Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV20447, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV20447    Hearing Date: March 5, 2025    Dept: 29

Jimenez v. Calloway
23STCV20447
Demurrer filed by Defendant Dejanique Calloway.

 

Tentative

The demurrer is overruled.

Background

On August 25, 2023, Jorge Salazar Jimenez, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Dejanique Calloway (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 20 for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence arising out of an accident on August 27, 2021, on the 110 Freeway near 54th Street in Los Angeles.

 

On February 5, 2025, Defendant filed this demurrer. Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 20, 2025.

 

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 provides:

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.”

A general demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see also 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [2024], ¶ 7:40.)

“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.”  (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; accord Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104.)  All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleading.  (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)  Even “improbable” facts alleged in the pleading must be accepted as true.  (Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 104-105.)

Courts must “liberally construe the pleading” and “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context.”  (Id. at p. 105.)

A complaint must contain a “statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1); see also C.A. v. William S. Hart High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action”].)  Ordinarily, a complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”  (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)  Ultimate facts are those upon which “the right to recover depends” and are “essential” to the cause of action.  (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 643 fn. 2; see also 1 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 6:124.)

A plaintiff is required to plead only “the essential facts of [its] case” that are sufficient “to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the] cause of action.”  (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 550.)  Mere boilerplate or pleading of legal conclusions is not sufficient.  (Id. at p. 551 fn. 5.)  But a plaintiff need not allege “each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of plaintiff’s proof” at trial.  (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 872.)

A demurrer can be sustained only when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

Leave to amend should be granted when “there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.”  (Centinela Freeman, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1010; Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145.)

Meet and Confer Requirement

Before filing a demurrer, the parties must meet and confer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).)  Defendant presents evidence of an attempt to satisfy the requirement.  (Calloway Decl., ¶¶ 2-6.)  The Court also notes that a determination that a meet and confer process was not sufficient is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).)

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that there is a dispute about whether the demurrer was properly served.  A proof of service is attached to the demurrer, but Plaintiff’s counsel contends that no service was made. 

Because the Court is (below) overruling the demurrer on substantive grounds, the Court need not reach, and does not reach, this issue regarding service.  The parties and counsel are advised that all documents filed with the Court must be properly served on the opposing party/counsel.

Turning to the substance of the demurrer, Defendant argues that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain. 

The complaint asserts two causes of action that sound in negligence: motor vehicle negligent and general negligence.  The basic elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Romero v. Los Angeles Rams (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 562, 567.)

The Court has reviewed the complaint and finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to state causes of action for both motor vehicle negligence and general negligence.  Plaintiff alleges Defendant was driving her vehicle on August 27, 2021, on the southbound 110 Freeway at or near 54th Street in Los Angeles; that Defendant negligently failed to yield or stop her vehicle; that Defendant’s vehicle collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle; and that Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result. (Comp. ¶¶ 11-12, 14-21.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant violated statutes, laws and regulations relating to the control of her motor vehicle. (Comp. ¶ 13.)

In the alternative, Defendant demurs on the ground of uncertainty.  Demurrers for uncertainty are “disfavored” and will be sustained “only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.”  (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695.)  A complaint need not be “a model of clarity” and must only contain sufficient allegations to put the defendants on notice of the claims against them.  (Ibid.; see also Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; 1 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶¶7:85-7:86.)  Here, the complaint is not incomprehensible; Defendant can reasonably respond.

Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled.

Conclusion

The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer.

The Court ORDERS Defendant to file an answer to the complaint by March 25, 2025.

Moving Party is to give notice.