Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 24STCP03455, Date: 2025-02-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP03455 Hearing Date: February 18, 2025 Dept: 29
Paronich v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority
24STCP03455 (related to 23STCV31832)
Petition for an Order Under Government Code Section 946.6
Tentative
The petition
is granted.
Background
In the
related case (Case No. 23STCV31832), Jason Scott Paronich (“Plaintiff”) filed a
complaint on December 29, 2023, against City of Los Angeles (“City”), County of
Los Angeles (“County”), State of California, State of California Department of
Transportation, Caltrans, and Does 1 through 100, asserting causes of action
for motor vehicle negligence and dangerous condition of public property arising
out of an accident between an automobile and a scooter on September 11, 2023.
On March 7,
2024, The People of the State of California, acting by and through the
Department of Transportation (erroneously sued as The State of California, The
State of California Department of Transportation, and Caltrans) (“State”),
filed an answer.
On April
15, 2024, City filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Roes 1 to 20.
On May 23,
2024, County filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Moes 1 to 50.
On May 29,
2024, City of Los Angeles amended its cross-complaint to name Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”) as Roe 1.
Metro filed
an answer to the cross-complaint on October 14, 2024.
On January
17, 2025, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Skanska Traylor Shea, a Joint
Venture, as Doe 1.
In this
case (Case No. 24STCP03455), Petitioner Jason Scott Paronich filed a petition
on October 24, 2024, for an order permitting the filing of a later claim
against a government entity. On December
17, 2024, the Court set a hearing on the petition for February 18, 2025, and
set a briefing schedule.
On December
31, 2024, the Court related the two cases.
On January
14, 2025, Metro filed an opposition to the petition. (The opposition was inadvertently filed in the
related case, but the Court has fully considered the opposition on the merits just
as if it had been filed in this case.)
On February 4, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply.
Legal
Standard
The Government Claims Act establishes
detailed procedures and specific time limit for claims against public
entities. Under Government Code section
945.4, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a
public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be
presented … until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public
entity and has been acted upon by the [entity], or has been deemed to have been
rejected.” The purpose of the claim presentment requirement is “to provide the
public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate
claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.”
(Stockett v. Association of
California Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 446 [quoting City of San Jose v. Super. Ct. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455].)
The process begins, first, with the
presentation of the claim to the public entity.
(Gov. Code, §§ 905, 910, 910.2.)
Any claim against a public entity for wrongful death or personal
injuries must be presented “not later than six months after the accrual of the
cause of action.” (Gov. Code, §
911.2.)
Second, the public entity must then either
grant or deny the claim within 45 days after the claim has been presented. (Gov. Code, § 912.4, subd. (a).) If the entity does not grant the claim within
45 days, it is deemed to have been rejected.
(Gov. Code, § 912.4, subd. (c).)
Third, if the claim is rejected (whether by
affirmative action of the entity or by operation of law), the public entity is
required to send a written notice to the claimant. (Gov. Code, § 913.) The notice may be sent by personal delivery,
mail, or electronically. (Gov. Code,
§ 915.4.)
Fourth, Government Code section 945.6,
subdivision (a), provides (subject to certain exceptions not at issue here):
“[A]ny suit brought against a public entity
on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented … must be
commenced:
(1) If written notice is given in accordance
with Section 913, not later than six months after the date such notice is
personally delivered or deposited in the mail.
(2) If written notice is not given in
accordance with Section 913, within two years from the accrual of the cause of
action.”
If
a party misses the deadline for submitting a timely claim to the public entity,
the party may apply for leave to present an untimely claim. (Gov. Code § 911.4, subd. (a).) The application must be “presented to the
public entity … within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the
accrual of the cause of action and shall state the reason for the delay in
presenting the claim.” (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (b).)
Government
Code section 911.6, subdivision (b)(1), provides that the public entity “shall
grant the application” if “[t]he failure to present the claim was through
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect and the public entity was
not prejudiced in its defense of the claim by the failure to present the claim
within the time specified in Section 911.2.”
The
public entity must “grant or deny the application within 45 days after it is
presented.” (Gov. Code, § 911.6, subd.
(a).) If the entity fails to act within
45 days, “the application shall be deemed to have been denied on the 45th
day.” (Id., subd. (c).)
If
an application to present a late claim is denied, the claimant may file a petition
for a court order “relieving the petitioner from Section 945.4.” (Gov. Code §
946.6, subd. (a).) The petition must
show:
(1) That
application was made to the board under Section 911.4 and was denied or deemed
denied.
(2) The reason
for failure to present the claim within the time limit specified in Section
911.2.
(3) The
information [relating to the claimant and the substance of the claim] required
by Section 910.”
(Id.,
subd. (b).) The petition must be filed with
the court within six months after the entity denied the application to file a
late claim. (Ibid.)
Government
Code section 946.6, subdivision (c), directs courts to grant the petition if
the application to file a late claim was timely filed and (among other grounds)
“[t]he failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it
would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the
petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4.” (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (c)(1).) “When an
application to file a late claim is itself not timely filed, however, the court
is without jurisdiction to grant relief under section 946.6.” (County of Los
Angeles v. Super. Ct. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313-14.)
“The
policy favoring trial on the merits is the primary policy underlying section
946.6. In order to implement this
policy, any doubts should be resolved in favor of granting relief.” (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College
Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276.)
Discussion
Petitioner seeks relief under Government
Code section 946.6 from the timely claim presentment of the Government Claims
Act.
The accident at issue occurred near
to a construction project on Wilshire Boulevard on September 11, 2023, and Petitioner’s
cause of action (presumably) accrued on that same day. (See Carr Decl., Exh. 1.) Petitioner was uncertain which entity or
entities was or were responsible for the construction project and so filed
timely government claims with City, County, and State. (Id. ¶ 4.)
No claim was submitted to Metro prior to March 11, 2024, the deadline
under Government Code section 911.2 for a timely claim.
Following the rejection of the
claims by City, County, and State, Petitioner filed a complaint (in the related
case) on December 29, 2023.
On April 22, 2024, City’s
counsel sent an email to Petitioner’s counsel.
(Id., ¶ 6 & Exh. 3.) In the
email, counsel stated that City “has done some preliminary investigation into
this matter and has determined that the work being performed on the street
where Plaintiff’s accident occurred was likely work related to the Purple Metro
Line being installed.” (Id., Exh.
3.) As a result, counsel stated, “I
think you need to bring in [Metro].”
(Ibid.) “I believe that Metro is
a separate entity from [County].”
(Ibid.)
Two days later, Petitioner
submitted an Application for Leave to Present Late Claim to Metrol. (Id., ¶ 7 & Exh. 4.) The application was denied on May 2,
2024. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 3 & Exh. A.)
As a threshold matter, although
Petitioner did not submit a timely claim to Metro, he did submit a timely application
to Metro for leave
to present an untimely claim under Government Code section 911.4, and when Metro
denied that application he did file this timely petition with the Court under
Government Code section 946.6. The
application and the petition satisfy all applicable procedural
requirements.
Turning
to the merits of the Petition, the Code requires the Court to consider two
issues: (1) whether the failure to submit a timely claim was the result of “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” and (2) whether the public entity
“would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim” if the Petition were
granted. (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (c)(1).)
Metro
presents no evidence that the delay (of approximately 42 days) caused it any prejudice. Accordingly, the core disputed issue presented
by this Petition is whether Petitioner has shown that he did not file a timely
claim because of a “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable negligent.”
“The mere recital of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect is not sufficient to warrant relief. Relief on grounds of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is available only on a showing that
the claimant's failure to timely present a claim was reasonable when tested by
the objective “reasonably prudent person” standard.” (Department of Water
& Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) “There
must be more than the mere failure to discover a fact; the party seeking relief
must establish the failure to discover the fact in the exercise of reasonable
diligence. (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767,
1783; accord Bettencourt, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 276.)
The Court has carefully considered the evidence and argument presented
by both sides. The Court has considered
the evidence from Metro that a person knowing that the construction site was
part of the Purple Line extension could have determined, in a simply Internet
search, that Metro was responsible for the construction. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 4 & Exhs. B-D.) Nonetheless, the Court credits the
declaration of Petitioner’s counsel that counsel was “not able to determine for
certain the entity responsible for the construction” and “[i]n an abundance of
caution” submitted government claims to City, County, and State. (Carr Decl., ¶ 4.) The Court finds that Petitioner was diligent
in pursuing the investigation and that Petitioner acted extremely promptly
(within two days) after being notified that a separate government claim might
possibly need to be submitted to Metro.
(See id., ¶¶ 5-7.) On this
record, and considering the other evidence of Petitioner’s diligence, the Court
finds that not recognizing that Metro was responsible for the project, and not
recognizing that separate claims must be submitted to County and Metro, were
mistakes “that might be expected of a prudent person under similar
circumstances.” (People ex rel. Dep’t of Transportation v. Superior Court
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 39, 44.)
The Court also notes that, in reply, Petitioner relies on a a
general rule that “when the governing body of one public entity is also the
governing body of another public entity, a claim against the subordinate entity
that is delivered to the governing body constitutes substantial compliance with
the claims statute.” (DiCampli-Mintz
v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 997; accord Carlino v.
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1533-1534;
Elias v. San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d
70, 75-77.) It is not apparent that
Metro is governed by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, however, and Petitioner
has submitted no evidence (whether through a request for judicial notice or
otherwise) that this is so.
The Petition is granted.
Conclusion
The
Court GRANTS the Petition of Jason Scott Paronich under Government Code section 946.6.
Moving
Party is ORDERED to give notice.