Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV17651, Date: 2024-04-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV17651 Hearing Date: April 26, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion to Strike filed by Defendant Reserve Lofts, LLC.
Tentative
The motion is granted with leave to amend.
Background
On July 27, 2023, Mateo Freeman (“Plaintiff”)
filed a complaint against Reserve Lofts LLC, Larry Greenwood, Hakeem Brown, and
Does 1 through 20, asserting causes of action for (1) battery, (2) assault, (3)
false imprisonment, (4) negligence, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional
distress. According to the complaint,
Plaintiff was assaulted and battered on premises owned or controlled by
defendants on West Olympic Boulevard in Los Angeles on October 15, 2021.
On March 29, 2024, Defendant Reserve Lofts
LLC (“Defendant”) filed this motion to
strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint.
No opposition has been filed.
Legal
Standard
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, “Any party, within the
time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to
strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides as follows:
“The court may, upon a motion
made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms
it deems proper:
(a) Strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike out all or
any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) In ruling on a motion to
strike, the court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded facts in the
complaint or other pleading. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California,
Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)
Preliminary Matters
The Court finds that counsel has made an adequate effort to meet
and confer under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5. (Overlid Decl., ¶ 3.)
Discussion
Defendant requests that the Court
strike the following allegations in the complaint relating to punitive damages
and attorney’s fees:
(1) Paragraph 18, in its entirety;
(2) Paragraph 23, in its entirety;
(3) Paragraph 31, in its entirety;
(4) Paragraph 44, in its entirety;
(5) Prayer for relief, paragraph 10, in its
entirety; and
(6) Prayer for relief, paragraph 11, in its
entirety
To recover punitive damages in a tort action, Civil Code
section 3294, subdivision (a), requires that a plaintiff prove by clear and
convincing evidence “that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud,
or malice.” In subdivision (c), the Legislature defines the terms “oppression,”
“fraud,” and “malice” for purposes of recovering punitive damages under section
3294:
(1) “Malice” means conduct which
is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) “Oppression” means despicable
conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious
disregard of that person's rights.
(3) “Fraud” means an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3).)
To plead a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section
3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has
been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (College Hospital, Inc. v.
Super. Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721; Smith v. Super. Ct. (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pleaded with
specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are
insufficient. (Ibid.; see also Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v.
Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.) A motion to strike may lie where
the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant
acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Today IV’s Inc. v. Los Angeles
County MTA (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193; Turman, supra, 191
Cal.App.4th at p. 63.)
In addition, in 1987, the
Legislature amended Civil Code Section 3294 to add the reference to “despicable”
conduct as part of the definition of malice.
This was “a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 725.)
“Used in its ordinary sense, the
adjective ‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are
‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p.
529.)¿As amended to include this word,¿the statute plainly indicates that
absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a
‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional
component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”
(Ibid.; see also CACI 3940
[“Despicable conduct is conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it
would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people.”].)
Pleading negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness is not
sufficient. (Dawes v. Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.)
Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant intended
to cause harm to plaintiff or “acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible
manner that the jury could infer that [the defendant] knowingly disregarded the
substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at p. 90; see
also, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017.).
When
punitive damages are sought against an employer for the acts of an employee, a
plaintiff must plead, and ultimately prove, that “the employer had advance
knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a
conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others or authorized or
ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was
personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
When punitive damages are sought against a corporate employer, “the
advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act
of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or
managing agent of the corporation.” (Ibid.)
The Court has reviewed
Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff alleges
willful and malicious conduct in conclusory terms but does not plead the basis
for punitive damages with the particularity required by the case law. Indeed, it is unclear from the complaint who
is alleged to have engaged in which conduct, or how Defendant (apparently a
corporate employer) is liable for punitive damages.
As to Plaintiff’s claim for
attorney’s fees, Plaintiff has failed to plead a statute or contract that would
provide a basis for the recovery of such fees.
The motion to strike is granted.
Because the defects in the
complaint are of particularity, and because this is the first round of pleading,
the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS
Defendant’s motion to strike paragraphs 18, 23, 31, and 44, and paragraphs
10 and 11 of the Prayer for Relief.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave
to amend within 14 days of notice.
Moving Party is to give notice.