Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV24243, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV24243    Hearing Date: October 2, 2024    Dept: 29

Gordon v. Yard House
23STCV24243
Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement, filed by Defendant LA Live Properties

Tentative

The motion is granted.

 

Background

On October 5, 2023, Sidney Gordon (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Yard House, Darden Restaurants, Inc., L.A. Arena Land Company, LLC, John Doe, and Does 1 through 100, asserting causes of action for (1) assault, (2) battery, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) negligent, and (5) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention causes of action. According to the complaint, on October 8, 2021, Plaintiff was the victim of an unprovoked assault and battery near the exit door of the premises committed by security guard Defendant John Doe, an employee of each of the other defendants. (Complaint, ¶ 8.)

On November 30, 2023, LA Live Properties, LLC, erroneously sued as L.A. Arena Land Company, LLC (“LA Live”), filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Roes 1 through 20.

On December 1, 2023, Yard House USA, Inc. and Darden Restaurants, Inc. (collectively “Yard House”) filed an answer and a cross-complaint against LA Live and Roes 1 through 25.

On September 3, 2024, LA Live filed this motion for determination of good faith settlement. Yard House filed an opposition on September 18. LA Live filed a reply on September 19.

Legal Standard

In a case involving two or more alleged joint tortfeasors, a party may seek a court order under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 determining that a settlement between the plaintiff and one or more of the alleged tortfeasors is in good faith. A judicial determination of good faith “bar[s] any other joint tortfeasor … from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor … for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)

In evaluating whether a settlement has been made in good faith, courts consider the following factors, as set forth by the California Supreme Court in the landmark case Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488:

              1) “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery”;

              2) “the settlor’s proportionate liability”;

              3) “the amount paid in settlement”;

      4) “the allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs”;

5) “a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial”;

              6) the settling party's “financial conditions and insurance policy limits”;

7) any evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”

(Id. at 499.) “Practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Ibid.)

The “good faith” concept in Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of nonsettling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced. (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal. App. 3d 939, 945.) Accordingly, under Tech-Bilt, the party asserting the lack of “good faith” may meet this burden by demonstrating that the settlement is so far "out of the ballpark" as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.) Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a “settlement made in good faith” within the terms of section 877.6. (Ibid.)

The Supreme Court explained that Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is designed to further two equitable policies:

1) encouragement of settlements; and

2) equitable allocation of costs among joint tortfeasors. 

(Ibid.) 

Those policies would not be served by an approach which emphasizes one to the virtual exclusion of the other. (Ibid.) Accordingly, a settlement will not be found in good faith unless the amount is reasonable in light of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. (Std. Pac. of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 589.) Or, as the California Supreme Court has stated, a “defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.)

When a motion seeking a determination under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is not opposed, the burden on the moving parties to show that the settlement was made in good faith is slight. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261 [holding that a “barebones motion” including a declaration setting forth “a brief background of the case is sufficient”].)

When a good faith motion is contested, however, the moving parties have the initial burden of producing evidence in support of the requested good faith determination. (Id. at pp. 1261-1262.) “Section 877.6 and Tech-Bilt require an evidentiary showing, through expert declarations or other means, that the proposed settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.” (Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1351.) “Substantial evidence” is required. (Id. at p. 1352.) A declaration from a settling defendant’s attorney that states, in conclusory fashion, that the client has little or no share of the liability may not be sufficient. (Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834-35; see also 3 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶¶ 12:774, 12:872-873.) 

The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the party opposing the good faith determination.  The “party asserting a lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d); see also 3 Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:875.)

Discussion

LA Live settled with Plaintiff and seeks a determination that the settlement is in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.

The Court must now consider and weigh the various factors set forth in Tech-Bilt and its progeny to determine whether LA Live’s settlement with Plaintiff is a good faith settlement under the statute. Before addressing these factors, however, the Court begins with the evidence in the record regarding the incident.

Plaintiff alleged in the complaint, filed on October 5, 2023, that she was attacked by a security guard near the exit of the Yard House restaurant located at 800 W. Olympic Boulevard in Los Angeles. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) In a discovery response verified under oath on February 21, 2024, Plaintiff repeated her allegation that the assailant was a security guard and the incident occurred within the Yard House restaurant. (Anvari Decl., Exh. 1, p. 31 [Response to Special Interrogatory No. 75].) In June 2024, Yard House stated in a discovery response verified under oath that it did not employ a security guard at the restaurant on the date of the incident. (Id., Exh. 2, at pp. 3-10 [responses to various interrogatories].)

Plaintiff was deposed on August 27, 2024. In the deposition, Plaintiff testified that as she and her friend Kyana Gomez were leaving the restaurant, and after there had been some argument with a Yard House employee, “a bunch of people,” at least six, attacked Ms. Gomez. (Id., Exh. 4 [“Plaintiff’s Depo.”], at pp.22:22-24:10, 29:11-14.) When Plaintiff tried to “grab one of the guys off of her,” Plaintiff was attacked and thrown to the ground. (Id., at p. 24:10-16.) Plaintiff did not know at the time that the attackers were Yard House employees, but when asked whether they were wearing uniforms, Plaintiff answered, “The guys were in all black.” (Id., at pp. 28:17-22, 29:1-3.) The attack occurred inside of the restaurant. (Id., at p. 30:3-5.) No one came to assist Plaintiff and Ms. Gomez. (Id. at p. 31:3-8.)

Plaintiff also testified in her deposition that she signed the verification of the discovery responses but she did not read them. (Id. at pp. 74:5-9, 75:17-22.) When asked about the conflict between her written discovery responses and her deposition testimony, Plaintiff affirmed that her deposition testimony was correct. (Id., at p. 77:7-14.)

Plaintiff testified that she had been drinking alcohol and was intoxicated at the time of the incident. (Id., at pp. 83:11-84:3.) But she denied that her memory was “fuzzy,” insisting that she remembered “that night very well.” (Id., at p. 91:8-17.)

Police were called to the scene. According to a police report, Plaintiff and Ms. Gomez argued with a Yard House employee (Jessie Castillo), and the three “ultimately became involved in a mutual combat fight leading to additional employees at Yard House utilizing physical force to remove [Ms.] Gomez and [Plaintiff] from the location.” (Id., Exh. 6, at p. 15.) Plaintiff and Ms. Gomez then tried to reenter the restaurant to locate Plaintiff’s cell phone; security officers “detained” Plaintiff and Ms. Gomez, and at some point Ms. Gomez “threw a chair” at one of the security guards (Rafel Castillo) and hit him in the arm. (Ibid.) Ms. Gomez was arrested for the attack on the security guard. (Ibid.)

1.                  Rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery.

To address the rough approximation of Plaintiff’s recovery, the Court begins with the evidence in the record regarding Plaintiff’s damages. According to Plaintiff’s discovery responses, verified under oath on February 21, 2024, Plaintiff attributes past medical damages of more than $120,000 to the incident and expects to incur an additional $170,000 in future medical damages. (Prouty Decl., Exh. A., at pp. 10-11, 14 [Responses to Form Interrogatories 6.4 and 6.7].) Plaintiff also seeks to recover $2,040 in lost property and $50,400 in lost income. (Id., at pp. 15-17 [Responses to Form Interrogatories 7.1 and 8.2-8.4].) In total, it appears Plaintiff seeks to recover almost $350,000 in special damages. And, of course, at trial, Plaintiff would also seek to recover general damages.

A calculation of the potential recovery must also take into account the strength or weakness of Plaintiff’s claim. And here there are some significant weaknesses in Plaintiff’s claim. She has substantially changed her sworn testimony regarding the incident. She was, by her own admission, intoxicated at the time of the incident. Her friend, who Plaintiff describes as a victim, is described as a wrongdoer in a police report and was arrested. Plaintiff faces some substantial risk that a finder of fact might find her not credible and might conclude that Plaintiff and her friends were the instigators, not the victims of the incident. In addition, some of the items of her damages appear to be speculative.

The Court also considers that evidence presented by Yard House of settlement discussions. Plaintiff accepted a $20,000 settlement from LA Live and offered to dismiss her claims against Yard House for an additional $175,000. (Anvari Decl., Exh. 3 [email from Plaintiff’s counsel with a date and time stamp of August 20, 2024, at 12:31 p.m.].)

Considering all of the evidence presented, the Court finds that a rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery is in the range of $250,000-450,000, with the recognition that there is some possibility that it could be less (as little as zero, if the finder of fact determines that Plaintiff is not credible) or more (as much as in the high six figures, if the finder of fact determines that Plaintiff is credible in all respects).

2.                  The settlor’s proportionate liability.

All of the evidence indicates that the incident occurred inside the Yard House restaurant. Although Plaintiff has changed her account in other respects, this has remained constant from her complaint to her written discovery responses to her deposition testimony. The police report also indicates the same.

If Plaintiff testifies at trial in a manner similar to her deposition testimony, and if she is found to be credible, a finder of fact could well conclude that Yard House employees attacked her without provocation and/or failed to protect her when others attacked her inside the restaurant. It does not appear that Plaintiff now contends that she was injured in a confrontation with a security guard, and so even if the security guard who did ultimately arrive (Mr. Castillo) was an employee of LA Live, it is not at all clear how that would establish that LA Live has any significant proportion of liability to Plaintiff. To the contrary, at least according to the police report, the confrontation involving the security guard was between him and Ms. Gomez, not Plaintiff. If Plaintiff was wrongfully injured, it was as part of the earlier confrontation with Yard House employees.

Stated in another way, it is possible that Yard House might prevail and convince the finder of fact that it did nothing wrong, and it is also possible that Plaintiff might prevail and convince the finder of fact that Yard House is responsible for her injuries, but there seems to be little likelihood that the finder of fact would conclude that Plaintiff was wrongfully injured and that LA Live is responsible for her injuries.

On this record, the Court determines that LA Live has little to no proportionate liability for Plaintiff’s injuries, most likely between 0 and 10 percent.

3.                  The amount paid in settlement.

LA Live has agreed to pay Plaintiff $20,000. (Prouty Decl., ¶ 7.)

4.                  The allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs.

As there is only one plaintiff, this factor does not apply here.

5.                  A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial

This factor supports a good faith determination.

6.                  The settling party’s financial conditions and insurance policy limits.

LA Live contends it has a policy limit of $2,000,000 for each occurrence and $20,000,000 general aggregate limited.

 

7.                  Any evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.

There is no direct evidence of any collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct.

The Court has considered all of the evidence in the record, all of the arguments of counsel, and each of the Tech-Bilt factors. Taking all of this into account, the Court finds that the settlement between Plaintiff and LA Live is a good faith settlement within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. In particular, the Court finds that the range of LA Live’s potential liability likely falls within the range of zero (at the low end) to $45,000 (at the high end). Given this range of likely potential outcomes, and after consideration of all of the factors, a settlement in the amount of $20,000 is “within the ballpark” and in good faith under section 877.6.

Accordingly, LA Live’s motion is granted.

Conclusion

 

The Court GRANTS the motion and determines that the settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant LA Live Properties, LLC was made in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice.