Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 19STCV44072, Date: 2023-03-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV44072 Hearing Date: March 7, 2023 Dept: 50
EVAN WASSERSTROM, Plaintiff, vs. RPK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
19STCV44072 |
Hearing Date: |
March 7, 2023 |
|
Hearing Time: |
8:30 a.m. |
|
[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS RPK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; KORDA CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION AND 7275 FRANKLIN LLC’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF EVAN
WASSERSTROM’S INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION |
Background
Plaintiff
Evan Wasserstrom (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on December 6, 2019 against
Defendants RPK Development Corporation, Korda Construction Corporation, and
7275 Franklin LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). The Complaint[1]
asserts causes of action for (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability,
(2) negligence, and (3) breach of contract.
Plaintiff’s
habitability action arises from Defendants’ alleged failure to properly maintain and manage
the apartment building in which Plaintiff lives. (Compl., ¶ 1.) Plaintiff
alleges that throughout his tenancy, Plaintiff’s unit and the apartment common
areas had repeated high-volume water leaks which caused serious mold
infestations. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges this caused illness and
allergies to him. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that despite repeatedly
informing Defendants of repairs needed, Defendants failed to timely make
necessary repairs to Plaintiff’s unit resulting in an uninhabitable living
condition. (Compl., ¶ 3.)
On
March 16, 2022, Defendants served an Amended Demand for Independent Medical
Examination (“IME”) of Plaintiff. (Partida Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) The examination
was noticed for April 12, 2022. (Ibid.) On
March 22, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel sent email correspondence to Defendants’
counsel indicating that Plaintiff would not agree to another medical
examination. (Partida Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2.) Thereafter, the parties met and
conferred regarding the issue. (Partida Decl., ¶ 4.)
On August 22, 2022, the parties attended an
Informal Discovery Conference (“IDC”) regarding whether Plaintiff must submit
to an IME. (See August 22, 2022 Minute Order.) The Court’s August 22,
2022 minute order provides, inter alia, that “[p]arties have fulfilled
his IDC obligation regarding the subjects set forth in their IDC statements
dated 08/12/22 and 08/18/22.” Defendants’ August 12, 2022 IDC Statement and
Plaintiffs’ August 18, 2022 IDC Statement both concern the IME sought by
Defendants.
Defendants now move for an order compelling Plaintiff
to submit to an IME for allergy and pulmonology testing by Defendants’ retained
immunologist/pulmonologist Jonathan Corren, M.D. Defendants also seek
sanctions. Plaintiff opposes.[2]
On October 14, 2022, the Court issued an Order
continuing the hearing on the instant motion to January 19, 2023, and
permitting Plaintiff to file and serve a surreply on or before January 11, 2023.
As set forth in the Court’s October 14, 2022 Order, Defendants filed the Declaration
of Jonathan Corren, M.D. on October 4, 2022, one day after the opposition was
filed. Thus, Plaintiff had not had the opportunity to respond to it. On January
11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a surreply in support of his opposition to the
instant motion. On
January 13, 2023, Defendants filed a “Sur Reply to Plaintiff’s Sur Reply.”
On
January 19, 2023, the Court issued an Order continuing the hearing on the
motion again, in light of Plaintiff’s failure to file
the Declaration of Evan Wasserstrom in connection with his surreply. The Court
ordered Plaintiff to file and serve
the Wasserstrom Declaration referenced in the
surreply by January 20, 2023, and permitted Defendants to file and serve a response to the Wasserstrom
Declaration on or before January
27, 2023. On January 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed the
Wasserstrom Declaration, and on January 27, 2023, Defendants filed a surreply
to Plaintiff’s surreply.
Discussion
“Any party may obtain discovery … by means of a physical or mental
examination of (1) a party to the action, (2) an agent of any party, or (3) a
natural person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, in any
action in which the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of
that party or other person is in controversy in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2032.020, subd. (a).) Absent
stipulation, mental examinations require a court order. Such order may be made
only after notice and hearing, and “for good cause shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320, subd. (a).) A showing of
good cause requires that the party “produce specific facts justifying discovery
and that the inquiry be relevant to the subject matter of the action or
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Vinson v.
Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 840.)
Defendants provide evidence that at his
deposition, Plaintiff testified that he gets “short of breath often.” (Partida
Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 6 (Wasserstrom Depo.) at pp. 103:10-13.) Plaintiff also testified
that his doctor did not prescribe any type of treatment or medication for
Plaintiff’s shortness of breath. (Id. at p.
104:11-14.) Defendants assert that “[b]ecause plaintiff has made his
injuries an issue in the case and because he attributes these injuries
to mold exposure at the subject property, it is essential that moving
defendants be allowed to conduct a full medical evaluation of
the plaintiff concerning these issues.” (Mot. at p. 4:26-28.) Defendants seek
to compel a routine oral history associated with allergy and pulmonary testing,
consisting of skin prick testing, pulmonary testing, and blood testing to
determine the allergic response of Plaintiff. (Defendants’ Notice of Motion at
p. 2:8-10.)
In the
opposition, Plaintiff indicates that that he and his counsel “have repeatedly
stated
that Plaintiff will submit to a medical examination,” but that “[t]he only
thing that Plaintiff has stated is that he will not agree to skin prick
testing.” (Opp’n at p. 2:21-3:1.)
Defendants submit the Declaration of Jonathan
Corren in support of the motion, who indicates that he “believe[s] allergy
testing of plaintiff is necessary to determine if the plaintiff in fact
demonstrates a response to mold.” (Corren Decl., ¶ 6.) Dr. Corren asserts that
“[w]hile the patient has undergone skin testing previously, I feel it is
important to confirm the patient’s responses.” (Corren Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff
asserts that there is no explanation given for why the prior testing and
results are inadequate to allow Dr. Corren to formulate his opinions. In the
motion, Defendants argue that they “cannot be unjustly forced to rely on the
findings and/or conclusions of plaintiff’s physicians. Defendants are entitled
to contest those conclusions and the only way to do that is through their own
testing.” (Mot. at p. 6:19-22.)
Dr. Corren states that “[f]ollowing exposure
to common environmental allergens, the allergic individual produces a special
type of antibody called Immunoglobulin E or IgE,” and that “[s]pecific IgE may
be detected in two ways: through a physiological test on the skin, known as a
skin prick test, or through a blood test.” (Corren Decl., ¶¶ 7, 8.) Dr. Corren
further states that “[i]n order to determine whether a particular allergen,
such as a mold spore, is causing allergic symptoms, specialized, but standard,
testing is required. Allergy skin testing and blood UNICAP testing are both
highly sensitive and specific tests to assess the presence of IgE (allergic
antibody) to an allergen. These tests are routinely used in clinical practice
and are accepted by the scientific medical community, including the American
Academy of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology (AAAAI) and the American College of
Allergy, Asthma and Immunology (ACAAI), for the evaluation of allergies.” (Corren
Decl., ¶ 9.) In addition, Dr. Corren states that “[i]t is imperative that the
testing conditions for a skin test be mandated as well. These conditions
require a subject to refrain from using antihistamines of any kind for
seventy-two (72) hours prior to testing, since the test will be equivocal in
the presence of antihistamines.” (Corren Decl., ¶ 12.)[3]
Plaintiff counters that the test Defendants
propose, and the requirement that Plaintiff forgo medication for three days, is
painful, protracted, and intrusive. Plaintiff notes that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.220, subdivision (a), “[i]n any case in which a plaintiff is seeking
recovery for personal injuries, any defendant may demand one physical
examination of the plaintiff, if both of the following conditions are
satisfied: (1) The examination does not include any diagnostic test
or procedure that is painful, protracted, or intrusive. (2) The
examination is conducted at a location within 75 miles of the residence of the
examinee.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff asserts that a test that requires foregoing medication for three days is, on its
face, “protracted.” Plaintiff also asserts that the proposed skin prick test is
unreasonably painful and intrusive.
Plaintiff’s January 11, 2023 Declaration
(filed on January 19, 2023) indicates that “[i]n Dr. Corren’s declaration filed
in support of Defendant’s motion to compel additional skin prick testing, it is
stated that I would need to refrain from taking antihistamines for three days
in order for Dr. Corren to perform this test.” (Wasserstrom Decl., ¶ 1.) Plaintiff
states that “[a]s a result of the exposure to mold, dust mites, and other
allergens present within my unit to this day, I rely on taking antihistamines
several times a week to mitigate the allergy symptoms I frequently experience.
If forced to stop taking these medications, my allergy symptoms would
significantly worsen. Committing to not take antihistamine medications for
three days would constitute a significant hardship to me.” (Wasserstrom Decl.,
¶ 2.)
Defendants counter (in their January 27, 2023 surreply)
that Plaintiff fails to show that refraining from taking antihistamines for 72
hours is protracted or painful. Defendants note that Plaintiff has not
described or reported any pain or excessive discomfort from refraining from
taking antihistamines 72 hours prior to testing. In addition, Plaintiff does
not state in his declaration that the skin prick testing is painful.
Defendants also note that Plaintiff’s
declaration states that he takes allergy medication several times in a week
(Wasserstrom Decl., ¶ 2.), which could mean taking such medication for two
days, with five days without taking any medication. As set forth above, Dr.
Corren asserts that the conditions “require a subject to refrain from using
antihistamines of any kind for seventy-two (72) hours prior to testing...”
(Corren Decl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff does not state in his Declaration that he takes
antihistamines every day, or that it would not be possible to take antihistamines on the four remaining
days of the week (other than the three days prior to testing). In addition,
Plaintiff acknowledges that he underwent prior testing by his own doctor
(January 11, 2023 Surreply at p. 1:15-22), but Plaintiff does not state in his
declaration that any prior skin prick testing conducted by his doctor(s) was “painful, protracted, or intrusive.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2032.220, subd. (a)(1).)
Defendants also assert that the skin prick
testing is not protracted as the tests are routinely administered without
examinees taking antihistamines. As set forth above, Dr. Corren asserts that
“[a]llergy skin testing and blood UNICAP testing are both highly sensitive and
specific tests to assess the presence of IgE (allergic antibody) to an
allergen. These tests are routinely used in clinical practice and are accepted
by the scientific medical community,” and that the conditions “require a
subject to refrain from using antihistamines of any kind for seventy-two (72)
hours
prior to testing, since the test will be equivocal in the presence of antihistamines.”
(Corren Decl., ¶¶ 9, 12.) In addition, Plaintiff
also does not appear to assert that the skin prick testing itself is
“protracted.” Dr. Corren states in his declaration that the allergy skin-prick testing takes approximately 30 to 40 minutes to
complete. (Corren Decl., ¶ 14.)
Defendants also note in their January 13, 2023 response to Plaintiff’s sur-reply that Plaintiff
testified in his April 21, 2021 deposition that he was not prescribed
medications from his allergists. Specifically, Plaintiff was asked, “Did the
second allergist prescribe you any medications?” to which Plaintiff responded,
“[n]o, he did not.” (Partida Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2 (Wasserstrom Depo.) at p.
79:10-12.) Plaintiff was also asked, “[a]nd Dr. Eitches, to your knowledge, has
not prescribed you any allergy medication; is that correct?” to which Plaintiff
responded, “[h]e has not.” (Id. at p. 93:14-16.)
Defendants also assert that certain discovery responses provided by Plaintiff do not list any medications
involving histamines. (Partida Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.)
Based on a consideration of the arguments and
evidence presented by the parties, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has
established that the proposed testing is “painful,
protracted, or intrusive.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2032.220, subd. (a)(1).)
Lastly, Defendants assert that the Court
should impose monetary sanctions against Plaintiff. Defendants cite to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.410, which provides that “[i]f a party is required to
submit to a physical or mental examination under Articles 2 (commencing
with Section 2032.210) or 3 (commencing
with Section 2032.310), or under Section 2016.030, but fails to do so, the court, on
motion of the party entitled to the examination, may make those orders that are
just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a
terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to that
sanction, the court may, on motion of the party, impose a monetary sanction
under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Emphasis added.) The Court notes that Defendants do not state that
Plaintiff was not previously required by the Court to submit to a physical
examination and failed to do so. The Court thus does not find that sanctions
are warranted here under Code of Civil Procedure
section 2032.410.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion is granted. The parties are ordered to meet and confer
with regard to the date for the examination within the next 30
days.
Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this ruling.
DATED:
Hon.
Teresa A. Beaudet
Judge,
Los Angeles Superior Court
[1]The Court notes
that the original operative Complaint filed on December 6, 2019 is incorrectly
captioned as Plaintiff’s “Third Amended Complaint for Damages.”
[2]As an initial
matter, Defendants assert that the Court should disregard Plaintiff’s
opposition because it is untimely. The opposition was filed and served on
October 3, 2022, 8 court days prior to the original October 14, 2022 hearing
date. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
1005, subdivision (b), opposition papers must be served and filed with the
court at least 9 court days before the hearing. In the
opposition, Plaintiff’s counsel indicates that she was unavailable from September 6, 2022 to September 30, 2022. (Lazar Decl., ¶ 5.) Because Defendant
has submitted a substantive reply brief that address the arguments made in
Plaintiff’s opposition, the Court elects to exercise its discretion to consider the
untimely opposition. (Cal Rules of Court, Rule
3.1300, subd. (d).)
[3]Defendants’ Amended Demand for an Independent Medical Examination of
Plaintiff also provides that Plaintiff may not take certain specified
medications for certain periods of time before skin testing. (See
Partida Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.)