Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV22530, Date: 2025-02-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV22530    Hearing Date: February 6, 2025    Dept: 29

Puentes v. City of Los Angeles
23STCV22530
Demurrer filed by Defendants Rania Chamoun and George Chamoun.

Tentative

The hearing on the demurrer is continued for procedural reasons.

Background

On September 18, 2023, Ramiro Marquez Puentes filed a complaint against City of Los Angeles (“City”), County of Los Angeles (“County”), and Does 1 through 100, asserting one cause of action for premises liability – dangerous condition of public property arising out of an incident on September 7, 2022, in which, Plaintiff alleges, he fell on uneven pavement near 709 Irolo Street in Los Angeles.

On February 13, 2024, City filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Roes 1 to 10.

On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff named George Chamoun and Rania Chamoun (collectively “Defendants”) as Does 1 and 2.

On January 13, 2025, Defendants filed a demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint.

No opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 provides:

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.”

A general demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see also 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [2024], ¶ 7:40.)

“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.”  (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; accord Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104.)  All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleading.  (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)  Even “improbable” facts alleged in the pleading must be accepted as true.  (Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 104-105.)

Courts must “liberally construe the pleading” and “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context.”  (Id. at p. 105.)

A complaint must contain a “statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1); see also C.A. v. William S. Hart High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action”].)  Ordinarily, a complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”  (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)  Ultimate facts are those upon which “the right to recover depends” and are “essential” to the cause of action.  (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 643 fn. 2; see also 1 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 6:124.)

A plaintiff is required to plead only “the essential facts of [its] case” that are sufficient “to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the] cause of action.”  (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 550.)  Mere boilerplate or pleading of legal conclusions is not sufficient.  (Id. at p. 551 fn. 5.)  But a plaintiff need not allege “each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of plaintiff’s proof” at trial.  (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 872.)

A demurrer can be sustained only when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

Leave to amend should be granted when “there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.”  (Centinela Freeman, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1010; Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145.)

Meet and Confer Requirement

Before filing a demurrer, the parties must meet and confer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).)  That requirement is satisfied here.  (Ishu Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.)

Discussion

The Court must continue the hearing on this demurrer for procedural reasons.

Service must be made sixteen days before the hearing, plus two additional court days for electronic service.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1005, subd. (b) & 1010.6, subd. (a)(3).)

For a hearing on February 6, 2025, the deadline for personal service of a motion (or here, a demurrer) was sixteen court days earlier, or Tuesday, January 14, 2025.  The deadline for electronic service was two court days earlier, or Friday, January 10, 2025.  Here, the proof of service indicates that the demurrer was served electronically on January 13, 2025.  That is not timely.

Accordingly, the hearing is continued for approximately 30 days.

In addition, the Court orders counsel for all parties to meet and confer to discuss whether the parties can reach a stipulation or other agreement that would obviate the need for a hearing on this demurrer.

Conclusion

The Court CONTINUES the hearing to March __, 2025, at 1:30 pm, in Department 29 of the Spring Street Courthouse.

The Court ORDERS counsel for all parties to meet and confer.

Moving parties are ordered to give notice.