Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV17507, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV17507 Hearing Date: April 11, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion to Strike filed by
Defendant 815 Green, LLC.
Tentative
The motion to strike is granted with leave to amend.
Background
Plaintiff Suyapa Nunez Sanchez
(“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Julio Melendez-Rodriguez (“Melendez”) was
sent by her landlord, 815 Green, LLC (“Landlord”) to fix certain plumbing
issues in Plaintiff’s apartment. On July 20 and 28, 2021, Plaintiff alleges,
Melendez grabbed her, kissed her, and committed other acts of sexual battery
against her.
On July 26, 2023, Plaintiff Suyapa Nunez Sanchez filed the
complaint against Melendez, Landlord, and Does 1 through 20.
Landlord filed a demurrer and motion to strike on December 20,
2023. By order entered on the
stipulation of the parties, the demurrer was resolved. At a court hearing on January 25, 2024, the
Court granted the motion to strike in part, with leave to amend.
On February 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (the
“FAC”) against Melendez, Landlord, and Does 1 through 20, asserting the
following causes of action: (1) Negligent Hiring Retention, Supervision
and Failure to Terminate (against Landlord and Does); (2) Common Law Assault (against
Melendez); (3) Common Law Battery (against Melendez); (4) Sexual Battery in
Violation of Civil Code section 1708.5 (against Melendez and Does); (5) Sexual
Battery in Violation of Civil Code section 51.7 (against Melendez and Does); (6)
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (against Melendez); (7) Premises
Liability (against Landlord and Does); and (8) Violation of the Tom Bane Civil
Rights Act Civil Code section 52.1 (against Melendez and Does).
On March 8, 2024, Defendant filed this motion to strike,
challenging the punitive damages allegations in the FAC. Plaintiff filed her
opposition on March 28, and Defendant filed its reply on April 4.
Legal Standard
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, “Any party, within the
time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to
strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1).)
Code of
Civil Procedure section 436 provides as follows:
“The
court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:
(a) Strike
out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike
out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the
laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”
(Code
Civ. Proc., § 436.) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court must
assume the truth of the properly pleaded facts in the complaint or other
pleading. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)
Preliminary
Matters
The
Court finds that counsel met and conferred as required by Code of Civil
Procedure section 435.5. (Pole Decl., ¶ 4.)
Discussion
To plead a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code
section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant
has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (College Hosp., Inc. v.
Super. Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721; Smith v. Super. Ct. (1992)
10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
“Malice”
is defined in section 3294, subdivision (c)(1), as “conduct which is intended
by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by
the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.”
“Oppression”
is defined in section 3294, subdivision (c)(2), as “despicable conduct
subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that
person’s rights.”
“Fraud”
is defined in section 3294, subdivision (c)(3), as “an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”
The
term “despicable conduct,” as used in subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2), has been
defined in the case law as
actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., College
Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725; Shade Foods, Inc. v.
Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App.
4th 847, 891; see also CACI 3940 [“Despicable conduct is conduct that is
so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by
reasonable people.”].)
The basis for punitive damages must be pleaded with particularity;
conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 721; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643; Smith, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1042.) A
motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support
a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. (Today IV’s Inc. v. Los Angeles
County MTA (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193; Turman,
supra, 191 Cal. App. 4th at p. 63.)
Pleading
negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness is not sufficient. (Dawes
v. Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff
must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant intended to cause harm to
plaintiff or “acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the
jury could infer that [the defendant] knowingly disregarded the substantial
certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at p. 90; see also,
e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017.).
When punitive damages are sought against an employer for the acts
of an employee, a plaintiff must plead, and ultimately prove, that “the
employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed
him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded
or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) When punitive damages are sought against a
corporate employer, “the advance knowledge and conscious disregard,
authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on
the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Ibid.)
The Court has carefully reviewed the FAC as well as
the argument presented by both sides.
Based upon its independent review of the FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages
against Landlord. Plaintiff alleges serious
intentional torts by Melendez that (if proven) would likely provide a basis for
punitive damages against him, but Plaintiff has not made sufficient allegations
against Landlord. Plaintiff alleges, for
example, that Landlord “knew or should have known” that Melendez was dangerous
and unfit, that Landlord failed to train and supervise him, and that Landlord “knowingly
disregarded the foreseeable risk” that Landlord would harm tenants. (FAC, ¶¶ 30-35.) But these are mere conclusions. Plaintiff does not plead, with particularity,
facts in support of these claims. As an
example, Plaintiff does not include in the FAC factual allegations that
Landlord had advance knowledge of Melendez’s unfitness and nonetheless employed
him with conscious disregard for the safety of others, or factual allegations
that Landlord authorized or ratified Melendez’s the wrongful conduct.
Accordingly, the motion to strike is GRANTED.
As this
is a defect in specificity or particularity in pleading, the court again GRANTS
Plaintiff LEAVE to AMEND.
The Court notes,
however, that Plaintiff has already had two opportunities to plead her claim
for punitive damages. The Court is granting Plaintiff one more opportunity, but
Plaintiff should assume that this is her final opportunity to plead, with
adequate specificity and particularity, her claim for punitive damages, at
least at this stage of the litigation.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s
motion to strike.
The Court STRIKES the
following portions of the FAC (only as they relate to Landlord; the allegations
remain in the FAC as to the other defendants): paragraph 25; (only as it relates to Defendant Landlord; the
allegations remain in the complaint as to the other defendants); lines 12-13 of
paragraph 33; paragraph 34; paragraph 40; and item 8 in the Prayer for Relief.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff
leave to amend within 21 days of notice.
Moving party is
ordered to give notice.