Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 16K07779, Date: 2022-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 16K07779    Hearing Date: August 11, 2022    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) filed this action on June 21, 2016 against, inter alia, Defendant Mary Ruth Summers (“Summers”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) recovery of money paid by mistake, (2) common count for money had and received, (3) common count for money paid, and (4) open book account. The Complaint seeks damages arising from the defendants’ alleged wrongful failure to repay mistaken wage overpayments made by LAUSD and received by defendants while they were employees of LAUSD. (Compl., ¶ 1.) LAUSD alleges that Summers had an overpayment balance in the amount of $9,061.40. (Compl., ¶ 11.)

On January 27, 2022, a Judgment was entered in this matter as to LAUSD and Summers. As set forth in the Judgment, the matter of the claim for salary overpayment by LAUSD against Summers came on regularly for a stipulated bifurcated nonjury trial on October 11 and 12, 2022.[1] After hearing and considering the evidence and testimony, the Court found that (1) LAUSD shall take nothing by reason of its Complaint against Summers; (2) this is a proper case for the entry of a separate Judgment resolving the dispute between these two parties; and (3) Summers is the prevailing party and shall have and recover her costs of suit and attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.5 from LAUSD. (See January 27, 2022 Judgment.)

Summers now moves for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.5 and Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.[2] LAUSD opposes.

Discussion

A.    Attorney’s Fees Under Civil Code Section 1717.5

Civil Code section 1717.5, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part:

“Except as otherwise provided by law or where waived by the parties to an agreement, in any action on a contract based on a book account, as defined in Section 337a of the Code of Civil Procedure, entered into on or after January 1, 1987, which does not provide for attorney’s fees and costs, as provided in Section 1717, the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, as provided below, in addition to other costs. The prevailing party on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section …

For the party against whom the obligation on the book account was asserted in the action subject to this section, if that party is found to have no obligation owing on a book account, the court shall award that prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees not to exceed nine hundred sixty dollars ($960) for book accounts based upon an obligation owing by a natural person for goods, moneys, or services which were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200) for all other book accounts to which this section applies. These attorney’s fees shall be an element of the costs of the suit …”

Here, LAUSD’s fourth cause of action in the Complaint is for open book account, and is alleged against all defendants. Summers asserts that she was sued under a book account by a party which did not prevail, and that she is thus entitled to attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1717.5.

LAUSD contends that Summers cannot recover attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.5 because the Court’s ruling at trial did not determine a prevailing party on the contract under the open book cause of action. LAUSD asserts that “at trial in this matter, Defendant Summers argued that LAUSD was barred from recovery of the salary overpayment pursuant to the terms of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board Compromise and Release, dated October 16, 2015. This Honorable Court agreed with Defendant Summers and ruled in her favor on those grounds without an adjudication of the Open Book cause of action.” (Opp’n at p. 2:16-20.)

However, the Minute Order from January 12, 2022 clearly states that “[t]he Court finds for Defendant Mary Ruth Summers on all causes of action alleged by plaintiff.”  Additionally,

 the January 27, 2022 Judgment provides, inter alia, that “[LAUSD] shall take nothing by reason of its complaint against [Summers],” and that Summers “is the prevailing party and shall have and recover her costs of suit and attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code § 1717.5 from   [LAUSD] …” As discussed above, under Civil Code section 1717.5, “[f]or the party against whom the obligation on the book account was asserted in the action subject to this section, if that party is found to have no obligation owing on a book account, the court shall award that prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees not to exceed nine hundred sixty dollars ($960) for book accounts based upon an obligation owing by a natural person for goods, moneys, or services which were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200) for all other book accounts to which this section applies.” (Emphasis added.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Summers is entitled to the requested $1,200.00 in attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.5.

B.    Attorney’s Fees Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2033.420

Summers also moves for an additional $11,500.00 in attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.

“If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420, subd. (a).) The court shall make this order unless an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under section 2033.290, the admission sought was of no substantial importance, the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter, or there was other good reason for the failure to admit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420, subd. (b).)

Summers asserts that she served Requests for Admission on LAUSD on May 30, 2017. (Wideman Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.) LAUSD served its responses on July 21, 2017. (Wideman Decl.,    ¶ 5, Ex. B.)[3] LAUSD denied the following Requests for Admission propounded by Summers:

Request for Admission No. 1:

(1) “Mary Ruth Summers (‘Summers’) resigned her position as an employee of            Los Angeles Unified School District (‘LAUSD’) in October of 2015 pursuant to a an [sic] Order Approving Compromise and Release and Award (‘Compromise’) in Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board Case No. ADJ9475584.”

(2) “The Compromise released Summers from any and all claims that LAUSD may have had against her stemming from her employment by LAUSD.”

            (4) “By filing case no. 16K07779 against Summers, LAUSD has breached the Compromise.”

            (5) “By filing case no. 16K07779 against Summers, LAUSD is retaliating against Summers for the Compromise.”

Request for Admission No. 2: The original of each of the following documents, copies of which are attached, is genuine:

1.     Order Approving Compromise and Release Award in W.C.A.B. Case No. ADJ9475583.

Summers argues that it was shown at trial that there was no basis for LAUSD’s refusal to admit that the document identified in Request for Admission No. 2 was genuine, or that the facts requested to be admitted in the first item of Request for Admission No. 1 were not true. As to the second item in Request for Admission No. 1, Summers asserts that the Court found that the Workers Compensation Appeals Board (“WCAB”) “Order Approving Compromise and Release and Award” showed that Summers’s earnings were an issue that was covered by the release. Summers does not provide any analysis regarding the fourth item in Request for Admission    No. 1. As to the fifth item in Request for Admission No. 1, Summers asserts that the Court “while not finding retaliation per se, did find that the timing of the demand letter…on the same day that Summers signed the WCAB Settlement (October 16, 2015) was suspicious and ‘bothered’ the Court…” (Mot. at p. 6:4-7.)

Although neither party requested a statement of decision, the Court did find that the WCAB Order Approving Compromise and Release and Award was controlling and that in particular paragraph 9 thereof expressly covered any disputes regarding Summers’ “earnings.” (See Exhibits 15 and 16 admitted at trial.) The Court also did find that the resignation of her position was part of the compromise as evidenced by the testimony in the case and the fact that it was executed concurrently with the other compromise documents. These issues were addressed in Summers’ Requests for Admissions 1 and 2 and LAUSD’s responses thereto.  Summers should not have had to prove up the genuineness of the WCAB Order and the compromise that was included therewith nor should she have had to prove up that any dispute with regard to her earnings was compromised thereby and that nothing further was owed. Accordingly, the Court finds that Summers has demonstrated her entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.

With regard to the reasonableness of the award requested, the Court does apply the lodestar method and finds that the $350 hourly rate of counsel and the number of hours expended are quite reasonable; in particular, counsel’s hourly rate falls well below the typical hourly rate charged by counsel in Los Angeles with his experience. Counsel for Summers has not requested any enhancement of that rate. Although LAUSD argues that counsel for Summers has experience in representing other employees and that should somehow work against the claim for attorney fees because the claims were not novel or difficult, the Court does not agree with that suggestion where no enhancement has been requested. Also, the fact that Summers has paid a portion of the attorney fees is not a factor this Court should consider. And regarding the fact that his fees exceed the amount in dispute, that can happen but it does not mean that the party seeking the fees should be penalized as long as the fees are not inflated. The Court does not find that the fees requested are inflated. Consequently, the Court finds that attorney fees in the amount of $12,775 are recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.  However, the fees must be reduced to $11,575 for the amount awarded pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.5 to avoid a double recovery.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Summers’s motion for attorney’s fees and orders that Summers is entitled to recover $11,575 in attorney’s fees from LAUSD.

Summers is ordered to give notice of this ruling and to prepare an Amended Judgment that reflects this award and corrects the reference to the trial dates as noted in footnote 1 above.

DATED:  August 11, 2022                                        

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court