Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 18STCV05377, Date: 2022-09-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 18STCV05377 Hearing Date: September 12, 2022 Dept: 50
freddy
m., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. joe
oroÑoz, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
18STCV05377 |
Hearing
Date: |
September 12, 2022 |
|
Hearing Time: |
10:00 a.m. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT
PI PROPERTIES NO. 79, LLC’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE TRIAL ON THE ISSUES OF
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES |
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AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS |
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Background
Plaintiff Freddy M. (“Freddy M.”), by
and through his guardian ad litem, Paola Mejia, Noe Reyes Lopez (“Lopez”), and
Paola Mejia (“Mejia”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action on
November 16, 2018 against Defendants Joe Oroñoz and Sarah Oroñoz (the
“Oroñozes”). On February 13, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an amendment to the
Complaint naming PI Properties
No. 79, LLC (“PI Properties”) in place of “Doe 21.”
The operative Third Amended Complaint
(“TAC”) was filed on June 26, 2020, and asserts causes of action for (1) breach
of implied warranty of habitability, (2) tortious breach of implied warranty of
habitability, (3) negligence, (4) private nuisance, and (5) violation of
On June 29, 2020, PI Properties filed a
Cross-Complaint against the Oroñozes, Chris Marsocci, Goldcoast Commercial
Group, Mejia, and Lopez.
PI Properties now moves for an
order to bifurcate or order separate trials on the issues of liability and
damages pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections
598 and 1048. Plaintiffs oppose.
Discussion
Code
of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b) provides: “The court, in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive
to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action,
including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate
issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of
trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the
United States.”
Pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 598, “[t]he
court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would
be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an
order…that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial
of any other issue or any part thereof in the case…” Additionally, Evidence
Code section 320 provides that trial courts have discretion to regulate the
order of proof. “[T]rial courts have broad discretion to determine the order of
proof in the interests of judicial economy.” ((Grappo v. Coventry Fin. Corp. (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 496, 504.) The objective of bifurcation is “avoidance of the
waste of time and money caused by the unnecessary trial of damage questions in
cases where the liability issue is resolved against the plaintiff.” ((Horton v. Jones (1972)
26 Cal.App.3d 952, 955.)
First, PI Properties contends that the
Court should order separate trials on the issues of liability and damages
because it would promote convenience and expedite trial in this matter. In
support of this assertion, PI
Properties indicates that it disputes liability for Plaintiffs’
alleged lead exposure and damages, and argues that even if the jury found that
PI Properties was tenuously negligent, the bulk of the negligence must be
attributed to the Oroñozes. However, PI Properties does not offer any evidence to support these
assertions.
Plaintiffs counter that bifurcation in
this case would not serve judicial economy, but has the potential of increasing
the length and complexity of the trial because numerous witnesses will be
required to testify on both liability and damages. The Court notes that Plaintiffs
also do not present any evidence in support of this assertion.
Second, PI Properties asserts that bifurcation
on the issues of liability and damages would avoid undue prejudice to PI
Properties. PI Properties argues
that “[w]ithout bifurcation of liability and damages, there is a substantial
likelihood that jurors will attribute a greater portion of liability to PI
Properties, resulting in higher damages. Jurors will hear that minor Plaintiff
Freddy M. was exposed to an unsafe level of lead at the Subject Property and
has suffered lead poisoning, neurological, cognitive, and behavioral ailments.
Sympathy for Plaintiffs and bias towards Defendants will undoubtedly arise.” (Mot.
at p. 6:16-20.) PI Properties also contends that without bifurcation, “[t]here
is a significant likelihood that the jurors will confuse issues, strain to
accurately consider and apply evidence, and award higher damages to Plaintiffs.”
(Caligiuri Decl., ¶ 2.)
Plaintiffs respond to the claim of
prejudice by noting that “jury
instructions and limiting instructions
during trial fully protect[] Defendant from such possible prejudice.” (Opp’n at
p. 5:22-24.) Plaintiffs also argue that they will be prejudiced by bifurcation,
because if a jury must stay for an additional phase of the trial, many jurors
will feel pressured to find no liability merely to end the trial.
Based on the foregoing, the
Court finds that PI Properties has not established good cause to bifurcate the sequence of proof
in this case so that liability will be tried first before damages at the trial
in this matter.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies PI
Properties’ motion to bifurcate the sequence of proof
in this case so that liability will be tried first before damages at the trial
in this matter.
PI Properties is ordered to provide
notice of this ruling.
DATED:
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court