Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 20STCV38718, Date: 2024-04-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV38718 Hearing Date: April 19, 2024 Dept: 50
SHELDON SMITH, TRUSTEE OF THE ALBERT S. SMITH, JR. SEPARATE PROPERTY
TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 8, 2002, Plaintiff, vs. WALTER PERKINS, et
al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
20STCV38718 |
Hearing Date: |
[No Hearing Date] |
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ORDER RE: DEFENDANT
EMERALD ESCROW, INC’S APPLICATION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT |
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AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS |
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Background
Plaintiff Sheldon Smith,
Trustee of the Albert S. Smith, Jr. Separate Property Trust Dated November 8,
2002 (“Smith”) filed this action on October 8, 2020 against Defendants Walter
Perkins, Henry A. Thomas, Trustee of the Henry A. Thomas Trust dated 2/12/2007,
Orange Coast Title Company, and Emerald Escrow, Inc. (“Emerald”). On October
15, 2021, Smith filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), asserting
causes of action for (1) fraud,
(2) cancellation of deed, (3) quiet
title, and (4) negligence.
On
March 29, 2021, Emerald filed a Cross-Complaint against several
Cross-Defendants, alleging causes of action for (1) implied indemnity, (2)
comparative indemnity, (3) equitable indemnity, (4) express contractual
indemnity, and (5) contribution.
On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff and Emerald entered into a settlement.
(Wayne Decl., ¶ 3.)
Emerald
now applies for an order that (1) Emerald’s settlement with
Plaintiff was entered into in good faith, (2) that any pending claims in
connection with the instant lawsuit are dismissed, with prejudice, as to Emerald, and (3)
that the subject settlement was made in good faith and shall thus bar any other
joint tortfeasor(s) or co-obligor(s) from any future claims against Emerald,
for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity,
based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. The application is unopposed.
Discussion
“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section 877.6
was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure for
determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered
into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint
tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when
good faith is shown.” ((Irm Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 94, 104.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6,
subdivision (a)(1) provides, that “[a]ny party to an action in
which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or
co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of
the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant
and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors, upon giving notice in the
manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1005.
Upon a showing of good cause, the court may shorten the time for giving the
required notice to permit the determination of the issue to be made before the
commencement of the trial of the action, or before the verdict or judgment if
settlement is made after the trial has commenced.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6,
subdivision (a)(2) provides that “[i]n the alternative, a
settling party may give notice of settlement to all parties and to the court,
together with an application for determination of good faith settlement and a
proposed order. The application shall indicate the settling parties, and
the basis, terms, and amount of the settlement. The notice, application,
and proposed order shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested,
or by personal service. Proof of service shall be filed with the
court. Within 25 days of the mailing of the notice, application, and
proposed order, or within 20 days of personal service, a nonsettling party may
file a notice of motion to contest the good faith of the settlement. If none of
the nonsettling parties files a motion within 25 days of mailing of the notice,
application, and proposed order, or within 20 days of personal service, the
court may approve the settlement. The notice by a nonsettling party shall be
given in the manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section
1005. However, this paragraph shall not apply to settlements in which a
confidentiality agreement has been entered into regarding the case or the terms
of the settlement.”
“A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good
faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further
claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative
contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative
negligence or comparative fault.” ((Id., § 877.6, subd. (c).) In
addition, “[t]he party asserting the lack of good
faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6,
subd. (d).)
In Tech-Bilt,
Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the
California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts
are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’
total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in
settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a
recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he
were found liable after a trial. Other
relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy
limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or
tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” The evaluation of whether a settlement was
made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information
available at the time of settlement.” (Ibid.)
Significantly, when the
good faith nature of a settlement is uncontested, the Court need not consider
and weigh the Tech-Bilt factors. ((City of Grand
Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) “[W]hen no
one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith,
accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is
sufficient.” (Ibid.)
In
the application, Emerald cites to Code of Civil
Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (a)(2), which, as set forth above,
provides as follows:
“In the alternative, a settling party may give notice of settlement
to all parties and to the court, together with an application for determination
of good faith settlement and a proposed order. The application shall
indicate the settling parties, and the basis, terms, and amount of the
settlement. The notice, application, and proposed order shall be given by
certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service. Proof of
service shall be filed with the court. Within 25 days of the mailing of
the notice, application, and proposed order, or within 20 days of personal
service, a nonsettling party may file a notice of motion to contest the good
faith of the settlement. If none of the nonsettling parties files a motion
within 25 days of mailing of the notice, application, and proposed order, or
within 20 days of personal service, the court may approve the settlement. The
notice by a nonsettling party shall be given in the manner provided in
subdivision (b) of Section 1005. However, this
paragraph shall not apply to settlements in which a confidentiality agreement
has been entered into regarding the case or the terms of the settlement.”
Here, Emerald’s application identifies the settling parties, Plaintiff
and Emerald. (Wayne Decl., ¶ 3.) Emerald’s counsel indicates that “[o]n March
1, 2024, Plaintiff and Emerald Escrow entered into a settlement. On March 1,
2024, following arms-length, good faith negotiations between their respective
counsel of record, Plaintiff and Emerald reached an agreed upon settlement. The
terms of the settlement include a full release of Plaintiff’s claims against
Emerald in exchange for payment to Plaintiff…subject to the Court’s
determination that said settlement is in good faith. The proposed settlement
includes a waiver of all claims under California Civil
Code Section 1542. The settlement does not include any non-monetary
consideration, nor an assignment of rights from any party.” (Wayne Decl., ¶ 3.)[1] In
addition, Emerald’s counsel indicates that “[t]he Settlement is between only
Emerald and Plaintiffs. The settling parties will bear their own costs,
expenses, and attorney’s fees. Plaintiff will file a Request for Dismissal of
Emerald, with prejudice, upon receipt of the settlement funds and this Court’s
determination of good faith under Code of Civil
procedure sections 877 and 877.6.” (Wayne Decl., ¶ 4.) Emerald’s counsel asserts
that “[t]here is no collusion, fraud, or other tortious conduct aimed to injure
the non-settling parties interests in this action.” (Wayne Decl., ¶ 6.)
The proof of service attached to Emerald’s
notice of application and application indicates that the notice and application
were served by certified mail, return receipt requested on March 20, 2024. In
addition, the proof of service attached to the proposed order indicates that
the proposed order was served by certified mail, return receipt requested on
March 20, 2024. The Court notes that over 25 days have passed since March 20,
2024.
As set forth above, Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (a)(2)
also provides that “this paragraph shall not apply to
settlements in which a confidentiality agreement has been entered into
regarding the case or the terms of the settlement.” Emerald’s counsel indicates that the
subject settlement agreement contains a confidentiality provision providing as
follows:
“SMITH agrees
that any information regarding the terms of the resolution of the LAWSUIT,
including, but not limited to, the SETTLEMENT AMOUNT, must remain confidential,
and promises to undertake all necessary actions to insure that this information
remains confidential. To this end, SMITH agrees that he, and any other person
acting on her behalf, shall never disclose the terms of the resolution of the
LAWSUIT, including, but not limited to, the SETTLEMENT AMOUNT, or the fact that
SMITH is receiving a settlement payment, to any other person, firm,
organization, corporation, or other entity, including but not limited to
newspapers, legal publications, the internet, electronic or print media,
television, radio, or any other publication. In the event any inquiry is made
of concerning the resolution of the subject lawsuit, SMITH agrees that he, and
his attorneys, consultants, employees, agents and representatives, shall only
indicate that ‘the lawsuit has been dismissed,’ and shall give no other
indication of the outcome. This confidentiality provision shall not apply to
any enforcement proceedings related to this RELEASE, the good faith settlement
proceeding related to this RELEASE, to lawful process or judicial order, or to
spouses, banks, legal and/or tax advisors, or, where mutually agreed to in
writing by SMITH and EMERALD ESCROW.” (Wayne Decl., ¶ 5(a), emphasis
added.)
As the settlement agreement’s confidentiality provision provides that
such provision “shall not apply to…the good faith settlement proceeding related
to this RELEASE” (Wayne Decl., ¶ 5), the Court finds that Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (a)(2)
can apply here.
Emerald argues that “given the lack of liability on [Emerald] and the
rough approximation of Plaintiff’s damages, the settlement is more than fair.”
(App. at p. 10:14-16.) The Court finds that the unopposed application describes the background of this case, details
the nature of the proposed settlement, and provides sufficient reasoning as to
why the settlement was reached in good faith. All indications are that the
settlement was reached as a result of arm’s length negotiations between the
settling parties.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court
grants Emerald’s application for determination of good faith settlement.
The Court notes that Emerald’s
proposed order submitted on March 20, 2024 refers to “Plaintiff SHELDON SMITH,
TRUSTEE OF THE ALBERT S. SMITH, JR. SEPARATE SHELDON SMITH, TRUSTEE OF THE
PROPERTY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 8, 2002.” (Proposed order, p. 2:3-5.) The Court
notes that the plaintiff named in the FAC is Sheldon Smith, Trustee of the Albert S. Smith, Jr. Separate Property
Trust Dated November 8, 2002. Thus, the foregoing underlined portion of the
proposed order appears to be a typo.
Emerald’s proposed order
also incorrectly indicates that the application “was presented to this
Court on March 18, 2024,” and that the subject documents were served “on March
18, 2024.” (Proposed order, p. 2:6; 2:10.) In addition, the proposed order
incorrectly indicates that “no confidentiality clause of any kind is contained
in the settlement agreement.” (Proposed order, p. 2:11-12.)
In
light of the foregoing, the Court orders Emerald to file and serve a revised
proposed order to correct the above defects within 10 days of this Order.
///
Emerald is
ordered to provide notice of this Order.
DATED: April 18, 2024 ________________________________
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court
[1]On March 20, 2024, Emerald filed a motion to seal
portions of the instant application for determination
of good faith settlement, specifically, portions concerning the
settlement amount. Emerald’s motion to seal was granted.