Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 23STCV30423, Date: 2024-04-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30423 Hearing Date: April 10, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion to Strike filed by Defendant Javan Akeen
Martin.
Tentative
The motion is granted, with leave to amend.
Background
On December 13, 2023, Harvey Waldman (“Plaintiff”),
representing himself, filed this action against Javan Akeen Martin
(“Defendant”), John Doe Truck Company, John Doe Truck Operator, and Does 1-2, asserting
causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence arising
out of collision between an automobile (driven by Defendant) and a bicycle (ridden
by Plaintiff) on July 25, 2023.
On March 13, 2024, Defendant filed this
motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and supporting
allegations in paragraphs 12, 20, and 27 in the complaint.
Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition on
April 8, 2024.
Legal
Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 435 authorizes a party to file
a motion to strike. “Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a
pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part
thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides
as follows:
“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant
to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems
proper:
(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike out all or any part of any
pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court
rule, or an order of the court.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court
must assume the truth of the properly pleaded facts in the complaint or other pleading.
(Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191
Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)
Preliminary
Matters
The Court finds
that counsel for the moving party made an adequate effort to meet and confer
under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5. (Ng Decl., ¶¶ 3-4 & Exh. A.)
Discussion
To
plead a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff
must allege specific facts showing that the defendant
has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (College Hosp., Inc. v.
Super. Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721; Smith v. Super. Ct. (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
“Malice” is defined in section
3294, subdivision (c)(1), as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with
a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”
“Oppression” is defined in
section 3294, subdivision (c)(2), as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to
cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”
“Fraud” is defined in section
3294, subdivision (c)(3), as “an
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known
to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”
The term “despicable conduct,” as used in subdivisions (c)(1) and
(c)(2), has been defined in the case
law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales &
Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th
847, 891; see also CACI 3940 [“Despicable conduct is conduct that is so
vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by
reasonable people.”].)
The
basis for punitive damages must be pleaded with particularity; conclusory
allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Ibid.;
see also Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 598, 643.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if
proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud,
or oppression. (Today IV’s Inc. v. Los Angeles County MTA (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
1137, 1193; Turman, supra, 191 Cal. App. 4th at p. 63.)
Pleading negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness is not
sufficient. (Dawes v. Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.)
Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant intended
to cause harm to plaintiff or “acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible
manner that the jury could infer that [the defendant] knowingly disregarded the
substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at p. 90; see also,
e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter
& Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017.).
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint, and finds the
complaint fails to state facts with sufficient particularity to support a claim
against Defendant for the recovery of punitive damages. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
was at fault for the accident; that Defendant was distracted, disabled and/or
impaired, and knew that he was so distracted, disabled and/or impaired; that
Defendant “acted with oppression, fraud and malice” or in “conscious disregard
of Plaintiff’s rights and safety”; and that Defendant drove “negligently and/or
recklessly.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 10-12, 20,
23, 27.) These conclusory statements are
not sufficient under the case law.
Therefore, the
Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages
(Section C of the Prayer for Relief), along with the entirety of paragraphs 20
and 27. The Court denies the motion to strike
the allegations of paragraph 12.
As this
is the initial complaint and the defect is one of specificity in pleading, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS
Defendant’s motion to strike the allegations of paragraphs 20 and 27, and section
C of the Prayer for Relief, of the Complaint.
The Court DENIES
Defendant’s motion to strike the allegations of paragraph 12 of the Complaint
The Court GRANTS
Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 21 days of notice.
The Court ORDERS
Defendant to give notice.