Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV16910, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV16910 Hearing Date: January 25, 2024 Dept: 29
Tentative
The Court GRANTS
in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash.
BACKGROUND
On July 19, 2023, Plaintiff Sara Azoulay (“Plaintiff”) filed the Complaint in this action against
Defendants Essex Property Trust, Inc. (“Defendant”),
Stefania Ghilarducci, and Does 1 through 100.
Plaintiff asserts causes of action for general negligence and premises liability
arising out of an alleged slip and fall on August 2, 2021, at premises located
on Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles.
Defendant filed its Answer to the Complaint on August 28, 2023.
On or about December 13, 2023, Defendant
issued a subpoena to AGG Legal Staffing seeking the production of Plaintiff’s employment
and medical records, including her attendance records; job duties; employment
applications and resumes; records of medical examinations, illnesses, or
injuries; and records regarding termination or separation. The time period is ambiguous: either from the
first day of employment or August 2, 2011, to the present. Medical records are limited to neck, right wrist,
right arm, left knee, left leg, face, and head.
(Peerali Decl., Exh. A.)
On December 29,
2023, Plaintiff filed the motion to quash the subpoena. Defendant filed its
opposition on January 11, and Plaintiff filed her reply on January 17.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Code of Civil
Procedure § 1987.1(a) states:
If a subpoena requires the attendance of a
witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored
information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue
therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably
made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion
after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order
quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it
upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective
orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate
to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including
unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.
The California Constitution recognizes that
all people have “inalienable rights,” including “pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy.” (Cal. Const.,
art. 1, § 1.)
For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might
reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or
facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Generally, all unprivileged information that is relevant to the
subject matter of the action is discoverable if it would itself be admissible
evidence at trial or if it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ.
Proc. § 2017.010; Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant seeks to obtain, by subpoena,
Plaintiff’s employment and medical records.
Plaintiff argues that the subpoena is overly broad in scope and time and
violates her right to privacy.
California’s Constitutional right to privacy
protects against the unwarranted, compelled disclosure of various private or
sensitive information regarding one’s personal life.¿ (Britt v. Superior
Court (1978)20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.)¿¿This includes employment and medical records.¿¿(El
Dorado Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d
342, 345 (employment); Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119
Cal.App.3d 516, 526 (employment); John B. v. Super. Ct. (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1177, 1198 (medical records); see also Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Super. Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656 (financial records).) “The public
interest in preserving confidential, personnel information generally outweighs
a private litigant's interest in obtaining that information.”¿ (Life
Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652,
disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3
Cal.5th 531.)
In Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3
Cal.5th 531, Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th
1, and other cases, the California Supreme Court has established “a framework
for evaluating potential invasions of privacy.” (Williams, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 552.) First, a party asserting a privacy right must establish “a
legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is
serious.” (Id., citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 35-37.) In
response, the party seeking the information may raise “whatever legitimate and
important countervailing interests disclosure serves,” and “the party seeking
protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or
protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Id.,
citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 37-40.) The court must then
“balance these competing considerations.” (Ibid.) The party seeking the
information need not, however, establish a “compelling interest” unless the
disclosure would be “an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal
autonomy.” (Id. at p. 556.)
Under
the Williams and Hill framework, Plaintiff here must first
establish a legally protected privacy interest and a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Plaintiff has done so. The employment
and medical records covered by the subpoena are protected by the right to
privacy, and Plaintiff has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
these records.
Next, the Subpoenas appear on their face to be a
serious intrusion into Plaintiff’s right to privacy. The circumstances relating
to Plaintiff’s employment, including employment and termination records, and Plaintiff’s
medical records are private, personal, and sensitive.
At this point, under Williams and Hill,
Defendant must identify the “legitimate and important countervailing
interests” that disclosure would serve. For example, Defendant may attempt to
show that the discovery sought in the subpoena is “directly relevant” to the
claims or defenses in dispute and is “essential to the fair resolution of the
lawsuit.” (Lantz v. Super. Ct. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854.)
Here, there are six categories of records that
Defendants seek.
1. “Days and hours absent from work, and the reasons thereof.” Defendant asserts it is “entitled” to
information regarding time Plaintiff missed at work from injuries from this
accident or similar conditions.
2. “Job duties, job title and employment capacity.” Defendant states that information regarding “any
physical capabilities relevant to the job” is relevant.
3. “Records of medical examinations for employment and for
illness or injury during the course of employment.” Defendant seeks information regarding potential
similar work injuries or potential physical limitations regarding her
employment.
4. “Any and all resumes submitted by or on behalf of the employee.” This information, Defendant argues, “would
verify Plaintiff’s employment history” and “accommodations.”
5. “Any and all employment applications prepared or filled out by
the employee.” Defendant makes a similar
argument for this category of records as well.
6.
“All records
regarding any termination and/or separation report regarding the employee including
the reasons therefore.” Defendant states
this information is relevant to determine whether the reason for termination
was because of physical capabilities or other reasons.
The Court has considered the evidence and argument submitted
by both sides and determines that Defendant has made an adequate showing of a
legitimate and countervailing interest as to categories 1 and 3 only. Information regarding Plaintiff’s health and
work absences, particularly in the period immediately following the accident,
are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims.
As to the other categories 2, 4, 5, and 6, however, Plaintiff has confirmed
that she is not making a claim for lost wages, and Defendant’s arguments do not
establish a legitimate and countervailing interest as to records sought in
these requests.
With regard to categories 1 and 3, Plaintiff has not
identified any feasible alternatives that would serve the same interests and
diminish the loss of privacy. Discovery
from other sources would not necessarily contain the same information as that
in the subpoenaed records.
Finally, under the framework set out in Hill
and reaffirmed in Williams, the Court must balance the “competing
considerations” of the serious intrusion into Plaintiff’s privacy and
Defendant’s legitimate need for the information. This balancing of competing considerations is
necessarily a difficult and delicate task, and it is particularly challenging
here as the Court does not know what the subpoenaed records will reveal.
Nonetheless, the Court must and will conduct the balancing based on the
information before it in the record.
On balance, and after considering all of the
evidence in the record and the arguments of both sides, the Court finds that
Defendant’s legitimate interest in obtaining some, but not all, of the records
requested in the subpoena outweighs Plaintiff’s substantial privacy interest,
and that the proper balancing of the competing interests requires limiting the
time scope of the records requested in categories 1 and 3. Accordingly, the Court will narrow categories
1 and 3 of the subpoena to cover only the time period of August 2, 2016 (five
years before the alleged accident) to the present.
The Court finds that the time period of the
subpoena, going back to five years before the incident, is reasonable and
strikes the correct balance between Plaintiff’s privacy rights and Defendant’s
legitimate need for information.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS in part and
DENIES in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
The Court GRANTS
in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash.
Specifically, the
Court MODIFIES
the subpoena as follows:
First, categories 2, 4, 5, and 6 are
stricken.
Second, the time period is limited
to August 2, 2016 to the present.
With these modifications, the motion
to quash is otherwise DENIED.
Defendant is ordered to give notice.