Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 21STCV05410, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV05410    Hearing Date: May 9, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Eduardo Quijano (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on February 9, 2021 against Defendants Marlo Cayton and Michelle Cayton (jointly, “Defendants”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) set aside of transfers of community property without spousal consent, (2) conversion of community property, (3) imposition of constructive trust, (4) community property had and received, (5) unjust enrichment, (6) accounting of community property, (7) quiet title, (8) reformation of deeds, (9) declaratory relief, (10) declaration that gifts of community personal property are void, (11) declaration that Bonnie Brae Convalescent Hospital, Inc. is community property, (12) declaration that St. Sharbel Residential Care Facility, Inc. is community property, (13) partition of real property, and (14) financial elder abuse.

Plaintiff alleges that he was married to Elma Ballo Cayton at all relevant times alleged in the Complaint through the time of Elma Ballo Cayton’s passing in January 2021. (Compl., ¶ 1.) Defendants are daughters of Elma Ballo Cayton from a previous marriage. (Compl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants diverted community property funds of Plaintiff and Elma Ballo Cayton into accounts and titles in an attempt to divest Plaintiff of his community property rights. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that he “did not consent to the transfer or gift of any community property funds, assets or property to Defendants, or any of them, at any time in any amounts whatsoever. By this Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to recover for the benefit of the community all community property and the profits therefrom transferred by Elma Ballo Cayton to Defendants.” (Compl., ¶ 15.)

Defendants now move “to bifurcate the trial in this action, or, in the alternative, for an order for a separate trial, so that the issues relating to the validity of Plaintiff’s marriage to decedent Elma Cayton…are first adjudicated before any other issue is adjudicated in this action.” Plaintiff opposes.

Discussion

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b) provides: “[t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (b).)

Code of Civil Procedure sections 597 and 598 allow a court to order that the trial of any issue or part thereof proceed before the trial of any other issue to promote the ends of justice or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation. Additionally, Evidence Code section 320 provides that trial courts have discretion to regulate the order of proof. “[T]rial courts have broad discretion to determine the order of proof in the interests of judicial economy.” (Grappo v. Coventry Fin. Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 504.) The objective of bifurcation is “avoidance of the waste of time and money caused by the unnecessary trial of damage questions in cases where the liability issue is resolved against the plaintiff.” (Horton v. Jones (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 952, 955.)

As set forth above, Defendants move to bifurcate the trial in this action, or, in the alternative, for an order for a separate trial, so that the issues relating to the validity of Plaintiff’s marriage to decedent Elma Ballo Cayton (“Decedent”) are first adjudicated before any other issue is adjudicated in this action.

In the motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s marriage to Elma Ballo Cayton was illegal and void. Defendants provide a copy of a “Complaint for Annulment,” with an e-filing date stamp of October 5, 2021 (the “Complaint for Annulment”), filed in the matter of Eduardo Quijano v. Mila Baylon Aquino, Saint Mary’s County Circuit Court, Maryland, Case No. C-18-FM-21-000724. (Pero Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Defendants also provide a copy of Plaintiff’s Response to Request for Admissions, Set No. 2, propounded by Marlo Cayton in this action, in which Plaintiff, in response to Request for Genuineness of Documents No. 2, admits to the genuineness of the Complaint for Annulment. (Pero Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B.)

Defendants note that the Complaint for Annulment attaches as Exhibit 1 thereto a copy of a Certificate of Marriage evidencing a marriage between Plaintiff and Mila Baylon Aquino on March 3, 1993. (Pero Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A, Ex. 1.) Defendants also provide a copy of a “License and Certificate of Marriage” between Plaintiff and Elma Ballo Cayton, which Defendants’ counsel states has been produced in the course of discovery in this action. (Pero Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. C.) The License and Certificate of Marriage lists January 12, 1998 as the “Date Accepted for Registration.” (Ibid.)

The Complaint for Annulment also attaches an Exhibit 2 which is the “Declaration of Mila Baylon Aquino,” dated September 30, 2021. (Pero Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A, Ex. 2.) Defendants assert that this evidences the fact that Mila Aquino was alive in 1998 when Plaintiff married decedent Elma Ballo Cayton. (Pero Decl., ¶ 4.)

Defendants cite to Family Code section 2201, subdivision (a), which provides that “[a] subsequent marriage contracted by a person during the life of his or her former spouse, with a person other than the former spouse, is illegal and void, unless: (1) The former marriage has been dissolved or adjudged a nullity before the date of the subsequent marriage. (2) The former spouse (A) is absent, and not known to the person to be living for the period of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent marriage, or (B) is generally reputed or believed by the person to be dead at the time the subsequent marriage was contracted.”

Defendants note (as set forth above) that it was not until October 2021 (after Decedent’s death, and after this action was filed) that Plaintiff filed a petition to annul his marriage with Mila Aquino.[1] Defendants assert that Family Code section 2201 is clear that an annulment must occur before a subsequent marriage, such that the marriage of Plaintiff to Elma Ballo Cayton is illegal and void.

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff must establish “putative spouse” status to claim an interest in property acquired during his marriage with Elma Ballo Cayton. They cite to Family Code section 2251, which provides that “(a) If a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall: (1) Declare the party or parties, who believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, to have the status of a putative spouse. (2) If the division of property is in issue, divide, in accordance with Division 7 (commencing with Section 2500), that property acquired during the union that would have been community property or quasi-community property if the union had not been void or voidable, only upon request of a party who is declared a putative spouse under paragraph (1). This property is known as ‘quasi-marital property.’” (Fam. Code, § 2251, subd. (a).)  

Defendants note that Plaintiff has not alleged “putative spouse” status in the Complaint in this case. Defendants assert that “[i]f Plaintiff is unable to establish his ‘putative spouse’ status, Plaintiff will be unable to proceed under any of his causes of action in this case: All of Plaintiff’s claims are based on his claimed community property interest in the property acquired during his union with Decedent.” (Mot. at p. 6:24-27.) 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants assert that “[i]f it is determined that Plaintiff’s marriage to Decedent was invalid and that Plaintiff does not have the status of a putative spouse, Plaintiff is not entitled to any interest in property acquired during the marital estate of Plaintiff and Decedent. Such a determination would eliminate all of Plaintiff’s claim.” (Mot. at p. 4:7-10.) Defendants contend that the interests of judicial economy are thus served by first adjudicating the validity of Plaintiff’s marriage to Elma Ballo Cayton before any other issues are adjudicated in this action.

In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that bifurcation is unwarranted because “the purported marriage between Eduardo Quijano and Milla Aquino was annulled by the Maryland court.” (Opp’n at p. 6:4-5.) Plaintiff cites to In re Marriage of Liu (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 143, 156, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[a]n annulment is said to ‘relate back’ and erase the marriage and all its implications from the outset.” However, Plaintiff does not address the operation of Family Code section 2201 or Defendants’ arguments pertaining to this provision.

Next, Plaintiff asserts that “there is ample evidence that Plaintiff believed in good faith that his marriage to Elma Cayton was valid.” (Opp’n at p. 8:20-21.) As set forth above, under Family Code section 2251, “[i]f a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall: (1) Declare the party or parties, who believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, to have the status of a putative spouse….” (Fam. Code, § 2251, subd. (a)(1).) “The good faith inquiry is a subjective one that focuses on the actual state of mind of the alleged putative spouse. … [T]here is no requirement that the claimed belief be objectively reasonable…” (In re Marriage of Aviles & Vulovic (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 694, 699 [internal quotations omitted].)

In his declaration in support of the motion, Plaintiff states, inter alia, that he “was married to Elma for almost 23 years, from January 10, 1998 through her passing on December 27, 2020.” (Quijano Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff asserts that “[a]t the time I married Elma, I believed that I was an unmarried man,” and that “I first found out about the Maryland certification of marriage when it was produced by Defendants in the course of this litigation. Prior to that time, I did not know that document even existed.” (Quijano Decl., ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff states that “[f]rom the date of our marriage, we filed joint tax returns.” (Quijano Decl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff also states that he took care of Elma Ballo Cayton during many years that she was ill. (Quijano Decl., ¶¶ 12, 14, 15, 16-22.)

Plaintiff asserts that “bifurcating the issue of [Plaintiff’s] status as a putative spouse will not promote judicial economy because the determination of his good faith requires the jury, as the trier of fact, to consider the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” (Opp’n at p. 2:13-15.) Plaintiff cites to Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1115-1116, where the California Supreme Court noted that “[s]ection 377.60 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a wrongful death action may be brought by a decedent’s ‘putative spouse’ if he or she was dependent on the decedent. The statute defines a putative spouse as ‘the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid.’ In question here is the meaning of the phrase in italics. Is the good faith inquiry a purely subjective one, or does the inquiry also require application of an objective test?” (Internal citations omitted, emphasis in original.) The Ceja Court “conclude[d] that the good faith inquiry is purely subjective and evaluates the state of mind of the alleged putative spouse, and that the reasonableness of the claimed belief is properly considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the belief was genuinely and honestly held.” (Id. at p. 1120.)

The Court notes that in the reply, Defendants indicate that their separate motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues seeks a determination that the issues presented in this case are properly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. In such motion, filed on February 9, 2023, Defendants argue, inter alia, that “the probate court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s alleged community property interest claims asserted in this lawsuit. The Court must dismiss any claims that it does not summarily adjudicate for want of jurisdiction.” (Defendants’ February 9, 2023 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues at p. 14:22-24.)

 Defendants assert in the reply in support of the instant motion that “[g]iven the jurisdictional issues presented by the MSJ, the Court should consider delaying its ruling on Defendants’ motion to bifurcate until the Court resolves Defendants’ MSJ.” (Reply at p. 3:3-4.)

The Court agrees that delaying the ruling on the instant motion is appropriate and will continue the hearing on the motion.

Conclusion

            Based on the foregoing, the hearing on Defendants’ motion to bifurcate is continued to ____________, 2023 at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50. No further briefing may be filed in support of or in opposition to the instant motion.

            Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED:  May 9, 2023                                   ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court