Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV13659, Date: 2024-12-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV13659 Hearing Date: December 4, 2024 Dept: 29
Anderson
v. Haynes
23STCV13659
Defendant Jaylen Whitt’s Motion to Strike
Tentative
The motion is granted with leave to amend.
Background
On June 14,
2023, Howard Anderson (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Alana Haynes, Tamara
Whitt, and Does 1 through 20, asserting a single cause of action for negligence
arising out of an automobile accident occurring on October 20, 2021.
On September 8,
2023, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed all causes of action
against Alana Haynes.
On April 29, 2024,
Tamara Whitt filed an answer.
On August 12,
2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Jaylen Whitt as Doe 1.
On November
5, 2024, Defendant Jaylen Whitt (“Defendant”) filed this motion to strike the
requests for punitive damages and attorney’s fees from the prayer for relief in
Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 19, and Defendant
filed a reply on November 21.
Legal
Standard
Under Code of Civil
Procedure section 435, “Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading
may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)
Code of Civil
Procedure section 436 provides:
“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435,
or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:
(a) Strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike out all or
any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”
(Code Civ. Proc., §
436.) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court must assume the truth of the properly
pleaded facts in the complaint or other pleading. (Turman v. Turning Point
of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)
Discussion
The motion to strike is accompanied by the
declaration of Melika Shafouri,
which satisfies the statutory meet and confer
requirement. (Code of Civ.
Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).) In addition,
notwithstanding Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, the motion to strike satisfies
all applicable procedural requirements.
Defendant moves to
strike the requests for punitive damages and attorney’s fees in the prayer for
relief on page 4 of the complaint. Defendant argues that punitive damages cannot be recovered for
negligent conduct, and that although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was
driving under the influence, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks sufficient allegations
to support the claim for punitive damages.
In addition, Defendant argues that the complaint sets forth no basis for
the recovery of attorney’s fees.
Beginning with the issue
of punitive damages, the law is clear that to recover
punitive damages in a tort action, Civil Code section 3294 requires a plaintiff
to prove by clear and convincing evidence “that the defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (a); see also (College Hosp., Inc. v. Super. Ct.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721; Smith v. Super. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th
1033, 1042.)
“Malice” is defined in section
3294, subdivision (c)(1), as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with
a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”
“Oppression” is defined in
section 3294, subdivision (c)(2), as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to
cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”
“Fraud” is defined in section
3294, subdivision (c)(3), as “an
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known
to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”
The term “despicable conduct,” as used in subdivisions (c)(1) and
(c)(2), has been defined in the case
law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales &
Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th
847, 891; see also CACI 3940 [“Despicable conduct is conduct that is so
vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by
reasonable people.”].)
The
basis for punitive damages must be pleaded with particularity; conclusory
allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Ibid.;
see also Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 598, 643.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if
proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud,
or oppression. (Today IV’s Inc. v. Los Angeles County MTA (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
1137, 1193; Turman, supra, 191 Cal. App. 4th at p. 63.)
Pleading negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness is not
sufficient. (Dawes v. Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.)
Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant intended
to cause harm to plaintiff or “acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible
manner that the jury could infer that [the defendant] knowingly disregarded the
substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at p. 90; see also,
e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter
& Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017.).
In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, the
California Supreme Court addressed whether punitive damages may be recovered in
an action based upon allegedly intoxicated driving. As the court, stated, “the
act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of
“malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a
conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Id. at p.
892.) “One who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume
alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that
he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean
Prosser, ‘such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others
that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.’” (Id. at p. 899.) But
the court also noted, “Although the circumstances in a particular case may
disclose similar wilful or wanton behavior in other forms, ordinarily, routine
negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an
award of punitive damages.” (Id. at pp. 899-900.)
Subsequently, in Dawes v.
Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, the Court of Appeal, applying and
interpreting Taylor, held that driving while intoxicated does not always
give rise to a claim for punitive damages. (Id. at p. 89.) “[W]e do not
agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and
decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as
the risk created by an intoxicated driver's decision to zigzag in and out of traffic
at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the
afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary
driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily
probable.” (Ibid.)
Applying these principles, the
California Supreme Court in Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147
issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its order granting
a motion to strike punitive damages allegations. In that case, plaintiff alleged that
defendant had earlier in the day driven in excess of 100 miles per hour; that
plaintiff had objected to the high speed; and defendant, after consuming
additional alcohol, then drove at a speed in excess of 75 miles per hour. (Id., at p. 162.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges that “defendant Alana Haynes and/or Tamara
White” drove under the influence “with the consent, permission, and knowledge
of defendant Alana Haynes and/or Tamara Whitt.”
(Complaint, ¶ 11; see also id., ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff also alleges that each of the Defendants negligently entrusted
the vehicle. (Id., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff otherwise alleges that Defendants
negligently operated the vehicle which resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id., ¶¶ 13-16.)
The Court
has carefully reviewed the Complaint as well as the argument presented by both
sides. Based upon its independent review
of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts
sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages against Defendant Jaylen
Whitt. More than mere negligence is
required to recover punitive damages, and, labels and conclusions aside, the
Complaint does not contain sufficiently particular factual allegations of oppression,
fraud, or malice by Defendant. Plaintiff
does not allege (for example) that Defendant Jaylen Whitt knowingly drove under
the influence in a reckless manner at high rates of speed or knowingly
entrusted a vehicle to a highly intoxicated person.
Turning to the issue of
attorney’s fees, Plaintiff does not plead in the Complaint any statute, contract,
or other basis for Plaintiff to recover such fees.
Accordingly, the motion
to strike is granted. As this is the
first pleading by Plaintiff, and the defect is an absence of sufficient
particularity, leave to amend is granted.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS
Defendant Jaylen Whitt’s motion to strike paragraphs 5 & 6 of the prayer
for relief in the Complaint as against this moving defendant.
The Court GRANTS
Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND within 10 days of notice.
Moving Party is
ORDERED to give notice.