Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 18STCV06807, Date: 2023-03-20 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 18STCV06807    Hearing Date: March 20, 2023    Dept: 50

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

 

brian weiner, et al.,

 

                        Plaintiffs,

            vs.

onyx tower group, llc, et al.,

 

                        Defendants.

Case No.:

18STCV06807 

Hearing Date:

March 20, 2023

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS REGARDING MICHAEL HAKIM’S ANSWER

 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS REGARDING MICHAEL HAKIM’S CROSS-COMPLAINT

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

 

           

Background

Plaintiff Brian Weiner, individually and derivatively on behalf of Onyx Tower Management, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on November 30, 2018 against a number of defendants, including Michael Hakim. The operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) was filed on October 22, 2020, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constructive trust, accounting, declaratory relief, constructive fraud, fraud, and appointment of receiver.

On February 3, 2021, Michael Hakim filed an answer to Plaintiff’s TAC.

In addition, on March 6, 2020, Michael Hakim filed a Cross-Complaint against a number of Cross-Defendants, including Brian Weiner as an individual. The Cross-Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) indemnity, (2) equitable contribution, (3) accounting, (4) declaratory relief - damages, and (5) declaratory relief – ownership interests.

Plaintiff now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Michael Hakim’s answer to the TAC. Plaintiff also moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the first, second, and fourth causes of action of Michael Hakim’s Cross-Complaint. Michael Hakim opposes both.  

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Regarding Michael Hakim’s Answer

A.    Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by ¿Code of Civil Procedure section 438¿, the rules governing demurrers apply.¿

 If the moving party is a plaintiff, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made on the grounds that “the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.(Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).) The motion may be made as to “[t]he entire answer or one or more of the affirmative defenses set forth in the answer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(2)(B).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings “¿tests the pleadings alone and not the¿evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.¿¿(¿SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [regarding demurrers]¿.)

A party against whom an answer has been filed may object, by demurrer as provided in Section 430.30, to the answer upon any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (b) The answer is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, ‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible. (c) Where the answer pleads a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the answer whether the contract is written or oral.” ((Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20.) Every affirmative defense “shall be separately stated, and the several defenses shall refer to the causes of action which they are intended to answer, in a manner by which they may be intelligibly distinguished.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (g).)

Demurring to an answer is a commonly recognized practice. Unlike the usual general demurrer to a complaint the inquiry is not into the statement of a cause of action. Instead it is whether the answer raises a defense to the plaintiff’s stated cause of action. A general demurrer raises the objection that the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense . . . .” (Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 879-880 [internal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis in original].) As a general rule, defendants must allege facts in support of affirmative defenses. ((FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384 [affirmative defenses “proffered in the form of terse legal conclusions, rather than as facts ‘averred as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and are alleged in the complaint’” are not well pled and cannot survive a demurrer].)

B.    Affirmative Defenses Alleged in Michael Hakim’s Answer

Plaintiff contends that every affirmative defense alleged in Michael Hakim’s answer to the TAC is defective.

In the first affirmative defense, Michael Hakim alleges that “Defendant generally denies each and every allegation of the unverified Complaint.” (Answer, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff argues that this affirmative defense is “inappropriate for an affirmative defense,” (Mot. at p. 5:9) but fails to explain why he contends this affirmative defense is inappropriate. Plaintiff includes new arguments in the reply as to the first affirmative defense, but ¿[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument.¿ (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453¿.) Thus, the Court denies the motion as to the first affirmative defense. 

In the third affirmative defense, Michael Hakim alleges that “Defendant is informed and believes, and thereon alleges Complainant’s Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Answer, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff asserts that the third affirmative defense is insufficient because it does not explain how the TAC is factually deficient. The Court finds that the third affirmative defense is sufficiently pled as no additional facts are required to demonstrate whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Baker v. Sudo (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 936, 942, fn. 7, “[h]ere, the Sudos and the Andersons pled failure ‘to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action’ as an affirmative defense in their answer to Baker’s complaint. This was sufficient…) The Court thus denies Plaintiff’s motion as to the third affirmative defense.  

In the second affirmative defense, Michael Hakim alleges that “[a]s to each cause of action of the Complaint, Defendant is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that, to the extent Complainant suffered damages, if at all, such damages was [sic] proximately caused, in whole, or in part, by the negligent or willful acts or omissions of third parties, and Defendant’s liability, if any, should be apportioned based on their respective degrees of fault, if any.” (Answer, ¶ 2.) The Court finds that the second affirmative defense fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute a defense. As Plaintiff notes, there are no specific facts alleged in this affirmative defense stating, for example, who did what, when, and how. Similarly, the Court finds that the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth affirmative defenses are in the form of terse legal conclusions and thus fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Thus, the Court grants the motion as to the foregoing affirmative defenses, with leave to amend.

In the fourteenth affirmative defense, Michael Hakim alleges that “[a]s a separate defense to the Complaint and each cause of action therein, Defendant presently has insufficient knowledge or information on which to form a belief as to whether he or she have or may have additional, as yet unstated, defenses available. Defendant reserves the right to assert additional affirmative defenses in the event discovery indicates that they would be appropriate.” (Answer,  ¶ 14.) Plaintiff does not explain why he contends the fourteenth affirmative defense does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Thus, the Court denies the motion as to the fourteenth affirmative defense. 

The Court notes that in the opposition, Michael Hakim contends that “[t]he notice of motion seeks judgment on the pleadings as to the entire Answer, and not merely to individual affirmative defenses.” (Opp’n at p. 4:7-10.) But Plaintiff does indicate in the notice of motion that the motion concerns each individual affirmative defense, which are listed out. (See Notice of Motion at p. 1:8-2:14.)

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Regarding Michael Hakim’s Cross-Complaint

A.    Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by ¿Code of Civil Procedure section 438¿, the rules governing demurrers apply. (¿Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999¿.) A motion by a defendant can be made on the ground that the complaint (or any cause of action therein) “¿does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii)¿.) The motion normally lies only for defects fully disclosed on the face of the pleading under attack or by matters for which judicial notice may be taken. (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d)¿.)¿

¿To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged.¿” (¿C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872¿.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967¿.) A demurrer “¿does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.¿” (¿Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713¿.)  

B.    Allegations of the Cross-Complaint

In his Cross-Complaint, Michael Hakim alleges that the causes of action in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint “arise from, in sum, alleged failures to pay management fees purportedly owed to Onyx Tower Management, LLC…of which Weiner allegedly owns an ownership interest concurrently with Cross-Complainant and Cross-Defendants. Weiner also alleges that with [sic] Cross-Complainant and Cross-Defendants fraudulently induced him to forfeit his individual interest in a commercial property owned by Onyx Tower Group.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 8.) 

C.    First Cause of Action

In the first cause of action for indemnity, Michael Hakim alleges that “in the event that he be found in some manner responsible for the allegations in the SAC, then Cross-Complainant would be entitled to be indemnified by Cross-Defendants, and each of them, for attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation, expert witness fees, any sums paid by way of settlement and/or judgment, and for all other costs incidental to the defense, investigation, and defense of the SAC.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 12.) 

As an initial matter, as noted by Plaintiff, the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) is not the operative complaint this matter. Plaintiff filed the operative TAC on October 22, 2020. As noted by Plaintiff, “the first cause of action for indemnity is strictly tied to the allegations of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, which has been rendered moot by the filing of the TAC.” (Mot. at p. 5:6-7.)

In the opposition, Michael Hakim does not address the fact that his first cause of action is directed to the SAC. Rather, he asserts that “[t]he motion is addressed solely to the ENTIRE Cross-complaint rather than to specific causes of action thereof.” (Opp’n at p. 1:23-24.) This is incorrect, as the notice of motion asserts that the first, second, and fourth causes of action fail to allege facts to constitute a cause of action against Plaintiff. (See Notice of Motion at p. 1:8-17.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown that the first cause of action of Michael Hakim’s Cross-Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

D.    Second Cause of Action 

In support of the second cause of action for equitable contribution, Michael Hakim alleges that “in the event that he be found in some manner responsible for the allegations in the SAC, then any such damages sustained by Weiner were proximately caused or contributed to by the actions and representations of Cross-Defendants, and each of them. It is necessary that a pro rata degree of fault be determined so that Cross-Complainant will not be required to pay more than his pro rata share of any judgment, and only according to that degree of fault attributable to Cross-Complainant.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 14.)

As Plaintiff notes, the second cause of action is also tied to the allegations of the SAC, although this is not the operative complaint in this action. As discussed, the TAC is the operative complaint. Michael Hakim does not address this fact in the opposition. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown that the second cause of action of Michael Hakim’s Cross-Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

E.     Fourth Cause of Action

In the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief-damages, Michael Hakim alleges that “[a]n actual controversy has arisen, and now exists, between Cross-Complainant and Cross-Defendants, and each of them, in that Cross-Complainants contend, and Cross-Defendants deny, that as between Cross-Complainant and Cross-Defendants, and each of them, responsibility for the damages claimed by Weiner, if any, rests entirely, or partially, with Cross-Defendants, including Weiner himself.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 21.) Michael Hakim further alleges that “Cross-Complainant desires a judicial determination of the respective rights and duties he has, and that Cross-Defendants have, with respect to the damages claimed in the SAC.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 22, emphasis added.)

As discussed, the TAC is the operative complaint, not the SAC. Plaintiff notes that the declaratory relief cause of action, like the first and second causes of action, are tied to the allegations of the SAC, which has been rendered moot by the filing of the TAC.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown that the fourth cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to the first, third, and fourteenth affirmative defenses set forth in Michael Hakim’s answer.

Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth affirmative defenses set forth in Michael Hakim’s answer, with leave to amend.

The Court orders Michael Hakim to file and serve an amended answer, if any, within 20 days of the date of service of this order.

            The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first, second, and fourth causes of action of Michael Hakim’s Cross-Complaint, with leave to amend.

The Court orders Michael Hakim to file and serve an amended cross-complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this order. If no amended cross-complaint is filed within 20 days, the Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an answer to the Cross-Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.¿

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this order.

 

DATED:  March 20, 2023                              ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court