Judge: Steven J. Kleifield, Case: 22STCV02521, Date: 2023-05-02 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV02521    Hearing Date: May 2, 2023    Dept: 57

Plaintiff Brian France is the personal representative of the estate of Megan France.  Along with other Plaintiffs, Brian also is a surviving family member of Megan’s.   The Plaintiffs have brought a wrongful death suit against the Defendants arising from Megan’s death from an overdose of a narcotic on the premises of an apartment building on Vine Street in Los Angeles.   Two of those Defendants, Kathleen and Beverly Coiner, are lessees of that property.  Kathleen is Beverly’s mother.  Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint asserts a cause of action against Kathleen and Beverly together for negligence, and causes of action against Beverly alone for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the Drug Dealer Liability Act (“DDLA”), Health and Safety Code Section 11700 et seq.  
Kathleen and Beverly have demurred to those causes of action. 

The Court’s tentative decision is to sustain the demurrer, albeit with leave to amend, as to the claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but to overrule the demurrer as to the DDLA claim.    Kathleen and Beverly have filed a separate motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for awards of punitive or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint related to that prayer.   The Court’s tentative decision is to deny the motion to strike.  In light of the Court’s ruling on the demurrer, the motion is moot insofar as it seeks to strike the prayer for punitive and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and associated allegations with respect to the claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The motion is denied for substantive reasons insofar as it seeks to strike the prayer for punitive and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and associated allegations with respect to the DDLA claim.

Negligence Claim

An essential element of a negligence claim is that the defendant owed a legal duty of care.  (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 913, 918.)  An owner or lessee of property owes a duty to use ordinary or skill in the management of the property.  (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119.)   In general, however, “one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.  (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203.)  

 Plaintiffs allege that Kathleen and Beverly owed a legal duty of care to Megan as lessees of the property at which Megan consumed, an illegal narcotic, cocaine, that led to her death.  This allegation is not rooted in the law.  Kathleen and Beverly’s status as lessees of the property did not, in and of itself, give rise to a duty of care to control the actions of Megan, whom Plaintiffs acknowledge was addicted to narcotics, and prevent her from making the choice on their property to consume cocaine.   Plaintiffs’ opposition cites no precedent that would impose such a duty on Kathleen and Beverly simply by dint of their status as lessees of the property.

It is true that a defendant may have a duty to control of the conduct of another person if there is a special relationship between the defendant and that person or a special relationship that requires the defendant to protect that person.  (Davidson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 203.)  Plaintiffs fail, however, to allege the existence of a special relationship between Kathleen and Megan that would give rise to a duty on Kathleen’s party to control Megan’s conduct.  Plaintiffs opposition to the demurrer contends that Kathleen had a special relationship with Beverly by virtue of being his mother and that she thus had a duty to control Beverly’s behavior as it related to his drug addiction and provision of cocaine to Megan.  The Second Amendment Complaint is devoid of any such allegations, however. As to Beverly, Plaintiffs allege that he was in a relationship with Megan, socialized with her, and provided her with the cocaine that she consumed and that led to her death.   These allegations are insufficient, however, to support the notion that Beverly had a special relationship with Megan that would give rise to a duty on Beverly’s part to control Megan’s action in choosing to consume the cocaine that Beverly is alleged to have given her.  Plaintiffs’ opposition cites no precedent supporting the existence of a special relationship under these circumstances.

Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.)  Conduct is outrageous for purposes of the first element when “it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community,” (id. at 1051), such that “recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim ‘Outrageous!’”  (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.)  Importantly, a court may determine as a matter of law in the first instance whether the conduct in question meets the outrageousness standard.  (Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883.)

Here, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint fail to meet that standard.  As alleged, Beverly and Megan together at Beverly’s apartment consumed narcotics that Beverly supplied to Megan, and Megan died as a result.   This is a sad event.  But Beverly’s participation in it was not extreme and outrageous for purposes of the law of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

DDLA Claim

The purpose of the DDLA is “to provide a civil remedy for damages to persons in a community injured as a result of the use of an illegal controlled substance.”  (Health and Safety Code Section 11701.)  Awards of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are authorized in an action under the DDLA.  (Id. Section 11705(d).)  As Megan’s family members, Plaintiffs have standing to bring a DDLA action.  (Id. Section 11705(a))  As to who can be liable under the DDLA, one section of the Act states that “[a] person who knowingly participates in the marketing of illegal controlled substances within [California] is liable for civil damages . . . for injury resulting from an individual's use of an illegal controlled substance.”  (Id. Section 11704(a).)  Elsewhere, however, the DDLA indicates that one need not have participated in the marketing of an illegal controlled substance to be liable under the Act.  Rather, one can be liable for simply furnishing an illegal controlled substance to an individual.  (Id. Section 11705(b)(1).  Here, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint contains sufficient allegations that Beverly furnished an illegal controlled substance, cocaine, to Megan, and that this led to Megan’s death.  This is enough at the pleading stage to state a claim under the DDLA.