Judge: Steven J. Kleifield, Case: 21STCV34981, Date: 2023-05-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV34981    Hearing Date: May 3, 2023    Dept: 57

Plaintiff Rita Iglecias has moved for leave to file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in this employment discrimination and wage and hour action.   As stated in the memorandum supporting the motion, Iglecias’s purpose in seeking leave to file a FAC is to add two new Defendants to the action, Leonardo Jose Davila and Zoraida Davila (collectively, the “Davilas”).  The proposed FAC alleges that the Davilas are the principals of Iglecias’s former employer, Defendant United Finishing Apparel, Inc. (“UFA”), and that the Davilas dissolved UFA in October 2022, after Iglecias filed suit against United, in an effort to hinder and defraud UFA’s creditors (including Iglecias).  The proposed FAC asserts five causes of action asserting claims for discrimination and retaliation under California’s Fair Employment and Discrimination Act (“FEHA”) and four causes of action asserting wage and hour claims under the Labor Code.  The FAC also asserts cause of actions for wrongful termination in violation of California public policy, violations of Business and Professions Code Section 17200, which is the State’s unfair competition law (“UCL”), and for declaratory relief.

Iglecias’s motion for leave to file the proposed FAC is not barred by earlier rulings of this Court (per Judge Steven Kleifield) with respect to previous efforts to amend the complaint.  This is true even as to the prayer in the proposed FAC for an award of punitive damages against the Davilas.  The Court’s prior ruling granting United’s motion to strike a request for punitive damages in the initial complaint does not bar Iglecias from renewing the request in the proposed FAC.

The Court’s tentative decision, however, is that the claims against the Davilas in the proposed FAC are time-barred.  Iglecias contends that, for statute of limitations purposes, the addition of the Davilas as Defendants in the proposed FAC “relates back” to the filing of Iglecias’s initial complaint against UFA on September 22, 2021 and all of the claims are within the applicable limitations periods, as measured with reference to that date.  Iglecias’s invocation of the relation back doctrine is incorrect.  

“The general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed.”  (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 169, 176.)  There is an exception for cases in which a new defendant is added pursuant to Section 474 of the Code of Civil Procedure to replace a “Doe” defendant when the identity of the new defendant was not known when the initial complaint was filed.  In such cases, the amendment relates back to the filing of the initial complaint and the statute of limitations for the claims against the new defendant is measured from that date.  (Ibid.)  Here, the Davilas are not being added to the action through a “Doe” amendment.   Accordingly, the proposed FAC does not relate back to the filing of the initial complaint and the statute of limitations is measured from the date of the proposed amendment. 

The statute of limitations on FEHA claims is one-year following the receipt of a right to sue letter from the Department of Fair Housing and Employment (“the Department”).  Iglecias received her right to sue letter from the Department on September 23, 2020.  Her attempt to bring the Davilas into the case as Defendants through the proposed FAC and to assert FEHA claims against them more than 2.5 years later is thus barred by the statute of limitations.

It appears to the Court that the claim against the Davilas for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is time-barred as well. The statute of limitations on such claims is one-year.  (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1203.)  Iglecias alleges that she was terminated from her job at United on December 26, 2019, which was 3.5 years ago.

Further, the wage and hour claims against the Davilas in the proposed FAC are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.   These claims seemingly are time-barred, too, because they accrued when Iglecias was terminated on December 26, 2019.

UCL claims have a four-year statute of limitations. (Business and Professions Code Section 17208.)  But a claim under the UCL necessarily depends on the existence of some viable, underlying predicate claim.  Absent a predicate claim, a UCL claim fails.  (Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th1176, 1185.)  Here, because it appears that all of Iglecias’s claims against the Davilas are time-barred, the UCL claim fails.