide the true name of a Doe defendant relates back to the date the pleading was filed; this allows a plaintiff, effectively, to extend or enlarge the statute of limitations period. (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 932.)

For a Doe amendment to relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint, however, Plaintiff must have been genuinely ignorant of the defendant’s identity at the time the original complaint was filed. (Woo v. Super. Ct. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 177.)

As the Court of Appeal has explained, in determining whether a plaintiff is “ignorant of the name of a defendant” under section 474:

“The test is whether, at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiff was ignorant of the facts giving [her] a cause of against the person. The focus is on the fact that the plaintiff knew, not on whether the plaintiff subjectively knew she had a cause of action based on those facts. While the plaintiff’s ignorance must be genuine, and the plaintiff cannot claim ignorance simply because she did not know all the details of the person’s involvement, the plaintiff is not barred from invoking section 474 merely because she suspected the person of wrongdoing based on an incomplete set of facts.”

(Hahn v. New York Air Brake LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 895, 899-900 [citations omitted]; see also, e.g., McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 374 [plaintiff must have “knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability is probable”]; General Motors Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 585 [plaintiff may rely on section 474 even if he has a “suspicion of wrongdoing” by defendant].)

The test is actual ignorance. For purposes of section 474, a plaintiff has no “duty to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain facts she ‘should have known.’” (Hahn, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 900; accord General Motors, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 594-596.)

Section 474 is to be “liberally construed” in favor of the pleader. (General Motors, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 593 [collecting cases].)

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the complaint in this action. Although the request is almost certainly unnecessary, it is granted.

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the meet and confer requirement is met. (Light Decl., ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ amendment to cross-complaint adding the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) is improper under Code of Civil Procedure section 474 because Defendants knew of USPS at the time of filing their cross-complaint.

Assuming that is true (and it should be noted that Defendants argue that they did not know of the culpability of USPS when they filed the cross-complaint), the result is that the Court would not apply the relation back rule to the Roe amendment. And so USPS could argue that the statutes of limitations for Defendants’ causes of action in the cross-complaint against USPS were not tolled by the filing of the cross-complaint.

But USPS has not appeared, and it is unclear whether USPS has even been served. If and when USPS appears, it may assert whatever defenses it has, including (if applicable) a statute of limitations defense.

Plaintiff, however, has no standing to assert this statute of limitations defense on behalf of USPS. Indeed, Plaintiff has no interest in any allocation of responsibility as between USPS and Defendants.

For that reason, as well as that the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants had actual knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe that the liability of USPS was probable (as opposed to a mere suspicion), the motion is denied.

Conclusion

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike.

Moving Party is to give notice.