Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 20STCV38299, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Itzel Martinez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on October 6, 2020 against Defendants GT Events Management, Inc., GT Events, Inc., and GT Agency. The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) discrimination on the basis of disability, (2) retaliation, (3) failure to engage in good faith interactive process, (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodation,

(5) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (7) failure to rehire, (8) violation of Labor Code section 226(b),

On June 21, 2024, a Judgment was entered in this action. The Judgment provides, inter alia, that “this matter came on for trial on May 1, 16, 17 and 23, 2023, in Department 50 of the above-entitled Court before the Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet, sitting without a jury. WHEREAS, having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties, the Court issued a Statement of Decision. The Court found in favor of Plaintiff Itzel Martinez on her discrimination, wrongful termination, failure to engage in the interactive process and failure to accommodate causes of action and awarded damages in the amount of $20,360.00, plus attorney fees and costs per motion. The Court found in favor of Defendant GT Events Management, Inc. (‘GT’) on the failure to prevent discrimination cause of action. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Judgment shall be entered for Itzel Martinez and against GT Events Management Inc. in the amount of $20,360.00.”

Plaintiff now moves for an order awarding her attorneys’ fees in the amount of $175,372.50 and costs in the amount of $6,811.73. GT Events Management and GT Events, Inc. (jointly, “Defendants”) oppose.

“A trial court has discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs to the party prevailing in a FEHA action.” (Steele v. Jensen Instrument Co. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 326, 331.) Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(6) provides in pertinent part that “[i]n civil actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party, including the department, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness fees.” “In FEHA actions, the discretion to deny a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff is narrow. A prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” (Steele v. Jensen Instrument Co., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 331 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citations omitted]; see also Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 584, “[p]ursuant to long-established precedent and practice, section 12965 fees are calculated by determining the number of hours reasonably worked by the attorneys who prosecuted the matter and multiplying that number by the reasonable hourly rate those attorneys should receive for such work. Depending on the circumstances, consideration may also be given to the attorneys’ experience, the difficulty of the issues presented, the risk incurred by the attorneys in litigating the case, the quality of work performed by the attorneys, and the result the attorneys achieved.”)

In the opposition, Defendants argue that “special circumstances exist that would render…an [award of attorney’s fees] unjust. This Court simply awarded Plaintiff $20,360.00 – approximately $5,000.00 below the statutory limit of the Superior Court. This matter should have been brought in a Limited Jurisdiction Court. Moreover, Plaintiff sought litigation for the sole purpose of an attorney fee award as Plaintiff failed to do better than her own 998. It will not be an abuse of discretion for the Court to refrain granting request for attorneys’ fees and costs given the award rendered.” (Opp’n at p. 6:5-11 [emphasis added].)

Defendants cite to Steele v. Jensen Instrument Co., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pages 330-331, where the Court of Appeal noted that a “policy promoted by a cost-shifting statute is the encouragement of the bringing of an action in the appropriate forum. For example, actions in which the amount in dispute is $25,000 or less should be brought in the municipal court. If a plaintiff brings an action in superior court and recovers a judgment within the $25,000 jurisdictional limit of the municipal court, the trial court has the discretion to deny costs to the plaintiff. In the superior court, costs or any portion of claimed costs shall be as determined by the court in its discretion…where the prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have been rendered in a court of lesser jurisdiction. In determining whether the prevailing party recovered a judgment that could have been rendered in a court of lesser jurisdiction, the trial court does not add a potential award of statutory or contractual attorney’s fees.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Here, the Court in its discretion does not find that Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs should be denied because Plaintiff recovered a judgment of only $20,360.00. Plaintiff asserts that “this Court already ruled that Plaintiff is entitled to its attorney’s fees and cost per motion.” (Reply at p. 1:17-18.) Indeed, as set forth above, the Court’s June 21, 2024 Judgment provides, inter alia, that “[t]he Court found in favor of Plaintiff Itzel Martinez on her discrimination, wrongful termination, failure to engage in the interactive process and failure to accommodate causes of action and awarded damages in the amount of $20,360.00, plus attorney fees and costs per motion.”

In addition, in Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 427, footnote 11, cited by Plaintiff, the Court of Appeal noted that “Beaty v. BET Holdings, Inc. and Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. were cases brought under the FEHA. In Vo, the jury found that the defendant was liable for harassment based on race, awarding the plaintiff $40,000 in compensatory damages, an amount later reduced to $37,500 by stipulation. The trial court then awarded the plaintiff $470,000 in attorney fees. Despite the fact that the fee award was more than 10 times greater than the plaintiff’s damages, the court concluded that the fee was justified because the defendant took a rigid nonsettlement posture, and because the award served the FEHA’s objectives of exposing and deterring discrimination.”

In the motion, Plaintiff asserts that “[a]t all times, defendant denied that it terminated Plaintiff due to her disabilities. The difficult fact pattern of this case, coupled with defendant’s hardline positions, made success highly unlikely. Defendant maintained that Plaintiff was not subject to discrimination or retaliation. From beginning to end, Defendant did not give an inch in this case, and Plaintiff’s counsel responded by vigorously fighting to vindicate the rights of Plaintiff.” (Mot. at p. 3:1-6.) In her supporting declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that she “attempted to resolve this matter with Defendant GT on at least two occasions. Plaintiff submitted a…CCP section 998 offer to compromise on February 8, 2021, inclusive of all claims for damages, cost and expenses, attorneys’ fees, statutory penalties, and interest against it. (See Exh. 5, copy of the 998 offer.) Defendant GT refused to engage or accept the 998 offer to compromise. Parties attended an MSC on March 15, 2022. However, Defendant GT did not engage in good faith and made no reasonable offers.” (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 15.) Plaintiff’s counsel states that “GT never responded to Plaintiff’s section 998 Offer and never made any counteroffers.” (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 17.) Plaintiff’s counsel states that she “faced tenacious opposition from Defendant who fought vigorously throughout this litigation.” (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 30.) Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown that the “fee [is] justified because the defendant took a rigid nonsettlement posture, and because the award serve[s] the FEHA’s objectives of exposing and deterring discrimination.” (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 158 Cal.App.at p. 427, fn. 11.)

Defendants also assert that “the award rendered by this Court is less than one-third of the C.C.P. 998 Offer to Compromise served by Plaintiff’s counsel on February 8, 2021.” (Opp’n at p. 2:15-16.) In Steele, cited by Defendants, the Court of Appeal noted that “Code of Civil Procedure section 998 permits a defendant to make a statutory offer to compromise an action. ‘If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c).) ‘[I]n determining the ‘more favorable judgment’ issue under section 998 ‘we first add to the judgment of damages those recoverable costs and attorney’s fees authorized by statute and incurred before the settlement offer.’…Although Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (c) has been amended to preclude, in contract actions, the addition of attorney’s fees and costs to the judgment of damages, such fees and costs must be added in actions brought under the FEHA.” (Steele v. Jensen Instrument Co., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 330.)

But here, Defendants do not appear to indicate that they made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to Plaintiff that was rejected. To the contrary, Defendants appear to acknowledge that on February 8, 2021, Plaintiff made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to GT Events Management, Inc. that was not accepted. (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 15, Ex. 5.) The Court finds that Defendants fail to articulate why Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs should purportedly be denied under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.

In her supporting declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel Sherri Nazarian indicates that she seeks an hourly rate of $650.00 per hour. (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 7.) Ms. Nazarian’s background and experience are discussed in her supporting declaration. (Nazarian Decl., ¶¶ 3-7.) In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel Harut Voskanyan indicates that he seeks an hourly rate of $575.00 per hour. (Voskanyan Decl., ¶ 8.) Mr. Voskanyan’s background and experience are discussed in his supporting declaration. (Voskanyan Decl., ¶¶ 2-6.)

In the opposition, Defendants do not appear to dispute Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested hourly rates. The Court finds that the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable and commensurate with rates charged by attorneys with comparable skill and experience.

“[T]he court’s discretion in awarding attorney fees is…to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The trial court may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 396.)

In her supporting declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel Sherri Nazarian states that “[m]y attached time keeping record includes 151 detailed entries, which is not remotely close to the actual hours I spent on this case. (See Exh. ‘1,’ a true and correct copy of my time keeping for the hours I am seeking payment for.).” (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 26.) Ms. Nazarian states that “even though I have expended over 330 hours on this case, I am requesting recovery for the total hours of 151 at $650 per hour, which equals $98,150.” (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 27.)

Plaintiff also seeks attorney’s fees for 134.3 hours expended by Mr. Voskanyan, for a total of $77,222.50 (134.3 hours x 575.00/hour). (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 29.) In his supporting declaration, Mr. Voskanyan states that “[a]ttached to Plaintiff’s Appendix of Evidence as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of my time records that reflect my work performed on this case, which I kept regularly in the course of my work on this case.” (Voskanyan Decl., ¶ 10.)

In the opposition, Defendants appear to object to “pre-litigation hours” Plaintiff’s counsel seek to recover. Defendants do not identify any specific billing entries they purportedly object to. In addition, Defendants do not cite to any legal authority indicating that Plaintiff may not recover fees for time incurred on “pre-litigation” tasks relating to this action.

Defendants also appear to object to 29.7 hours spent by Plaintiff’s counsel “preparing, filing the complaint, conversing between themselves and preparing an initial set of discovery.” (Opp’n at p. 7:17-18.) Again, Defendants do not identify any specific billing entries they object to. Thus, the Court is unable to determine whether any such unidentified billing entries are purportedly unreasonable. Moreover, the Court finds that 29.7 hours to prepare and file a complaint and to prepare an initial set of discovery is reasonable.

In addition, Defendants appear to object to 19.4 hours of time incurred by Plaintiff “for motions to compel that were denied...” (Opp’n at p. 7:20-21.) Again, Defendants do not identify the particular billing entries they are objecting to. In addition, Defendants do not cite to any legal authority indicating that a party must prevail on a motion in order to recover attorney’s fees for the time spent on such motion.

Defendants also state that “Plaintiff seeks 6 hours for conversing with a witness (DT) who was identified in discovery or deposed or called as a witness at trial.” (Opp’n. at p. 7:23-24.) This argument is confusing. The Court notes that Mr. Voskanyan’s time records include an entry for a “call with witness DT” on March 14, 2021. (Voskanyan Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 2.) To the extent Defendants are objecting to this billing entry, it is unclear on what grounds Defendants are doing so.

Lastly, Defendants state that “Plaintiff is seeking over 7 hours for ex parte motions to continue trial based on Defense counsel illness and unavailability (which were granted by the Court not only on Defense counsel unavailability but also the Court’s) rather than simply stipulating to the same.” (Opp’n at pp. 7:25-8:1.) Again, it is unclear what specific billing entries Defendants are objecting to. Moreover, Defendants do not submit any evidence to support the foregoing argument.

The Court does not find that Defendants have demonstrated that any of Plaintiff’s billing entries are unreasonable. The Court finds that the time requested by Plaintiff’s counsel is reasonable.

Plaintiff’s counsel states that Plaintiff seeks $6,811.73 in costs. (Nazarian Decl., ¶ 30, Ex. 4.) Defendants do not appear to dispute Plaintiff’s requested costs. The Court finds that the requested costs are reasonable.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is granted. Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $175,372.50 and costs in the amount of $6,811.73.

[1]The Court notes that the causes of action listed on the caption page of the Complaint do not exactly match the causes of action alleged in the body of the Complaint.

ITZEL MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, vs. GT EVENTS MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	20STCV38299
	Hearing Date:	January 17, 2025
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50