Judge: Steven J. Kleifield, Case: 22STCV30646, Date: 2023-04-24 Tentative Ruling
Inform the clerk if you submit on the tentative ruling. If moving and opposing parties submit, no appearance is necessary.
Case Number: 22STCV30646 Hearing Date: April 24, 2023 Dept: 57
Plaintiff Artak Agamalian has brought an action against
Defendants Arsen Mkerchyan and Amerisource Capital Group, LLC seeking to quiet
title to real property located at 3919 Mayfield Ave, Glendale, CA 91214 (the “Subject
Property”). According to Agamalian’s
complaint, Mkerchyan obtained legal title to the Subject Property in connection
with an agreement in which Mkerchyan promised to refinance Agamalian’s existing
indebtedness to Mkerchyan on loans secured by the Subject Property and then
transfer legal title back to Agamalian after Agamalian paid off the new loan
arising from the refinancing that also was secured by the Subject Property. Defendants have demurred to the complaint on
two grounds. The Court’s tentative ruling is to sustain the
demurrer as to both grounds, albeit with leave to amend.
First, Defendants point out that Agamalian concedes in
his complaint that he owns only an equitable interest in the Subject Property
and that Mkerchyan is the legal owner.
From there, Defendants invoke the rule that an owner of an equitable
interest in real property cannot maintain an action to quiet title against the
owner of the legal title to the property.
(See Stafford v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 294-295
[setting forth rule barring equitable owners from quieting title against the
legal owners].) In his opposition to the
demurrer, Agamalian contends that this rule does not apply because the
complaint alleges that Mkerchyan acquired legal title from him through
fraud. (See Liberty Nat’l Enterprises, L.P. v.
Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 62, 81 [setting forth fraud
exception to the equitable ownership rule].)
In the Court’s view, however Agamalian’s complaint contains insufficient
allegations that the Defendants perpetrated a fraud against Agamalian in
connection with the transfer of the legal title to the Subject Property to
Mkerchyan. The closest the complaint
comes to alleging fraud is in paragraph 43, which states that Mkerchyan never intended
to transfer to transfer legal title to the Subject Property back to Agamalian
even if Agamalian complied with his obligations under the agreement to pay off
the new loan. The problem for Agamalian on
this front is that fraud must be alleged with specificity. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003)
30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) Paragraph
43 is not specific enough.
Second, Defendants point out that Agamalian concedes in
his complaint that he has not paid off the debt he owes to Mkerchyan under the
agreement. From there, Defendants invoke
what is known as the “tender” rule, which provides that a borrower may not
maintain a quiet title action against a secured lender without first paying the
outstanding debt owed to the lender. (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (221
Cal.App.4th 49, 86 [setting forth tender rule].) In his opposition, Agamalian contends the tender
rule does not apply by dint of the exception for cases in which the borrower is
challenging the validity of the debt. (Lona
v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 112.) The problem for Agamalian on this second
front is that his complaint does not seek to cancel his indebtedness to
Mkerchyan on the ground that it is invalid.
Agamalian also contends that legal tender rule does not apply because
the complaint alleges that he has sought an accounting of his indebtedness from
Mkerchyan but that Mkerchyan has not accounted to him. Agamalian cites no precedent, however,
standing for the proposition that the tender rule is inapplicable when the
lender does not account to the borrower.
Because it is still possible at this early stage of the
case for Agamalian to plead around these defects in his complaint, the Court is
sustaining the Defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend. Agamalian is directed to serve and file his
amended complaint within 21 days from the date of the hearing on the demurrer.