Judge Steven A. Ellis, Case Number: 23STCV28307, Date: 2025-03-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV28307, Date: 2025-03-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV28307 Hearing Date: March 3, 2025 Dept: 29

Saint-Cyr v. City of Los Angeles
23STCV28307
Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint
Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Tentative

The demurrer is overruled.

The motion to strike is granted with leave to amend.

Background

On November 17, 2023, Frederic Saint-Cyr (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against City of Los Angeles (“City”), County of Los Angeles (“County”), Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”), and Does 1 through 100 for negligence, premises liability, and negligent training, supervision or retention of employees arising out of an incident on October 26, 2022, in which, Plaintiff alleges, he was attacked by two individuals in a parking garage at the MTA Building at 1 Gateway Plaza in Los Angeles.

In May and July 2024, Plaintiff requested dismissal of City and County.

On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting causes of action for premises liability and negligence.

On January 27, 2025, Metro filed this demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiff filed oppositions on February 18, and Metro filed replies on February 24.

Legal Standard

Demurrer

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 provides:

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.”

A general demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see also 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [2024], ¶ 7:40.)

“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; accord Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104.) All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleading. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.) Even “improbable” facts alleged in the pleading must be accepted as true. (Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 104-105.)

Courts must “liberally construe the pleading” and “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context.” (Id. at p. 105.)

A complaint must contain a “statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1); see also C.A. v. William S. Hart High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action”].) Ordinarily, a complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) Ultimate facts are those upon which “the right to recover depends” and are “essential” to the cause of action. (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 643 fn. 2; see also 1 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 6:124.)

A plaintiff is required to plead only “the essential facts of [its] case” that are sufficient “to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the] cause of action.” (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 550.) Mere boilerplate or pleading of legal conclusions is not sufficient. (Id. at p. 551 fn. 5.) But a plaintiff need not allege “each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of plaintiff’s proof” at trial. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 872.)

A demurrer can be sustained only when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

Leave to amend should be granted when “there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Centinela Freeman, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1010; Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145.)

Motion to Strike

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, “Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides:

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded facts in the complaint or other pleading. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

Discussion

The meet and confer requirement for the demurrer and motion to strike is satisfied here. (Sood Decls., ¶¶ 2-3.)

Demurrer

Metro demurs to the FAC on the following grounds: (1) Metro is entitled to immunity under Government Code section 815, as Plaintiff does not allege a violation of a mandatory imposed by statute; (2) Plaintiff’s claims are not plead with sufficient particularity; (3) the crimes or intentional torts of third parties are a superseding cause; (4) Plaintiff fails to state facts that are sufficient to demonstrate that the crimes or intentional torts of third parties was foreseeable; and (5) Plaintiff fails to state facts that are sufficient to demonstrate that Metro had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.

The Court considers each argument in turn.

Immunity Under Government Code Section 815

Under Government Code section 815, subdivision (a), “Except as otherwise provided by statute … A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).)

Metro argues that as it is a public entity, Plaintiff must identify in the complaint a statute that imposes a mandatory duty on Metro and creates a basis for liability.

The FAC does, however, identify a number of statutory bases for liability, including Government Code sections 815.2, 815.4, and 835. (See FAC, ¶¶ 34, 47.)

Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument made by Metro in support of its demurrer.

Pleading with Particularity

Statutory causes of action, including causes of action under the Government Claims Act, must be pleaded with particularity. (Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.) The Court has reviewed the FAC and concludes, however, that it pleads the causes of action with adequate particularity. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 8-9, 13-14, 29-34, 37-40, 47-48.)

Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument made by Metro in support of its demurrer.

Superseding Third Party Conduct and Absence of Foreseeability

Metro contends that the criminal act or intentional torts of third parties operates as a superseding cause and were not foreseeable to Metro.

Plaintiff alleges that in the FAC (among other things) that the location of the attack was in a heavily populated area with significant foot traffic, making it likely that pedestrians would use the subject location. (FAC, ¶ 39.) Plaintiff further alleges (among other things) that reasonable diligence would have alerted Metro that the security of the subject location was not being adequately maintained, creating a dangerous condition. (FAC, ¶ 40.)

At the pleading stage, the FAC contains sufficient allegations to state the causes of action. Whether Plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove these allegations will be addressed at trial (or potentially on summary judgment).

Accordingly, the Court rejects these arguments made by Metro in support of its demurrer.

Actual or Constructive Notice of Dangerous Condition

Last, Metro argues that Plaintiff fails to allege that it had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. But Plaintiff does so allege. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 34, 38.)

Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument made by Metro in support of its demurrer.

The demurrer is overruled.

Motion to Strike

Metro seeks to strike the request for punitive damages from the prayer for relief in the FAC.

To recover punitive damages, Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), requires that a plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence “that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); see also College Hosp., Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721; Smith v. Super. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) In subdivision (c), the Legislature defines the terms “oppression,” “fraud,” and “malice” for purposes of recovering punitive damages under section 3294:

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3).)

The term “despicable conduct,” as used in subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2), has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891; see also CACI 3940 [“Despicable conduct is conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people.”].)

The basis for punitive damages must be pleaded with particularity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643; Smith, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1042.) A motion to strike may also lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. (Today IV’s Inc. v. Los Angeles County MTA (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193; Turman, supra, 191 Cal. App. 4th at p. 63.)

Pleading negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness is not sufficient. (Dawes v. Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant intended to cause harm to plaintiff or “acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that [the defendant] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at p. 90; see also, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017.).

As against Metro, Plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages under a theory of vicarious liability (that is, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Metro, at least in part, as employer or principal for the conduct of its employee or agent). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is governed by Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b). That subdivision provides:

“An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a) [i.e., punitive damages], based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”

Further, “a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Government Code § 818.)

The Court has reviewed the FAC and considered the arguments presented by each side. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not pleaded, with particularity, a basis to recover punitive damages. Mere negligence and allowing a dangerous condition to exist, even if proven, is not sufficient to recover punitive damages.

The motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is granted.

Because the primary basis of the ruling is a failure to allege a basis to recover punitive damages with sufficient particularity, the motion is granted with leave to amend.

Conclusion

The Court OVERRULES Metro’s demurrer to the FAC.

The Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Metro’s motion to strike the request for punitive damages in the prayer for relief.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND by no later than March 20, 2025.

Moving Party is to give notice.