Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV19584, Date: 2025-03-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV19584 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 29
Troy v. California Highway Patrol
23STCV19584
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Tentative
The motion is granted.
Background
On August 16, 2023, Plaintiff Andrew Troy
(“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants California Highway Patrol
(“CHP”) and Does 1 through 100 asserting one cause of action for motor vehicle
negligence arising out of an accident on September 26, 2022, at or near the
intersection of Highland Avenue and Franklin Avenue in Los Angeles.
On September 11, 2023, Plaintiff amended
the complaint to name Christopher Zaguirre Diaz (“Defendant”) as Doe 1.
On September 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a
request to dismiss CHP.
On November 7, 2023, Defendant filed an answer
to the complaint and a cross-complaint against Ismael Castro (“Castro”) and Roes
1 through 5.
On August 19, 2024, Defendant filed this
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 29. Defendant
filed a reply, along with objections to some of Plaintiff’s evidence, on
February 27.
Legal Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations,
trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section
437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if
all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there
is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion
for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the
affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of
fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of
Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v.
Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ...
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
A plaintiff or
cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has
met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show
that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply
“rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Objections to Evidence
Defendant asserts objections to some of
Plaintiff’s evidence.
Evidence presented in support of, or in
opposition to, a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (d); Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne LLC (2017)
2 Cal.5th 536, 541-43.) The court must “consider all of the evidence set forth
in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and
sustained.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
The Court SUSTAINS each of Defendant’s
objections. The Court specifically notes that the traffic accident report is
inadmissible as hearsay and under Vehicle Code section 20013.
Discussion
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendant
drove negligently and caused a motor vehicle accident on September 26, 2022, at
or near the intersection of Highland Avenue and Franklin Avenue in Los Angeles.
(Complaint, at p. 4.)
Defendant is a CHP officer. (Diaz Decl., ¶
1.) On the date of the accident, at approximately 12:38am, Defendant attempted
a traffic stop of a Dodge Charger later determined to be driven by Cross-Defendant
Castro. (Id., ¶ 2.) The Dodge Charger fled, and a high-speed pursuant
ensued. (Ibid.) Defendant was driving an CHP cruiser, an authorized
emergency patrol vehicle, with its emergency lights and sirens activated. (Id.,
¶ 3.)
During the pursuit, and while Defendant was
in immediate pursuit of Castro, Defendant’s CHP cruiser collided with Castro’s
Dodge Charger, which in turn collided with Plaintiff’s Land Rover. (Id.,
¶ 4; Cale Decl., Exhs. B-C [Plaintiff’s Responses to Requests for Admission
Nos. 1, 2, 7].) Castro was arrested. (Diaz Decl., ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s improper
and unsafe driving led to the collision. (Cale Decl., Exhs. D-E [Plaintiff’s
Responses to Form Interrogatories 17.1, 20.6].)
Defendant moves for summary judgment based
on Vehicle Code section 17004. That statute provides:
“A public employee is not liable for civil
damages on account of personal injury to or death of any person or damage to
property resulting from the operation, in the line of duty, of an authorized
emergency vehicle while responding to an emergency call or when in the
immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when
responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm or other emergency
call.”
In Cruz v. Briseno (2000) 22 Cal.4th
568, our Supreme Court has explained, “The language of section 17004 is clear
and unambiguous in immunizing public employees … from civil liability for
injuries incurred while in pursuit of an actual or suspected lawbreaker.” (Id.
at p. 572.) There is no “loss of immunity due to the officer’s negligent or
intentional conduct during the pursuit.” (Ibid.) Although there may be certain
circumstances in which a public entity or agency may be liable, the public
employee is immune from individual civil liability. (Id. at pp. 573-574.)
Notably, in reaching this conclusion in Cruz,
the Supreme Court cited, among other cases, City of Sacramento v.
Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 395, a case on which Plaintiff relies.
In City of Sacramento, the Court of Appeal held that the individual officers
were entitled to immunity under section 17004, but the entity defendant was
not. (Id. at pp. 400.)
Here, it is undisputed that when the
accident occurred, Diaz was a public employee operating an authorized emergency
vehicle in the line of duty, and that he was in immediate pursuit of an actual
or suspected violator of the law. Thus, absent some exception, Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant are barred by Vehicle Code section 17004.
In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff
makes essentially three arguments.
First, Plaintiff argues that there is an
exception to Vehicle Code section 17004 in Vehicle Code section 21056. Section 21056
provides:
“Section 21055 does not relieve the driver
of a vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all
persons using the highway, nor protect him from the consequences of an
arbitrary exercise of the privileges granted in that section.”
Section 21055, in turn, provides that the
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle is, under certain conditions, exempt
from Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Division 11 of the Vehicle
Code, as well as Article 3 and Article 4 of Chapter 5 of Division 16.5 of the Vehicle
Code. (Vehicle Code, § 21055.)
Section 20155 and 20156 have nothing to do
with the immunity granted by Vehicle Code section 17004, which is in Division 9
of the Vehicle Code. Nothing in section 20156 creates an exception to section
17004.
Second, Plaintiff argues that there is an
exception in Vehicle Code section 17001. Section 17001 provides:
“A public entity is liable for death or
injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act
or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public
entity acting within the scope of his employment.”
Here, however, the Defendant is an
individual public employee, not a public entity. Nothing in section 17001 creates
an exception to section 17004.
Third, and finally, Plaintiff argues that
there is an exception in Vehicle Code section 17004.7, subdivision (b)(2). Section
17004.7 creates, under certain circumstances, an immunity for public agencies
employing peace officers. (Vehicle Code, § 17004.7, subd. (b)(1).) This
immunity is “in addition to any other immunity provided by law.” (Id.,
subd. (a).) Even assuming (as Plaintiff argues, and without deciding) that the
conditions for the section 17004.7 immunity are not satisfied, nothing in section
17004.7 creates an exception to section 17004.
Defendant has shown that there is a
complete defense to Plaintiff’s cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Plaintiff has not shown that there is a triable issue of one or more material
facts as to the defense thereto. (Ibid.) Accordingly, Defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The motion is
granted.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Moving party is
to give notice.
Moving party is
to submit a proposed judgment to the Court within 21 days.