Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV16974, Date: 2024-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV16974 Hearing Date: December 6, 2024 Dept: 29
Paige v. City of Los Angeles
23STCV16974
Motion for Terminating Sanctions filed by Defendant County of Los Angeles
Motion for Terminating Sanctions filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles
Tentative
The motions are denied.
Background
County filed an answer on September 7, 2023. City filed an answer on September 11, 2023.
On February 2, 2024, the Court granted the motion of
Plaintiff’s counsel to be relieved. Since
that time, Plaintiff has been a self-represented litigant.
On July 16, 2024, the Court granted City’s motions to
compel Plaintiff to respond to form interrogatories, special interrogatories,
and requests for production. The Court also
ordered Plaintiff to pay sanctions in the amount of $1,125 to City.
On the same day, July 16, 2024, the Court granted County’s
motion to compel Plaintiff to respond to form interrogatories, special
interrogatories, and requests for production, and granted County’s motion for
an order deeming Plaintiff to have admitted the truth of the matters specified
in requests for admission. The Court also
ordered Plaintiff to pay sanctions in the amount of $1,500 to County.
On October 9, 2024, the Court granted County’s motion to
compel Plaintiff to appear for deposition.
The Court also ordered Plaintiff to pay sanctions in the amount of $460
to County.
Currently before the Court are two motions for
terminating sanctions.
First, on November 7, 2024, County filed a motion for
terminating sanctions against Plaintiff.
Second, on November 8, 2024, City filed a motion for
terminating sanctions against Plaintiff.
No opposition has been filed to either motion.
Legal Standard
When a plaintiff fails to obey an order compelling answers to
interrogatories, “the court may make those orders that
are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction,
or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section
2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to,
that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).)
When a plaintiff fails to obey an order compelling responses to
requests for production, “the court may
make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction,
an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing
with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in
addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under
Chapter 7.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.300, subd. (c).)
When a party fails to obey an order compelling attendance and
testimony at a deposition, “the court may make those orders that are just,
including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a
terminating sanction under Chapter 7 [of the Civil Discovery Act.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd.
(h).) “In lieu of, or in addition to,
this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 ….” (Ibid.)
In Chapter 7 of the Civil Discovery Act, section 2023.030 provides
for monetary, evidence, issue, and terminating sanctions for any “misuse of the
discovery process,” “[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any
particular discovery method or any other provision of this title.” A “misuse of
the discovery process” is defined to include (among other things) failing to
respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery; making, without
substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making an
evasive response to a discovery request; disobeying a court order to provide
discovery; and making or opposing, unsuccessfully, a motion to compel without
substantial justification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (d)-(h).)
The Civil Discovery Act provides for an escalating and
“incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions
and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination.” (Lopez v. Watchtower
Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th
566, 604.) Discovery sanctions should be appropriate to and commensurate
with the misconduct, and they “should not exceed that which is required to
protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery.” (Doppes
v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) “If a lesser
sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing
misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until
the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.” (Ibid.; see also,
e.g., Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
262, 279-280.)
Terminating sanctions should be used sparingly. (Doppes, supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 992; R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999)
75 Cal. App. 4th 486, 496.) “Although in extreme cases a court has the
authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure, a terminating
sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less
severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly
shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective.” (Lopez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th
at p. 604.) But where discovery violations are “willful,
preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe
sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial
court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” (Doppes, supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Repeated and willful violations of discovery orders
that prejudice the opposing party may warrant a terminating sanction. (Creed-21
v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 702; Los
Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390; Biles
v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327; Lang v.
Hachman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246; Collisson X Kaplan
v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622.)
The
primary purpose of discovery sanctions is to obtain compliance with the Civil
Discovery Act and the Court’s orders. It is not to punish. (Newland v.
Super. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 613; Ghanooni v. Super
Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.) A discovery
sanction should not create a “windfall” for a party or place a party in a
better position than it would have been if the opposing party had simply
complied with its obligations under the Court’s orders and the Civil Discovery
Act. (Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164,
1194; see also 2 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure
Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), ¶¶ 8:2214-2220.)
It is “never
justified” for a court to impose a terminating sanction “solely because of a
failure to pay a monetary discovery sanction.”
(Newland, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.)
Discussion
City’s Motion
for Terminating Sanctions
City moves for
terminating sanctions based primarily on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
Court’s order of July 16, 2024, ordering Plaintiff to provide response to City’s
interrogatories and document requests.
(See Kwon Decl., ¶ 12.)
In the order of
July 16, 2024, the Court ordered City to give notice. According to the proof of service filed by
City, it gave notice by email. (Kwon
Decl., Exh. A.) But Plaintiff has been a
self-represented litigant since February 2024, and – in the absence of express
consent – electronic service on a self-represented litigant is not proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (c).)
Accordingly, there
is no evidence in this record that Plaintiff was properly (or actually) given
notice of the Court’s order of July 16, 2024.
City’s motion for terminating sanctions, based largely on Plaintiff’s
violation of that order, is therefore denied.
(City also appears
to seeks terminating sanctions based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with
discovery propounded by County. The
Court is aware of no authority that would permit the imposition of a
terminating sanction in favor of Defendant #1 based on the failure of a
plaintiff to respond to discovery propounded by Defendant #2, and the Court
declines to do so here.)
County’s Motion
for Terminating Sanctions
City moves for
terminating sanctions based primarily on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
Court’s order of July 16, 2024, ordering Plaintiff to provide response to City’s
interrogatories and document requests; Plaintiff’s failure to appear for a
properly noticed deposition on April 4, 2024; and Plaintiff’s failure to comply
with the Court’s order of October 9, 2024, ordering Plaintiff to appear for
deposition within 15 days. (Kadomatsu
Decl., ¶¶ 9-13.)
Beginning with
the order of July 16, 2024, the Court ordered County to give notice. According to the proof of service filed by County
on August 23, 2024, it gave notice by email.
But Plaintiff has been a self-represented litigant since February 2024,
and – in the absence of express consent – electronic service on a
self-represented litigant is not proper.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (c).)
County did,
however, give Plaintiff notice by mail of his deposition scheduled for April 4,
2024, and Plaintiff failed to appear.
(Kadomatsu Decl., ¶¶ 10-11 & Exhs. F-G.) In response, County moved to compel, and the
Court ordered Plaintiff to appear for deposition “within 15 days of notice of
the Court’s order.” (Minute Order dated
October 9, 2024.) The Court ordered
County to give notice, and County gave notice to Plaintiff by mail on October
9, 2024. (Kadomatsu Decl., ¶ 12 &
Exh. H.) On the same day, County served
Plaintiff by mail with a deposition notice setting his deposition for October
24, 2024. (Ibid.) Plaintiff did not appear. (Id., ¶ 13 & Exh. I.)
Plaintiff
has failed to comply with his obligations under the Civil Discovery act to respond
to written discovery, including interrogatories and requests for production,
and to appear for deposition. Those are
serious instances of misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd.
(d).) Plaintiff then compounded this abuse
by failing to comply with a Court order compelling him to appear for
deposition. (Id., subd.
(g).) Serious sanctions are warranted
for this discovery abuse.
For terminating sanctions, however, a party
must present evidence of repeated and willful misuse of the discovery process,
as well as evidence that less severe sanctions have
not (or likely will not) lead to compliance with the discovery rules. County has not, on this record at this time,
made such a showing. There has not been a showing, for example, that
nonmonetary sanctions short of a terminating sanction have not cured (or would
not cure) Plaintiff’s misconduct.
County does
not seek lesser nonmonetary sanctions and does not seek further monetary
sanctions.
County’s request
for terminating sanctions is denied.
Conclusion
The Court DENIES
the motion for terminating sanctions filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles.
The Court DENIES
the motion for terminating sanctions filed by Defendant County of Los Angeles.