Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 21STCV05777, Date: 2025-05-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV05777    Hearing Date: May 14, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiffs Yaniv Shlomo and Elizabeth L. Saade (“Plaintiffs”) filed this lemon law action against defendants Seidner Enterprises, Inc. and BRP US Inc. (originally as Doe 1) (“Defendants”) on February 9, 2021. On October 5, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement. On April 13, 2023, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice upon Plaintiffs’ request, reserving jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On December 19, 2024 – one year, eight months, and six days after Plaintiffs’ dismissal – Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. On May 1, 2025, Defendants filed their opposition, and on May 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their reply.

Discussion

The motion is denied as untimely.

A motion for attorneys’ fees “for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court. . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).) In this case, the latest date for the filing of the motion would be “180 days after entry of judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) In Catlin Ins. Co., Inc. v. Danko Meredith Law Firm, Inc. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 764, 781 (Catlin), the Court held that the deadline governing a motion for an award of attorney fees is triggered by the conclusion of the litigation, a terminus point typically marked by the entry of judgment or dismissal in the trial court, including … voluntary dismissal… Under this timing scheme, the clock starts to run from either the service of notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, … or if no such notice is given, the entry of judgment or dismissal (starting a 180-day clock.”) (Emphasis added; internal citations and quotations omitted.))

Plaintiffs argue their motion is timely because the dismissal here appears in a minute order, rather than a signed order formally entered; so the clock for their motion never began to run. Plaintiffs cite Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 581d regarding a dismissal ordered by the court in support of their contention that a written order signed by the Court was required.  However, the Court in this instance did not order the dismissal of the action. Plaintiff made an oral request and voluntarily dismissed the complaint. The Court’s minute order reflects the dismissal upon Plaintiffs’ oral request. Consequently, the timeline to appeal or move for fees began to run upon the voluntary dismissal without separate entry of judgment. (Catlin, 73 Cal. App. 5^th 764, 781.)

Plaintiff also argues the Court may award fees because it retained jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement according to section 664.6. But the parties’ settlement allows for fees to be awarded “by agreement or a Court motion.” (Meiki Decl., ¶ 11.) Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction to award fees properly sought by motion – which do not include these. The phrase “a Court motion” must be construed to incorporate all relevant Rules of Court, including filing deadlines. A settlement with a 664.6 provision and permission for fees by motion does not expose the parties to possible liability for fees in perpetuity.

            Conclusion

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  May 14, 2025                                             ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court