Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case 21STCV06120 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Roel Punzalan (“Plaintiff”) filed this Lemon Law action on February 16, 2021 against Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Defendant”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) breach of implied warranty of merchantability under Song-Beverly Warranty Act, and (2) breach of express warranty under Song-Beverly Warranty Act.

Plaintiff indicates that the parties entered into a settlement, whereby Defendant agreed to pay $61,000.00, inclusive of a loan payoff to Plaintiff in exchange for the subject vehicle. (Barry Decl., ¶ 9.)

The parties’ Settlement Agreement also provides, inter alia, that “[i]n the event the parties cannot agree about reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, the parties agree that DEFENDANT shall pay PLAINTIFF’S attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d) in an amount determined by the Court by way of noticed Motion to have been reasonably incurred by PLAINTIFF in the commencement and prosecution of this action. The parties agree that PLAINTIFF is the prevailing party in the Action solely for purposes of the motion and for no other reason, including but not limited any other remedy or potential award. DEFENDANT shall pay any attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses determined by the Court upon receipt of Notice from the Court and/or PLAINTIFF’S counsel.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 4, ¶ 2(b).)

Plaintiff now moves for an award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in the total amount of $35,765.61. Defendant opposes.

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act grants car buyers the right to sue a manufacturer or retail seller for failure to comply with implied or express warranties. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subdivision (a).) “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subdivision (d).)

From January 1, 2021 through the present, The Barry Law Firm billed 88.1 hours for services rendered for a total of $34,350.00. (Barry Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 5.) The Barry Law Firm indicates that the following attorneys performed work on this case, followed by their requested hourly rates:

(Barry Decl., ¶¶ 12, 16, 23, 30-31, Ex. 5; Whitman Decl., ¶ 11; Kim Decl., ¶ 9; Mot. at p. 10:4-5.)

In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel set forth their background and experience. (Barry Decl., ¶¶ 17, 19, 20, 23; Whitman Decl., ¶¶ 3-7; Norris Decl., ¶¶ 3-5; Kim Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.)

Defendant contends that Mr. Barry’s requested rate of $525/hour is excessive. Defendant asserts and that a rate of $450/hour is in line with the work performed herein, the level of skill required, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience.[1] In support of this assertion, Defendant cites to the “United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report” for 2017-2018, which indicates, inter alia, that the median hourly rate for attorneys handling “Vehicle Cases” is $450 per hour, and the “Average Attorney Rate for All Attorneys” is $450 per hour. (Wolf Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 1.) However, as Plaintiff notes, the subject United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report (for the years 2017-2018) also provides the median rate for “Attorneys Handling Vehicle Cases” in the Los Angeles area is $569/hour. (Rosner Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1, p. 288.)[2]

The Court finds that the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable and commensurate with rates charged by attorneys with comparable skill and experience.

“[T]he court’s discretion in awarding attorney fees is … to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The trial court may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ., supra, at p. 396.)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel has attached billing statements to the instant motion detailing the nature of the work performed. (Barry Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 5.) Defendant asserts that the fees requested are excessive and asserts that Plaintiff’s fee request should accordingly be reduced to $27,748.75.

Defendant first asserts that “Plaintiff’s counsel overbilled at $2,572.50 through the filing of the boilerplate Complaint. See Pl.’s Exh. 5, pp. 1-2; see also Pl.’s Complaint. However, this was essentially a form Complaint for a garden-variety Lemon Law case with only slight modifications and almost no elaboration regarding the facts at issue in this particular case.” (Opp’n at p. 5:1-4.) However, Defendant does not identify any particular time entry on page 1-2 of Plaintiff’s billing entries that it asserts are excessive. Moreover, Plaintiff’s billing statements lists a time entry on February 9, 2022 for 0.5 hours to “Draft Plaintiff’s Summons and Complaint.” The Court finds that this requested amount of time is quite reasonable.

Defendant also asserts that “much of this work was billed at the highest rate—$525.00 per hour. Certainly, when one is working on a rote contingency matter such as this, one should be more sparing, particularly for an attorney with 20+ years of experience.” (Opp’n at p. 5:6-8.) The Court notes that Defendant has not identified any particular tasks that it asserts should have been performed by an attorney with a lower billing rate.

Next, Defendant notes that on April 27, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel billed a total of 3.3 hours for a review of Defendant’s first set of requests for production of documents, form interrogatories, and special interrogatories. (Barry Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 5, pp. 3-4.) Defendant asserts that this amount is excessive and should be reduced by a third. The Court does not find that the requested 3.3 hours is excessive and declines to reduce this amount.

Defendant also notes that Plaintiff’s counsel billed 4.7 hours to draft written discovery. (Barry Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 5, pp. 4-5.) Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff’s written discovery is largely ‘cut-and-paste’ discovery much like the discovery in any other Lemon Law case. No more than half of this time should be deemed reasonable…” (Opp’n at p. 5:19-21.) The Court does not find that the requested 4.7 hours is excessive and declines to reduce this amount. The Court notes that although the use of forms and templates help with efficiency, counsel is still expected to review and modify each document for each individual case, and time spent to ensure that each document is appropriately modified is reasonable.

Next, Defendant notes that Plaintiff’s counsel billed $400.00 for travel to and from a case management conference (“CMC”) on August 23, 2021 that was continued. (Barry Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 5, p. 12.) Defendant asserts that it was unreasonable to bill for traveling in person to the August 23, 2021 CMC, considering that Plaintiff’s counsel attended the continued case management conference on September 7, 2021 telephonically. (Barry Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 5, p. 13.) However, as Plaintiff notes, the CMC was originally noticed for August 23, 2021. (See Notice of Case Management Conference filed on February 19, 2021.) Both parties appeared at the the August 23, 2021 CMC, which was continued. (See August 23, 2021 Minute Order.) The Court’s August 23, 2021 minute order provides, inter alia, “[m]atter is not called for hearing. The Court’s Disclosure and Order is posted online for the parties to review, is signed and filed this date, and incorporated herein by reference. Pursuant to the request of defendant, the Case Management Conference scheduled for 08/23/2021 is continued to 09/7/21 at 10:00 AM in Department 50 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.” The Court does not find that Plaintiff’s billing entries for travel to and from the original August 23, 2021 CMC reflect unreasonable amounts of time.

Next, Defendant indicates that Plaintiff’s billing entries include a task on October 12, 2022 for “Follow-up Review Status of Case Settlement given Court’s September 2022 vacating trial date…” (Barry Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 5, p. 24.) Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff’s counsel’s own billing records reflect that the case had effectively resolved by 10/12/2022,” but that “counsel then continued to bill for numerous administrative or ministerial tasks, such as conferences and case reviews, all the way up to the time of drafting the instant Motion.” (Opp’n at p. 6:3-6.) Defendant asserts that the time requested for tasks conducted after October 12, 2022 should be reduced by one half. However, Defendant does not identify any specific time entries after October 12, 2022 that it asserts are unreasonable, and the Court does not find that any of the entries reflect excessive or unreasonable amounts of time for the particular tasks specified. Thus, the Court declines to reduce the hours as requested by Defendant.

Lastly, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel overbilled $4,592.50 for the preparation of the instant fee motion and that no more than half of the time requested should be deemed reasonable. The Court does not find that any of the entries related to the fee motion reflect excessive or unreasonable amounts of time for the particular tasks specified. Thus, the Court declines to reduce the hours as requested by Defendant.

Lastly, Plaintiff indicates that his counsel incurred $1,415.61 in costs in prosecuting this matter. (Barry Decl., ¶ 21, Ex. 7 (Memorandum of Costs).) Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s requested costs.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is granted in the amount of $35,765.61.

[1]The Court notes that Defendant does not appear to dispute Mr. Barry’s requested $600/hour rate for 2022/2023.

[2]The Declaration of Hallen D. Rosner was filed in support of Plaintiff’s motion.

ROEL PUNZALAN, Plaintiff, vs. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	21STCV06120
	Hearing Date:	January 26, 2023
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO CIVIL CODE SECTION 1794(d)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50