Judge: Stuart M. Rice, Case: 24STCV19411, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV19411 Hearing Date: March 21, 2025 Dept: 1
Moving Party: Defendants Sunrun, Inc. and Sunrun Installation Services,
Inc.
Responding Party: Plaintiff John Briones
Ruling: Motion
to compel arbitration is granted.
This is a wage and hour proposed class and Private Attorneys
General Act (PAGA) action. Plaintiff
John Briones (Plaintiff) alleges that he and others were employed by defendants
Sunrun, Inc. and Sunrun Installation Services, Inc. (collectively, Defendants),
during which employment Defendants committed various violations of labor
law. Defendants move to compel
Plaintiff’s claims to arbitration pursuant to an agreement he purportedly
signed.
Legal Standards
Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2
states, in relevant part:¿
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging
the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a
party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the
petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….¿
“California law reflects a strong public
policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for
resolving disputes. To further that policy, section 1281.2 requires a trial
court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited
exceptions applies. Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives
the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration
agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the
possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues.” (Acquire
II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group¿(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967,
citations omitted.)¿
“There is no public policy favoring arbitration
of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.” (Engineers
& Architects Assn. v. Community Development Dept.¿(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th
644, 653.) Nevertheless, the strong public policy promoting private arbitration
of civil disputes gives rise to a presumption in favor of arbitrability and
compels the Court to construe liberally the terms of the arbitration agreement.
(Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co.¿(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189).¿
¿¿
“The petitioner bears the burden of
proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of
the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. In these
summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the
affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral
testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.”
(Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc.¿(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276,
1284.)¿¿ The movant may bear this initial burden “by attaching a copy of
the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party's signature.” (Iyere
v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere);
Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060.) “At
this step, a movant need not ‘follow the normal procedures of document
authentication’ and need only ‘allege the existence of an agreement and support
the allegation as provided in [Rules of Court, Rule 3.1330].’” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
at 755; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th
215, 219 (Condee).)
“The party opposing arbitration has the
burden of demonstrating that an arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to
require arbitration of the dispute. Nonetheless, this policy does not override
ordinary principles of contract interpretation. The contractual terms
themselves must be carefully examined before the parties to the contract can be
ordered to arbitration: Although [t]he law favors contracts for arbitration of
disputes between parties, there is no policy compelling persons to accept
arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate.” (Rice
v. Downs¿(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1223, citations and quotations
omitted.)¿¿¿
“A party seeking
to enforce an arbitration agreement has the burden of showing FAA
preemption.” (Lane v. Francis Capital
Management, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 687; see also Nixon v.
AmeriHome Mortgage Company, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 934, 946
[“The party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement also bears the burden
of establishing the FAA applies and preempts otherwise governing provisions of
state law or the parties’ agreement.”].)
Request for Judicial
Notice
On reply, Defendant requests judicial notice of the following items:
A.
The Court’s order denying the motion to compel
arbitration in the related case of Mondragon v. Sunrun, Inc., No.
22STCV25672;
B.
The Court’s order denying the motion to compel
arbitration in the related case of Gillette v. Sunrun, Inc., No. 24STCV03326;
and
C.
The declaration of Megan Lessard used in the Gillette
case, filed May 17, 2024.
These are all court records and subject to judicial notice under Evid. Code
§ 452(d), and the Court grants the request.
Evidentiary
Objections
Plaintiff’s Objections to Declaration of Megan Lessard
Objection 1 is overruled. Ms.
Lessard is the Vice President of Talent Acquisition and sets out sufficient
foundation for her knowledge of the general way in which new employees are
onboarded. She is not asserting a legal conclusion or relating any out-of-court
statement for its truth. Objection 2 is
overruled for the same reason.
Objection 3 is sustained. Ms.
Lessard is simply stating a speculative conclusion based on events that she did
not witness but believes occurred. This lacks
foundation. Objections 4 and 5 are
sustained for the same reason.
Defendants’ Objections to Declaration of Ryan A. Crist
These objections merit particular discussion. Defendants object to two exhibits to the declaration
of Ryan A. Crist, which are orders of the Court entered in the related Mondragon
and Gillette cases, as well as one quotation from one of those
orders. The objections are on the
grounds of relevance, lack of foundation, hearsay, and authentication.
Quite frankly, the Court is dumbfounded by these objections. Not only are the Court’s orders not hearsay
(but rather legally operative statements of the Court’s ruling on particular
issues), and the orders are properly authenticated by Mr. Crist, but these are
the same orders of which Defendants requested the Court take
judicial notice so as to make certain distinguishing arguments on reply. That Defendants would at the same time object
that the orders are irrelevant or not authentic is frivolous as defined in California
statutes, and Defendants’ counsel should be prepared to address this issue at
the hearing. The objections are
overruled.
Discussion
I.
Electronic Signature
Defendants present an agreement bearing an electronic signature. Even where the signature is electronic, a
movant “[meets] its initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate by
attaching a copy of the Contract to its petition, which purportedly bears [the
plaintiff’s] electronic initials and signature.” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067 (Fabian).) Where the plaintiff does not recall signing
the contract, the movant then has “‘the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the electronic signature was authentic.’” (Ibid.)
Code Civ. Proc. § 1633.9(a) provides: “An
electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was
the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner,
including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to
determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was
attributable.”
Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 836 (Ruiz) is instructive. There, a defendant moved to compel
arbitration based on an electronically signed agreement of which the plaintiff
had no recollection. (Id. at 844.)
When the plaintiff said so in opposition to the motion, the defendant’s
witness provided further information:
After Ruiz averred he did not recall electronically signing
the 2011 agreement, Main explained in her reply declaration that the 2011
agreement was part of an employee acknowledgment form that “is” presented to
all Moss Bros. employees as part of a series of changes to the company's
employee handbook, and each employee is required to log into the company's HR
system, using his or her “unique login ID and password,” to review and sign the
employee acknowledgment form. Again, however, Main did not explain how, or upon
what basis, she inferred that the electronic signature on the 2011 agreement
was “the act of” Ruiz. (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) This left a critical
gap in the evidence supporting the petition.
Indeed, Main did not explain that an electronic signature in
the name of “Ernesto Zamora Ruiz” could only have been placed on the 2011
agreement (i.e., on the employee acknowledgement form) by a person using Ruiz's
“unique login ID and password”; that the date and time printed next to the
electronic signature indicated the date and time the electronic signature was
made; that all Moss Bros. employees were required to use their unique login ID
and password when they logged into the HR system and signed electronic forms
and agreements; and the electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was,
therefore, apparently made by Ruiz on September 21, 2011, at 11:47 a.m. Rather
than offer this or any other explanation of how she inferred the electronic
signature on the 2011 agreement was the act of Ruiz, Main only offered her
unsupported assertion that Ruiz was the person who electronically signed the
2011 agreement. In the face of Ruiz's failure to recall electronically
signing the 2011 agreement, the fact the 2011 agreement had an electronic
signature on it in the name of Ruiz, and a date and time stamp for the
signature, was insufficient to support a finding that the electronic signature
was, in fact, “the act of” Ruiz. (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) For the
same reason, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the
electronic signature was what Moss Bros. claimed it was: the electronic
signature of Ruiz. (Evid. Code, § 1400, item (a).) This was not a difficult
evidentiary burden to meet, but it was not met here.
(Ibid.)
Defendants present the declaration of Megan Lessard, Sunrun, Inc.’s Vice
President of Talent Acquisition, where she states as follows. Sunrun Installation uses a platform called
iCims for new hire onboarding. (Lessard
Decl., ¶ 7.) Individuals register for a
user account on the iCims website, for which they create a unique password to
access the onboarding documents. (Id.,
¶ 8.) Users must have an account to access
the onboarding documents. (Ibid.) Defendants had no ability to access users’
iCims accounts or passwords. (Id., ¶
9.) iCims usernames and passwords were
only ever created by applicants and employees, not by Defendants. (Id., ¶
12.) The certificate of completion
attached to the Agreement appears to provide that the document was sent on
September 27, 2022 at 7:54:26 a.m., re-sent at 6:44:12 p.m., viewed eight
seconds later, at 6:44:20 p.m., and signed just over two minutes later at 6:46:35
p.m. (Lessard Decl., Ex. A, p. 5.) The certificate lists the signer’s e-mail and
IP address and provides that the signature was drawn on the device. (Ibid.)
Defendants have established that the signature is the act of
Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that he does
not recall signing the Agreement and would not have signed it had his attention
been drawn to it, but he does not deny that the signature on the Agreement is
his signature. Indeed, the signature on
his declaration and the signature on the Agreement are very similar. Plaintiff does not deny that the e-mail address
or IP address shown on the certificate of completion are his. Ms. Lessard’s declaration establishes the steps
by which Plaintiff’s electronic signature came to be on the Agreement.
The Court recognizes Plaintiff’s arguments that in the related Mondragon
and Gillette cases, other judicial officers denied motions to compel
arbitration. Those rulings do not bind
this Court and the grounds on which those motions were denied are not present
here. Mondragon was a PAGA-only
case in which the Court found the agreement to expressly exclude arbitration of
PAGA claims. (See Defendant’s Request
for Judicial Notice (RJN), Ex. A, p. 12.) In Gillette, Gillette expressly denied
signing the agreement and denied that the signature on it was hers, something
that Plaintiff here does not do. (See
RJN, Ex. B, p. 7.) Ms. Lessard stated
that the Gillette signed the arbitration agreement on September 21, 2021, when
the document itself apparently was dated September 20, 2021. (See Ibid.; see also RJN, Ex. C, ¶
7.) There was no explanation of why the iCims
platform produced a DocuSign-stamped document.
(RJN, Ex. B, p. 7.) Now there
is. (See Lessard Decl., ¶ 11.) The signatures in Gillette were
apparently applied in the exact same instant, which the Court found
suspicious. (RJN, Ex. B, p. 7.) Nothing of the sort appears to be the case
here.
Plaintiff contends that the fact that the document was opened only eight
seconds after being re-sent is suspicious.
The Court does not agree. It
seems normal that when a person requests a document be re-sent to them, they
are on the lookout for it and ready to open it when it arrives. Nothing Plaintiff presents undermines
Defendant’s showing that the electronic signature on the Agreement is
Plaintiff’s signature.
II.
Treatment of Class Claims
Having determined the Agreement is enforceable, the Court turns to the
class action waiver, which provides:
The Parties agree to arbitrate all claims covered by
this Agreement may only be brought in an individual capacity, meaning for
injuries or violations directly experienced by the party. The Parties expressly
waive any right to arbitrate violations or injuries that the party did not
directly experience. This waiver includes waiver of any right to arbitrate on a
class or collective basis. The Parties further agree not to submit, initiate,
or participate in any arbitration on a class or collective basis.
(Lessard Decl., Ex. A, p. 2.)
Plaintiff
offers no argument why this waiver is not enforceable if the Agreement is
enforceable. The Court will therefore
enforce the waiver and dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims.
III.
Treatment of PAGA Claims
Viking River
Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906 “requires enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement
is covered by the FAA.” (Adolph v.
Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1119.) While the individual claims are being
arbitrated, the Court is empowered to stay the non-individual claims. (Id. at 1123-1124; see also Code Civ.
Proc. § 128(a)(3) [“Every court shall have the power…[t]o provide for the
orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers.”])
Plaintiff does
not dispute that the Agreement is governed by the FAA. The Court will therefore compel Plaintiff to
arbitrate his individual PAGA claims.
His non-individual PAGA claims will remain stayed in this Court.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion is granted. Plaintiff is required to arbitrate his
individual claims, including his individual PAGA claims, pursuant to the
Agreement. His class claims are
dismissed. His non-individual PAGA claims
remain in this Court, and the Court will stay the action pending the completion
of arbitration. The Court will set a
date for an arbitration status conference at the hearing on this motion. Defendants to give notice.