Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 20STCV30336, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV30336    Hearing Date: October 24, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Christopher Conner filed this action on August 11, 2020 against Defendants Del Amo Hospital, Inc. (“Del Amo”) and Universal Health Services, Inc. On November 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the Complaint substituting UHS of Delaware, Inc.  (“UHS of Delaware”) in place of “Doe 51.”

On July 15, 2021, the Court “received” a First Amended Consolidated Complaint for Damages (“FACC”). On July 22, 2021, a Stipulation Regarding Consolidated Complaint and Order Thereupon (the “Stipulation”) was filed. The Stipulation provides that “on May 19, 2021, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file and serve the Consolidated Complaint by June 16, 2021 should the parties agree to a Consolidated Complaint.” The Stipulation further provides that the “parties agreed to a Consolidated Complaint and Plaintiff attempted to file the Consolidated Complaint by June 16, 2021…the Consolidated Complaint was rejected due to a Complaint already being on file in…Case Number 20STCV30336 and…Case Number 20STCV36065.” The Stipulation then provides that “Plaintiff has now filed a ‘First Amended Consolidated Complaint’”. 

The first cause of action alleged in the FACC is for dependent adult abuse by Dawn Kraemer-Conner against all defendants. The second cause of action is for negligent hiring and supervision by Dawn Kraemer-Conner against all defendants. The third cause of action is for wrongful death by Christopher Conner against all defendants. Christopher Conner and Dawn Kraemer-Conner are jointly referred to herein as “Plaintiffs.”

In the FACC, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that on or about August 26, 2019, Dawn Kraemer-Conner entered Del Amo after transfer from Kaiser Permanente Woodland Hills.

(FACC, ¶¶ 3, 17.) Plaintiff alleges that on August 27, 2019, Ms. Conner was placed on 1:1 supervision by her physician due to her increased propensity for self-harm and self-injurious behavior. (FACC, ¶ 18.) On August 29, 2019, Dawn Kraemer-Conner’s physician reaffirmed his order that Ms. Conner was to be on 1:1 supervision, but the staff at Del Amo failed to carry out her physician’s order and routinely failed to provide Ms. Conner with 1:1 supervision. (FACC,   ¶ 20.) Later that afternoon, Ms. Conner was left unattended in the courtyard of Del Amo for nearly 45 minutes and was found lying on her stomach in the grass of the courtyard, unresponsive. (Ibid.) She was pronounced dead at the scene. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs further allege that Del Amo’s staff’s failure to properly address Ms. Conner’s risk as a threat to herself and her risk of potential seizure was the result of insufficiency of staff in both number and training, and led to an overall failure to put in place required interventions to protect Ms. Conner’s health and safety. (FACC, ¶ 23.)

Del Amo and UHS of Delaware (jointly, “Defendants”) now move for summary judgment or in the alternative, summary adjudication. No opposition to the motion was filed.

Legal Standard

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc.,¿      § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.)¿¿ 

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿ 

When a defendant seeks summary judgment or summary adjudication, he/she must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  

Discussion

A.    First Cause of Action for Dependent Adult Abuse (Pursuant to the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act – Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 15600, et seq.)

Defendants assert that the first cause of action for dependent adult abuse fails as a matter of law because “there is no evidence that Del Amo refused to provide medical care to Ms. Conner or Del Amo withheld necessary medical care from her.” (Mot. at p. 11:7-9.) In the first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Del Amo “‘neglected’ DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER as that term is defined in Welfare and Institutions Code §15610.57 in that the Defendants themselves, as well as their employees, failed to exercise the degree of care that reasonable persons in a like position would exercise as is more fully alleged herein.” (FACC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs further allege as follows:

“On August 29, 2019, DAWN-KRAEMER CONNOR died in the courtyard of the HOSPITAL.[1] These injuries would not have occurred had the Defendants simply adhered to applicable rules, laws and regulations, as well as the acceptable standards of practice governing the operation of an acute psychiatric HOSPITAL, in acting upon their advance knowledge that DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER suffered from epileptic seizures, psychotic disorder due to another medical condition with hallucinations, anxiety disorder, suicidal ideations with prior attempts, and borderline personality disorder. By their own admission the HOSPITAL knew that DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER was at high risk of placing herself in imminent danger required appropriate and significant interventions to protect her from injuring herself. Moreover, the HOSPITAL was aware that DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER was at high risk for the for seizure during her admission in the HOSPITAL. The HOSPITAL failed to adhere to applicable rules, laws and regulations, as well as the acceptable standards of practice for an acute psychiatric HOSPITAL leading to DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER developing preventable and fatal injuries as alleged herein. This failure to provide required care for DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER’s physical and mental health needs and failure to protect DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER from health and safety hazards was the direct cause of DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER’ injuries as alleged herein.” (FACC, ¶ 21.)

Del Amo cites to Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407, where the Court of Appeal “distill[ed] several factors that must be present for conduct to constitute neglect within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act and thereby trigger the enhanced remedies available under the Act. The plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult’s basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness). The plaintiff must also allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) that the neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental suffering.” (Internal citations omitted.)

            Defendants assert that here, there is no evidence that Del Amo denied or withheld goods or services to Ms. Conner that were necessary to meet her basic needs. Del Amo contends that to the contrary, there is evidence that Ms. Conner was closely monitored at all times at Del Amo, that she had three separate physical assessments at the time of her hospital admission and was cleared each time, and that she was provided her anti-seizure medication consistently.

            In support of the motion, Defendants provide the Declaration of Mace Beckson, M.D., a medical doctor licensed to practice in the State of California who has been Board Certified in Psychiatry since 1991. (Beckson Decl., ¶ 1.) Dr. Beckson states, inter alia, that “[o]n August 25, 2019, the patient, Dawn Kraemer-Conner was brought by her husband to Kaiser Woodland Hills emergency department and assessed by a mental health evaluator on the Psychiatric Emergency Team (PET). The PET evaluator received report from the patient’s husband and reviewed the previous inpatient hospitalization records. The PET evaluator indicated the patient was a danger to herself and gravely disabled. He placed the patient on a Welfare & Institutions Code (W.I.C.) section 5150 involuntary hold and she was transported to Del Amo Behavioral Health System (‘Del Amo’) where she was admitted on August 26, 2019.” (Beckson Decl., ¶ 4.)

            Dr. Beckson states that “[o]n August 26, 2019, the patient was evaluated by psychiatrist Matthew Wong, M.D., who determined the patient was grossly psychotic and noted the patient had a seizure disorder and previous diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. Dr. Wong’s admitting diagnoses were unspecified psychotic disorder (probable paranoid schizophrenia); borderline personality disorder (by history); and seizure disorder. Dr. Wong ordered the patient to be monitored by nursing staff with 15-minute checks. On the same date, the patient was assessed by general medical provider René Perez-Silva, M.D., who completed a medical history and physical examination…Dr. Perez-Silva noted that the physical examination was unremarkable except for heart rate that was bradycardic. He also noted a history of hyperlipidemia, seizure disorder, and hirsutism. Dr. Perez-Silva placed the patient on seizure precautions, with activity as tolerated.” (Beckson Decl., ¶ 5.) Dr. Beckson also indicates that “[s]oon after admission to Del Amo Hospital, [Ms. Conner] was transferred to Torrance Memorial Medical Center emergency department for evaluation of bradycardia; and again she was medically cleared to return to Del Amo Hospital.” (Beckson Decl., ¶ 11.)

            Dr. Beckson further states that “[t]hroughout her hospitalization at Del Amo Hospital, the patient appropriately was given topiramate (Topamax), an anticonvulsant medication to prevent seizures, and she was placed on seizure precautions. Del Amo Hospital staff ensured that the patient received regular doses of topiramate throughout her entire admission. The hospital personnel competently and diligently addressed the potential for seizures, and she was properly monitored after receiving the medication. There is no evidence in the medical records that the patient had a seizure at any time during her stay at Del Amo Hospital. The emergency intramuscular injections (of Haldol, Ativan, and Benadryl), which the patient received on three occasions were clinically indicated and appropriate, and low risk for causing a seizure, especially while the patient was on the anticonvulsant topiramate.” (Beckson Decl., ¶ 12.) Dr. Beckson states that “[t]he administration of these medications was necessary emergently to protect the patient and others from harm due to the patient’s psychosis with behaviors that substantially elevated the immediate risk of injury: she was trying to choke herself; she was holding her breath to the point of turning red; and she was striking out at staff on one occasion. The hospital records indicate the patient was closely monitored after the administration of medications and at all other times (she was on one-to-one observation from August 27th through the time of her clinical decompensation on August 29th that resulted in her death).” (Ibid.) In addition, Dr. Beckson states that “[t]he day after her admission to Del Amo Hospital, the patient was placed on one-to-one monitoring and provided appropriate medications to treat her psychosis, all within the standard of care. The patient was maintained on the anticonvulsant medication topiramate, and the medications ordered and administered were low risk for causing a seizure. All measures were taken by the hospital staff to keep this patient safe.” (Beckson Decl., ¶ 13.)

            Defendants also submit the Declaration of Edwin C. Amos, III, M.D., a medical doctor licensed to practice in the State of California who has been Board Certified in Psychiatry and Neurology since 1990. (Amos Decl., ¶ 1.) Dr. Amos states that “[o]n August 19, 2019 in the evening hours, the patient was being monitoring [sic] one-on-one by psychiatric assistant Eva Szymanski. At no time while the patient was in the courtyard, including when she was lying on the grass, was any clinical seizure activity observed. At approximately 6:09 p.m., Eva Szymanski checked on the patient, then called another staff member who was in the courtyard for assistance. A third staff member came over and they rolled the patient over, then one of the staff ran inside the building and came out with a nurse. A Code Blue was called which was directed by Dr. Badri and CPR was administered in a timely manner. EMS was called and took over the resuscitative efforts at approximately 6:25 p.m. The patient was pronounced dead at 6:53 p.m. An autopsy of the decedent Dawn Kramer-Conner was conducted on September 1, 2019. The medical examiner attributed the cause of death as ‘Sudden unexpected death in epilepsy’ (SUDEP)…” (Amos Decl., ¶ 12.) In addition, Dr. Amos indicates that the medical examiner made the following findings:

“People with epilepsy can suffer sudden death, and this is termed sudden unexpected death in epilepsy. Although the cause is not exactly known, some research has found evidence of mutations in ion channels that affect both the heart and brain, being termed cardiocerebral channelopathies. There is also research that indicates the possibility that epilepsy may result in acquired cardiac dysfunction due to altered sympathetic/parasympathetic nervous system output (which affects items such as heart rate) or protein expression of ion channels.

In addition to the history of epilepsy and immediately aforementioned associations with sudden death, cardiac dilation results in increased susceptibility to arrhythmia. The cause of death is sudden unexpected death in epilepsy, with cardiac hypertrophy and dilation as contributing conditions. Based on the history, circumstances, and/or autopsy, as I currently know them, the manner of death is natural.” (Amos Decl., ¶ 12.)

Dr. Amos also states that “[b]ased upon the records and materials I have reviewed, as well as my education, training and experience, it is my opinion that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the hospital staff at Del Amo did not cause or contribute to the death of Dawn Kramer-Conner. The patient’s blood level of anti-seizure medication was at therapeutic levels at the time of her death, confirming that there was no failure of the hospital staff to properly administer the medication Topamax (topiramate). At no time did Dawn Kramer-Conner demonstrate any clinical signs or symptoms of seizure activity will she was a patient at Del Amo, including the minutes prior to her death.” (Amos Decl., ¶ 13.) In addition, Dr. Beckson states that “[t]here is no evidence that the staff failed to recognize a seizure and the staff closely monitored the patient throughout her stay to prevent self-harm. Her volitional behaviors were consistent with psychosis rather than seizure activity. In the minutes prior to finding the patient unresponsive and throughout the time the patient was in the hospital courtyard, the assigned psychiatric assistant was at the patient’s side continuously without any lapse of monitoring. There was no action by the Del Amo Hospital staff that did not adhere to the standard of care with respect to the care and treatment of Dawn Kramer-Conner.” (Beckson Decl., ¶ 13.)

Defendants assert that “[t]he administration of anti-seizure medication, one-to-one monitoring with no lapse in monitoring, are affirmative actions of providing care to Ms. Conner. It does not in any manner resemble a denial of medical care.” (Mot. at p. 10:22-24.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that Del Amo did not deny or withhold goods or services necessary to meet Ms. Conner’s basic needs. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for dependent adult abuse (pursuant to the Elder Adult and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act) is without merit as to Del Amo. As set forth above, Plaintiffs did not file any opposition to the instant motion. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the first cause of action.  

B.     Second Cause of Action for Negligent Hiring and Supervision

In support of the second cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision, Plaintiffs allege that “DEFENDANTS negligently hired, supervised and/or retained employees including HOSPTIAL Administrator Steven Hytry, Dena Greene, Lisa Montes, Bob Deney, Peter Hirsch, Kenneth Abjelina, Matthew Wong, Tina Clark, Helen Medina, Dena Nishimura, and many certified nursing assistants, registered nurses, licensed vocational nurses and others whose names are presently not known to DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER but will be sought via discovery.” (FACC, ¶ 50.) Plaintiffs further allege that “as the result of the unfitness of Steven Hytry, Dena Greene, Lisa Montes, Bob Deney, Peter Hirsch, Kenneth Abjelina, Matthew Wong, Tina Clark, Helen Medina, Dena Nishimura, and many certified nursing assistants, registered nurses, licensed vocational nurses and others whose names are presently not known to DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER but will be sought via discovery, DAWN KRAEMER-CONNER was injured in an amount and manner to be proven at time of trial.” (FACC, ¶ 55.)

“California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. Liability is based upon the facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.” (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054 [internal citation omitted].) Defendants cite to Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[a]n employer may be liable to a third person for the employer’s negligence in hiring or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit. Liability for negligent hiring … is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees. Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) In addition, “[l]iability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees. The tort has developed in California in factual settings where the plaintiff’s injury occurred in the workplace, or the contact between the plaintiff and the employee was generated by the employment relationship.” (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339-1340.)

As to the second cause of action, Defendants assert that “Plaintiff can present no evidence that any employee at Del Amo was unfit to perform his or her duties in administration or direct patient care of Ms. Conner. To the contrary, the evidence presented by Del Amo indicates the staff performed their professional duties competently.” (Mot. at p. 14:27-15:1.)

Defendants also assert that “[i]n our present matter, there is no evidence that any other staff member was not qualified to render care to Ms. Conner or any evidence of any prior negligent or wrongful conduct. In our present matter, plaintiff has merely contended that Del Amo was negligent in its hiring and supervision of personnel based on the fact that the incident occurred; not based upon any foreseeability factors. The fact that an incident occurred is not evidence of negligence.” (Mot. at pp. 15:28-16:4.)

As set forth above, Dr. Beckson states in his declaration that “[t]he day after her admission to Del Amo Hospital, the patient was placed on one-to one monitoring and provided appropriate medications to treat her psychosis, all within the standard of care. The patient was maintained on the anticonvulsant medication topiramate, and the medications ordered and administered were low risk for causing a seizure. All measures were taken by the hospital staff to keep this patient safe. There is no evidence that the staff failed to recognize a seizure and the staff closely monitored the patient throughout her stay to prevent self-harm. Her volitional behaviors were consistent with psychosis rather than seizure activity. In the minutes prior to finding the patient unresponsive and throughout the time the patient was in the hospital courtyard, the assigned psychiatric assistant was at the patient’s side continuously without any lapse of monitoring. There was no action by the Del Amo Hospital staff that did not adhere to the standard of care with respect to the care and treatment of Dawn Kramer-Conner.” (Beckson Decl., ¶ 13.)

In addition, Dr. Amos states in his declaration that “[t]he hospital personnel competently and diligently addressed the potential for seizures and Dawn Kramer-Conner was properly monitored after receiving medications. The ‘Haldol cocktail’ (Haldol, Ativan, and Benadryl) the patient received on three occasions would not predispose her to experience increased seizure activity. SUDEP is a well described phenomenon which befalls patients with chronical seizure disorders. Ms. Conner was receiving her usual dosage of anti-seizure medication while at Del Amo which was confirmed at autopsy demonstrated by the therapeutic level of topiramate. There is no evidence that she had any clinical seizure activity while at Del Amo. The video evidence and autopsy report indicate that she did not have any seizure activity but rather cardiogenic pathology. To a reasonable degree of medical probability, there were no additional preventative measures that could have been taken and the Del Amo staff did not cause or contribute in any manner to this patient’s harm or death.” (Amos Decl., ¶ 16.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the second cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision is without merit as to Del Amo. As set forth above, Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the instant motion. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the second cause of action.  

C.     Third Cause of Action for Wrongful Death

Defendants note that “the plaintiff in a wrongful death action must prove the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s death.” (Nelson v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 791.) “A cause of action for wrongful death is … a statutory claim. Its purpose is to compensate specified persons—heirs—for the loss of companionship and for other losses suffered as a result of a decedent’s death. The elements of the cause of action for wrongful death are the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs.” (Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968 [internal quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted].)

In the third cause of action for wrongful death, Christopher Conner alleges that “CHRISTOPHER CONNER is the husband and heir of DECEDENT,” and that “[a]s a proximate result of the negligence and ‘neglect’ (as that term is defined in Welfare and Institutions Code §15610.57)[2] by all of the DEFENDANTS, and each of them, as more fully alleged above, DECEDENT died on August 29, 2019.” (FACC, ¶¶ 58, 61.)

Defendants assert that “there is no admissible evidence that Defendants were negligent in the care of Ms. Conner and Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for wrongful death.” (Mot. at p. 16:5-6.) Defendants note, as set forth above, that their expert Dr. Beckson has opined that “the day after her admission to Del Amo Hospital, the patient was placed on one-to-one monitoring and provided appropriate medications to treat her psychosis, all within the standard of care. The patient was maintained on the anticonvulsant medication topiramate, and the medications ordered and administered were low risk for causing a seizure. All measures were taken by the hospital staff to keep this patient safe. There is no evidence that the staff failed to recognize a seizure and the staff closely monitored the patient throughout her stay to prevent self-harm. Her volitional behaviors were consistent with psychosis rather than seizure activity. In the minutes prior to finding the patient unresponsive and throughout the time the patient was in the hospital courtyard, the assigned psychiatric assistant was at the patient’s side continuously without any lapse of monitoring. There was no action by the Del Amo Hospital staff that did not adhere to the standard of care with respect to the care and treatment of Dawn Kramer-Conner.” (Beckson Decl., ¶ 13.)

In addition, Defendants note that Dr. Amos indicates that “[t]he medical examiner attributed the cause of death as ‘Sudden unexpected death in epilepsy’ (SUDEP).” (Amos Decl., ¶ 12.) Dr. Amos states that “SUDEP is a diagnosis which has been applied to patients with chronic seizure disorder who experience unexpected death. Although the precise pathophysiological mechanism of SUDEP has not been elucidated, many experts believe it is due to a cardiac process. Patients who expire due to SEDEP [sic] are often found at autopsy to have cardiac abnormalities. Dawn Kramer-Conner was found at autopsy to have significant abnormalities of the heart as noted by the medical examiner…” (Amos Decl., ¶ 14.)

As set forth above, Dr. Amos further states that “[t]he hospital personnel competently and diligently addressed the potential for seizures and Dawn Kramer-Conner was properly monitored after receiving medications. The ‘Haldol cocktail’ (Haldol, Ativan, and Benadryl) the patient received on three occasions would not predispose her to experience increased seizure activity. SUDEP is a well described phenomenon which befalls patients with chronical seizure disorders. Ms. Conner was receiving her usual dosage of anti-seizure medication while at Del Amo which was confirmed at autopsy demonstrated by the therapeutic level of topiramate. There is no evidence that she had any clinical seizure activity while at Del Amo. The video evidence and autopsy report indicate that she did not have any seizure activity but rather cardiogenic pathology. To a reasonable degree of medical probability, there were no additional preventative measures that could have been taken and the Del Amo staff did not cause or contribute in any manner to this patient’s harm or death.” (Amos Decl., ¶ 16.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the third cause of action for wrongful death is without merit as to Del Amo. As set forth above, Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the instant motion. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the third cause of action.  

D.    UHS of Delaware

The Court notes that Defendants’ motion does not appear to contain any argument or evidence as to why Plaintiffs’ causes of action purportedly fail as to UHS of Delaware. It appears that the only argument in the motion pertaining to UHS of Delaware is that “Plaintiff has not identified any employees of UHS of Delaware, Inc. or an officer, director or managing agent who had any knowledge of this patient.” (Mot. at p. 14:4-6.) But Defendants do not appear to provide any evidence in support of this assertion. In addition, the only Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) in Defendants’ separate statement that appear to refer to UHS of Delaware cite to the allegations of Plaintiffs’ FACC. (See UMF Nos. 1, 86, 163.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden of demonstrating that as to UHS of Delaware, one or more elements of the three causes of action of the FACC cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to these causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

            Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to Del Amo. Defendants’ motion is denied in its entirety as to UHS of Delaware.

The Court orders Del Amo to file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days of the date of this Order.

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

DATED:  October 24, 2023                            ________________________________

Hon. Rolf M. Treu

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court