Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV13913, Date: 2024-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13913    Hearing Date: October 18, 2024    Dept: 29

Garcia v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
23STCV13913
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to Respond to Form Interrogatories (Set One)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to Respond to Special Interrogatories (Set One)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to Respond to Requests for Production (Set One)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Defendant to Have Admitted the Truth of the Matters Specified in Requests for Admission (Set One).

Tentative

The motions to compel are denied as moot.

The motion for a deemed-admitted order is denied.

The requests for sanctions are granted in part and denied in part.

Background

Three related cases arise out of a bus colliding with another vehicle on September 7, 2022.

In the first filed matter (Case No. 23STCV09010) Plaintiff Jack Axelrod (“Axelrod”) filed a complaint on April 24, 2023, against Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”) and Does 1 through 25 (the “Axelrod Action”).

On August 16, 2023, Metro filed an answer.

On July 25, 2024, Axelrod amended the complaint to name Susana Covian (“Covian”) as Doe 1.

On September 4, 2024, Covian filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Metro and Roes 1 through 10.

In the second filed action (Case No. 23STCV12815) Azucena Rojas and Efrain Mercado (collectively, the “Rojas Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint on June 6, 2023, against Covian, Metro, and Does 1 through 50 (the “Rojas Action”).

On October 26, 2023, Covian filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Metro and Roes 1 through 10. 

On November 7, 2023, Metro filed an answer to the complaint.  On January 16, 2024, filed an answer to Covian’s cross-complaint.

In this action, the third filed action (Case No. 23STCV13913), Ana Belen Garcia (“Garcia”) filed a complaint on June 15, 2023, against Metro, Doe Driver, and Does 1 through 100 (the “Garcia Action”).

On May 2, 2024, Metro filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Roes 1 through 20.

On August 12, 2024, Garcia filed these four discovery motions: (1) to compel Metro to respond to form interrogatories; (2) to compel Metro to respond to special interrogatories; (3) to compel Metro to respond to requests for production; and (4) for an order deeming Metro to have admitted the truth of the matters specified in requests for admission.  Garcia filed amended motions on August 14.

Metro filed oppositions on October 4, and Garcia filed replies on October 11.

Legal Standard

A party must respond to interrogatories within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.260, subd.(a).) If a party to whom interrogatories are directed does not provide a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (Id., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) There is no time limit for a motion to compel initial responses, and no meet and confer efforts are required. (See Id., § 2030.290; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.) Nor must a separate statement be filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b)(1).)  In addition, a party who fails to provide a timely response generally waives all objections.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).)

When a party moves to compel initial responses to interrogatories, “the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes [the motion], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).)

A party must respond to requests for production of documents within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.260, subd.(a).) If a party to whom requests for production of documents are directed does not provide timely responses, the requesting party may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (Id., § 2031.300, subd. (b).) There is no time limit for a motion to compel initial responses, and no meet and confer efforts are required. (See id., § 2031.300; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.) Nor must a separate statement be filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b)(1).)  In addition, a party who fails to provide a timely response generally waives all objections.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a).)

When a party moves to compel initial responses to requests for production, “the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes [the motion], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (c).)

A party must respond to requests for admission within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.250, subd.(a).) If a party to whom requests for admission are directed does not provide a timely response, the propounding party “may move for an order that … the truth of [the] matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) There is no time limit for such a motion, and no meet and confer efforts are required. (See id., § 2033.280; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.) Nor must a separate statement be filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b)(1).)  In addition, a party who fails to provide a timely response generally waives all objections.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (a).)

The court “shall” make the order that the truth of the matters specified in the request be deemed admitted unless the court “finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c); see St. Mary v. Super. Ct. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 778-780.)

“It is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion [to deem admitted the truth of the matters specified in the requests for admission].”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)

In Chapter 7 of the Civil Discovery Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, subdivision (d), defines “[m]isuses of the discovery process” to include “[f]ailing to respond to or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.”  Where a party or attorney has engaged in misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose a monetary sanction in the amount of “the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020, subd. (a).)

Discussion

On February 27, 2024, Garcia served Metro with Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission. (Khorshidi Decls., ¶ 2 & Exhs. A.)  Metro did not serve timely responses.  (Id., ¶ 3.) 

Although not required to do so, Garcia followed up with Metro about the responses.  Metro requested extensions, which Garcia granted, but Metro repeatedly failed to serve responses as promised.  (Ibid.)  At the time of filing the motions in August, almost six months after the discovery was served, Metro had not responded to the discovery.  (Ibid.) 

Finally, on September 30, 2024, Metro served discovery responses.  (Brooks Decls., ¶¶ 3, 5.) 

As the discovery responses have been served, the motions to compel are denied as moot, and the motion for a deemed-admitted order is denied.

As the three motions to compel are denied (as moot), the Court also denies the requests for sanctions.  The statutes at issue authorize sanctions against any party, person, or attorney “who unsuccessfully makes or opposes” the motion.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ § 2030.290, subd. (c) & 2031.300, subd. (c).)  Here, the motion is denied, and so Metro has not unsuccessfully opposed the motion.

As to the motion for a deemed-admitted order, the Court grants the request for sanctions in part.  For this category of motions, the Legislature has determined that sanctions are “mandatory” against the party or attorney “whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)  That is plainly the case here.  The Court understands that Metro’s counsel has faced a series of issues (including illness and evacuation orders), but the imposition of sanctions is “mandatory,” and, given the six-month delay in providing responses, the conduct of Metro and its counsel is not substantially justified, and the imposition of sanctions would not be unjust.

The Court sets sanctions in the amount of $660, calculated based on two hours of attorney time multiplied by a reasonable billing rate of $300 per hour for work of this nature, plus a $60 filing fee.  (See Khorshidi Decl., ¶ 5.)

Conclusion

The Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority to Respond to Form Interrogatories (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), and Requests for Production of Documents (Set One).

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for an order deeming Metro to have admitted the truth of the matters specified in Requests for Admissions (Set One).

The Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions.

The Court ORDERS Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and its attorneys of record, Jeffrey M. Lenkov, Esq. (“Lenkov”) and Becky Brooks, Esq., jointly and severally, to pay $660 in monetary sanctions under the Civil Discovery Act to Plaintiff Garcia (through counsel) within 30 days of notice of this order.