Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 21STCV06266, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Jesua Ochoa (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on February 16, 2021 against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“GM”).

Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on August 2, 2021. The FAC alleges causes of action for (1) breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act, (2) breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act, and (3) fraudulent inducement-concealment.

On February 28, 2022, the Court issued an Order sustaining GM’s demurrer to the third cause of action of the FAC for fraudulent inducement-concealment without leave to amend.

Plaintiff indicates that on September 18, 2023, Plaintiff signed a “Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims” (herein, the “Settlement Agreement”). (Barry Decl., ¶ 40, Ex. 5.) The Settlement Agreement provides, inter alia, that “Defendant shall pay Plaintiff attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in an amount determined by the Court, by way of a single noticed motion, to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in the commencement and prosecution of this action, unless the parties agree on the amount of fees, costs and expenses to be paid absent such a motion. The parties agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of the motion. Defendant reserves the right to oppose any fee motion to be filed in this case.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 40, Ex. 5, § 2(b)(iii).)

Plaintiff now moves for an order awarding his attorney fees, costs, and expenses. GM opposes.

The Court rules on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Xylon Quezada as follows:

Objection No. 4: sustained as to the first and third sentence, overruled as to the second sentence.

Objection No. 5: sustained as to the first sentence, overruled as to the second sentence.

Objection No. 8: sustained as to the second and fourth sentences, overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 11: sustained as to the first sentence, overruled as to the second sentence.

Objection No. 12: sustained as to the second sentence, overruled as to the remainder.

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act grants car buyers the right to sue a manufacturer or retail seller for failure to comply with implied or express warranties. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (a).) “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

As set forth above, the subject Settlement Agreement provides, inter alia, that “Defendant shall pay Plaintiff attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in an amount determined by the Court, by way of a single noticed motion, to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in the commencement and prosecution of this action, unless the parties agree on the amount of fees, costs and expenses to be paid absent such a motion. The parties agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of the motion. Defendant reserves the right to oppose any fee motion to be filed in this case.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 40, Ex. 5, § 2(b)(iii).) In the opposition, GM does not dispute that Plaintiff “prevails in an action under this section” for purposes of Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).

From January 20, 2021 through the present, The Barry Law Firm billed 212.40 hours for services rendered for a total of $86,519.50. (Barry Decl., ¶ 47, Ex. 6.) The Barry Law Firm indicates that the following attorneys performed work on this case, followed by their requested hourly rates:

David N. Barry: $525/hour for September 2019-December 2021; $600/hour for January 1, 2022-March 31, 2023; and $625/hour for April 1, 2023 to the present

In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel set forth their background and experience. (Barry Decl., ¶¶ 44, 45, 51-53; Galaviz Decl., ¶¶ 3-6; Shumake Decl., ¶¶ 3-5; Matera Decl., ¶¶ 3-6; Kim Decl., ¶¶ 3-6.) In the opposition, GM does not appear to challenge Plaintiff’s requested hourly rates.

The Court finds that the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable and commensurate with rates charged by attorneys with comparable skill and experience.

“[T]he court’s discretion in awarding attorney fees is … to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client.” ((Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The trial court may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. ((Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ., supra, at p. 396.)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel has attached billing statements to the instant motion detailing the nature of the work performed. (Barry Decl., ¶ 47, Ex. 6.) In the opposition, GM asserts that “the actual hours of legal ‘work’ should be cut and Counsel awarded no more than…$35,864.72 in fees and costs.” (Opp’n at p. 2:26-27.)

First, GM asserts that Plaintiff “has zero statutory or contractual rights to recover any fees from GM for the common law fraud claim.” (Opp’n at p. 4:22-23.) The parties cite to Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 349, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[w]hen a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action. However, [s]uch fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both causes of action in which fees are proper and those in which they are not. Moreover, [a]pportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable units.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) The Court of Appeal in Santana noted that “[t]he trial court found the latter exception applied, describing the two causes of action—fraud and Song-Beverly Act—as encompassing ‘one set of facts.’ We agree.” (Ibid.)

The Santana Court also noted that “[b]eyond the estoppel argument, Chrysler has not proposed any practical method of apportioning fees in this case. It has not, for example, identified any discrete portion of the litigation that was solely focused on fraud. Moreover, Chrysler’s only proposals for how to apportion fees are unpersuasive: a 50 percent reduction in fees, calculated simply attributing half of the fees to each of two causes of action; or a 92 percent reduction in fees to reflect the fact that 92 percent of the damages were attributable to fraud. Unsurprisingly, Chrysler does not cite any authority for those approaches, both of which are completely out of keeping with the principle of ensuring the prevailing party receives a full recovery of attorney fees on the fee-shifting cause of action. Consequently, the court did not err in refusing to apportion fees.” ((Id. at p. 350 [internal citation omitted].)

In its opposition, GM states that it is “propos[ing] [a] practical method of apportioning fees in this case…by identif[ying] [a] discrete portion of the litigation that was solely focused on fraud.” (Opp’n at p. 3:17-20, citing Santana.) GM states that it “seeks to strike compensation of $9,570.00 (10.7 hours) related only to the fraud claim…” (See Opp’n at pp. 3:24-4:21.)

In the reply, Plaintiff asserts that “GM incorrectly interprets Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334 to hold that merely providing a method for apportionment of fees between those incurred relating to Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action and Song-Beverly cause of action is sufficient to establish that apportionment should occur. In fact, the court in Santana said the opposite by pointing out that the apportionment proposals made by the defendant in that case were unpersuasive.” (Reply at p. 2:21-25.) Indeed, the Santana Court did not appear to hold that the apportionment of fees is required if a proposal for apportionment is made. In addition, as noted by Plaintiff, “like the defendant in Santana, GM has provided no legal support for its method of apportionment.” (Reply at p. 4:16-17.)

Further, as set forth above, the Santana Court noted held “[w]hen a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action. However, [s]uch fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both causes of action in which fees are proper and those in which they are not. Moreover, [a]pportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable units.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 349 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Here, GM does not appear to dispute that the fees pertaining to Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement-concealment cause of action were incurred “for representation on an issue common to both causes of action in which fees are proper and those in which they are not.” (Ibid.) GM does not appear to dispute Plaintiff’s assertion in the motion that “all causes of action arose out of the same set of facts.” (Mot. at p. 9:16-7.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies GM’s request to strike compensation for work related to Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement-concealment cause of action.

Next, GM asserts that “Mr. Barry should not recover for the 2.5 hours ($1,312.50) he ‘billed’ to the file before Plaintiff was even a client of Counsel’s firm. He ‘billed’ to talk to [his] ‘potential client,’ ‘[r]eview repair orders and research technical service bulletins and recalls[,]’ and draft the representation agreement…this entry should be stricken.” (Opp’n at pp. 5:27-6:1.) GM also asserts that Plaintiff should not recover time spent on communications with Plaintiff regarding “case status” before the case was filed. (See Opp’n at p. 6:9-12.) However, as noted by Plaintiff, GM does not appear to cite any legal authority demonstrating that “pre-engagement work” is not recoverable here. The Court finds that the foregoing time was “reasonably incurred by [Plaintiff] in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action” and declines to strike it. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

GM also contends that “Mr. Barry ‘billed’ 0.5 hour ($262.50) to draft the Complaint…Given than Counsel has filed thousands of nearly identical complaints against GM, this amount of time is absurd. GM requests that the time be reduced to 0.1 hour…” (Opp’n at p. 6:12-14.) The Court does not agree that the requested 0.5 hours is excessive and declines to reduce this amount.

Next, GM asserts that “Mr. Barry “billed” .2 hours ($202.50) simply to ‘review’ two Court notices…This category of task is unreasonable and necessary for an attorney to be charging his client or shifting to an adversary.” (Opp’n at p. 6:15-17.) It appears GM intended to state “unnecessary” instead of “necessary.” In any event, GM does not cite any legal authority to support the foregoing proposition. The Court does not find that the requested 0.2 hours is unreasonable and declines to deduct this amount.

GM also asserts that “Mr. Matera should not be permitted to bill 2.5 hours ($725.00) to review GM’s discovery requests…GM—like Counsel—uses the same requests in each case because the nature of the claims that Counsel asserts against GM are the same in every case…” (Opp’n at p. 6:17-19.) The Court does not agree that the requested 2.5 hours is excessive and declines to reduce this amount as requested by GM.

Next, GM asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel spent an excessive amount of time on preparing
“templated” discovery responses. (See Opp’n at p. 6:21-26.) GM argues that “[t]his time is excessive because Plaintiff’s responses were largely templated objections duplicated from past cases Counsel has brought against GM.” (Opp’n at p. 6:22-23.) GM also argues that Plaintiff’s counsel spent excessive time on “templated” discovery requests and deposition notices. (See Opp’n at pp. 6:26-7:3.) GM also objects to “templated” motions to compel and “templated” motions in limine. (See Opp’n at p. 8:13-26.) The Court does not find that GM has shown that the time spent on the foregoing tasks is unreasonable. The Court notes that although the use of forms and templates help with efficiency, counsel is still expected to review and modify each document for each individual case, and time spent to ensure that each document is appropriately modified is reasonable. As noted by Plaintiff, GM does not appear to cite any legal authority supporting the contention that Plaintiff must draft pleadings and other documents from scratch in order to be entitled to attorney’s fees.

GM also asserts that “Ms. Eabisa billed 4.4 hours ($1,100.00) to read GM’s written discovery responses…Counsel should not be allowed to recover these fees. Like every other part of discovery, neither Plaintiff’s requests nor GM’s responses to those requests were novel nor varied significantly from past cases.” (Opp’n at p. 7:4-6.) The Court does not find that the requested 4.4 hours for this task is excessive and declines to reduce this amount.

Next, GM asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel spent excessive time, specifically a total of 8.9 hours, on “canned” meet and confer correspondence, reviewing GM’s meet and confer emails, and related file review. The time entries GM objects to are from “April 19, September 1 & 3, October 1 & 18, December 6 & 28, 2021; January 20 & 25-26, March 9 & 16, August 1, 11 & 31, 2022; January 19, 20 & 31, March 17, July 5 & 13, August 4 & 7, 2023.” (Opp’n at p. 7:8-10.) The Court does not find that the requested 8.9 hours is excessive and declines to reduce this amount.

GM also asserts that “Ms. Eabisa ‘billed’ 5.4 hours ($1,350.00) to ‘review file in preparation for’ the Court-ordered IDC and related activities…This ‘work’ was not standalone but duplicative of the meet-and-confer activities and review of discovery discussed above.” (Opp’n at p. 7:16-18.) The Court does not see how this time is duplicative. The Court does not find that the 5.4 hours is excessive, and declines to reduce this time as requested by GM.

Next, GM asserts that “Ms. Easbisa should not recover for the 0.3 hour [sic] ($75.00) she says she has spent to ‘[r]eview’ GM’s Proposed Stipulation and Protective Order.’…This is the same protective order GM offers in all its cases with Counsel, and Counsel has reviewed this document hundreds of times.” (Opp’n at p. 7:19-21.) The Court does not agree that the requested 0.3 hours is excessive. The Court declines to strike this amount.

GM also asserts that “Counsel should not recover for the 18.6 hours ($9,806.00) that Counsel, mainly Mr. Barry, ‘billed’ in total to telephonically give updates to their ‘client re case status,’ ‘draft email correspondence to client,’ or ‘review email correspondence from client re case status.”…A closer look reveals that Mr. Barry’s entries often seem duplicative and inefficient. For example, on August 3, 2023, Mr. Barry ‘billed’ 2.5 hours ($1,562.50) for ‘[t]elephonic conference with client re[:] case status,’ then ‘billed’ an additional 0.3 hour ($187.50) the next day for the same task…It is only reasonable that many of these communications could have been performed in half the time by Mr. Matera at his rate, such that GM requests a reduction of 9.3 hours ($7,109.00).” (Opp’n at p. 7:24-28.) The Court does not find that the referenced 18.6 hours is unreasonable. In the motion, Plaintiff notes that “[u]pdating a client is a fundamental responsibility of an attorney.” (Mot. at p. 7:18-19, citing California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-500.) The Court notes that California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, “[f]ormerly cited as CA ST RPC Rule 3-500,” provides, inter alia, that “(a) A lawyer shall:…(3) keep the client reasonably…informed about significant developments relating to the representation, including promptly complying with reasonable…requests for information and copies of significant documents when necessary to keep the client so informed…” (Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, subd. (a)(3).)

Next, GM asserts that it “should not be billed for various clerical tasks or tasks which Counsel must do to manage their files…To cite but one example, on February 17, 2023, Mr. Barry ‘billed’ 0.4 hours ($240.00) to “[d]raft memo to file re[:] case status.’…Three days later, Ms. Shumake likewise ‘billed’ 0.2 hours ($60.00) to ‘[d]raft memo to file re[:] case status.’…Because of these numerous entries— which did nothing to advance Plaintiff’s case—GM asks that the Court deny these entries in their entirety for a reduction of 27.4 hours.” (Opp’n at p. 8:2-7.)[1] But GM does not appear to cite any legal authority demonstrating that such costs are not recoverable. The Court finds that the requested time is reasonable and declines to deny these entries in their entirety, as requested by GM.

Next, GM asserts “[c]ounsel should get no credit for the 7.9 hours…that Counsel claims that Mr. Barry, Mr. Matera, and Ms. Papyanis spent or will spend on travel time to various events, including the future fee motion hearing…Traveling to court is part of cost of doing business and involves none of the special skill or knowledge presumably supporting Counsel’s outrageous hourly rates. Also, travel time is rarely charged to one’s client and fees not properly charged to one’s client may not be imputed to GM.” (Opp’n at p. 8:8-11.) The Court notes that GM does not cite any legal authority to support the proposition that Plaintiff may not recover fees incurred for an attorney’s travel time. The Court does not find that the requested 7.9 hours is unreasonable and declines to strike this amount.

GM also asserts that “[c]ounsel is asking to recover 6.8 hours ($2,400.00) that Ms. Shumake ‘billed’ preparing proposed jury instructions, a joint pretrial statement, verdict form, stipulated facts, exhibit and witness lists, and so forth…But these documents, such as jury instructions, do not vary from case to case…And the time spent on this work is excessive. At most, it should have taken no more than 1.0 hour to perform these tasks.” (Opp’n at pp. 8:27-9:1.) The Court disagrees and finds that the requested 6.8 hours for the subject tasks billed on January 25, 2023 is reasonable. And to the extent GM is arguing that Plaintiff used “templates,” the Court notes, as set forth above, that time spent to ensure that each document is appropriately modified is reasonable.

Lastly, GM asserts that “[c]ounsel should not get full credit for the 12.6 hours ($5,684.50), excluding claimed travel time, that Counsel claims that has been spent or that it will spend on its fee motion—for three reasons…First, this total includes 1.2 hours for four of the timekeepers to ‘[r]eview and revise’ their personal declarations as to their experience and hourly rate, which are not case-specific and do not change from case to case except for the caption…Second, Counsel’s fee motion is the same as fee motions Counsel has recently filed in other Song-Beverly cases against GM, like the declarations from the involved attorneys…Finally, this activity alone counts for over nearly 6% of all of Counsel’s billed fees.” (Opp’n at p. 9:2-8.) GM contends that “1.0 hour to prepare the fee motion (at Ms. Shumake’s rate), 1.0 hour to prepare a reply brief (at Ms. Sumake’s rate), 1.0 hour to prepare the memorandum of costs (at Ms. Shumake’s rate), and 1.0 hour to go to the hearing (at Mr. Barry’s rate) will adequately compensate Counsel’s templated efforts and asks for a reduction of 9.1 hours…” (Opp’n at p. 9:8-9.) The Court does not find that any of the entries related to the fee motion reflect excessive or unreasonable amounts of time for the particular tasks specified. Thus, the Court declines to reduce the hours as requested by GM.

Lastly, Plaintiff indicates that his counsel incurred $4,810.50 in costs in prosecuting this matter. (Barry Decl., ¶ 49, Ex. 8 (Memorandum of Costs).) In the opposition, GM asserts that Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs includes “expenses not actually or reasonably incurred.” (Opp’n at p. 9:15-16.)

However, Plaintiff seeks both attorney’s fees and costs in connection with the instant motion. Plaintiff does not appear to cite any legal authority demonstrating that GM must challenge Plaintiff’s requested costs in a motion to tax costs as opposed to in an opposition to the instant motion. The Court notes that in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 68, the Court of Appeal noted that “[o]n appeal, plaintiffs renew their contention that contractor has forfeited any objections to plaintiffs’ claim for costs by failing to file a motion to tax costs.” The Gorman Court noted that “[t]here is no statute requiring the filing of a motion to tax costs.” ((Id. at p. 69.) The Gorman Court found that “[w]hile contractor’s opposition to plaintiffs’ motion was alternatively entitled a motion to tax costs, contractor did not specify objectionable line items in the cost memo, but then again, $ 76,954.76 of plaintiffs’ claimed costs (22 percent) were not itemized in this memo, so no such objection could be made to them. We consider it clear enough from contractor’s opposition what cost claims contractor objected to. We perceive no prejudice to plaintiffs, or even a claim of prejudice, from the absence of a more formal motion to tax costs.” ((Ibid.) Here too, Plaintiff does not claim any prejudice from GM’s failure to file a more formal motion to tax costs.

Moreover, as set forth above, the parties’ Settlement Agreement provides, inter alia, that “Defendant shall pay Plaintiff attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in an amount determined by the Court, by way of a single noticed motion, to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in the commencement and prosecution of this action, unless the parties agree on the amount of fees, costs and expenses to be paid absent such a motion. The parties agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of the motion. Defendant reserves the right to oppose any fee motion to be filed in this case.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 40, Ex. 5, § 2(b)(iii), emphasis added.) In Gorman, the Court of Appeal found that “Section 1032, subdivision (c) states in part: ‘Nothing in this section shall prohibit parties from stipulating to alternative procedures for awarding costs … .’…The wording of the settlement agreement and the subsequent conduct of the parties provided substantial evidence for the trial court to conclude that the parties had stipulated to an alternative procedure for awarding costs, dispensing with the usual formalities of a complete cost memo and a motion to tax costs. The trial court was justified in considering the merits of contractor’s objections to plaintiffs’ cost claims. We conclude there was neither error nor prejudice in the omission of a formal motion to tax costs.” ((Id. at p. 70.)

In light of the foregoing, the Court will consider the objections in GM’s opposition to Plaintiff’s cost claims.

As noted in the opposition, Plaintiff claims $150.00 for jury fees. (Barry Decl., ¶ 49, Ex. 8, ¶ 2.) GM asserts that it “should not be forced to reimburse Counsel $150 for ‘Jury fees’ because the case never went to trial and GM should therefore not be billed for this.” (Opp’n at p. 9:17-18.) Plaintiff does not appear to address or dispute this point in the reply. Thus, the Court deducts $150.00 from the total amount of costs requested.

Plaintiff also claims $500.00 for “[c]ourt reporter fees as established by statute.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 49, Ex. 8, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s attached “Memorandum of Costs (Worksheet)” references $550.00 in court reporter fees for “Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 49, Ex. 8.) GM asserts that “costs are only allowed if actually incurred; Counsel has spent nothing for future services. $550 seems to be an estimate, not an actual charge incurred.” (Opp’n at p. 9:20-21.) Plaintiff also does not appear to address or dispute this point in the reply. Thus, the Court deducts $550.00 from the total amount of costs requested.

In addition, Plaintiff claims $337.60 for “[f]ees for electronic filing or service.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 49, Ex. 8, ¶ 14.) GM contends that “[c]ounsel improperly seeks $337.60 in ‘[f]ees for electronic filing or service’ because Counsel provides no explanation for these alleged costs.” (Opp’n at p. 9:22-23.) But it is unclear what additional explanation GM seeks, and GM does not appear to assert that electronic filing fees are not recoverable. Thus, the Court declines to strike the $337.60 in costs.

Further, Plaintiff claims $266.95 in “Other” costs. (Barry Decl., ¶ 49, Ex. 8, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff’s attached “Memorandum of Costs (Worksheet)” indicates that Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, costs for “parking” and “mileage.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 49, Ex. 8.) GM contends that “the Court should disallow these expenses since travel and parking are an inherent cost of doing business.” (Opp’n at p. 9:27.) GM does not cite to any legal authority to support its assertion that costs for parking and mileage are not recoverable. Thus, the Court declines to deduct these costs from the total amount.

Plaintiff’s attached “Memorandum of Costs (Worksheet)” also indicates that Plaintiff’s “Other” costs include $94.13 in costs for “Courtesy Copy Delivery.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 49, Ex. 8.) GM contends that “‘Courtesy’ copies, as the name implies, are not required and such expenses are unreasonable and excessive. These costs should be disallowed.” (Opp’n at pp 9:28-10:1.) The Court does not find that these costs are unreasonable or excessive, particularly in light of the Court’s requirement that courtesy copies be delivered to Dept. 50 when a brief includes a points and authorities or a filing is more than 15 pages in length. Thus, the Court declines to strike the $94.13 in costs.

In light of the foregoing, the Court deducts $700.00 from the total amount of costs requested. Thus, the Court awards Plaintiff $4,110.50 in costs.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in the amount of $90,630.00 ($86,519.50 in attorneys’ fees + $4,110.50 in costs.)

[1]As an initial matter, GM cites to, inter alia, a time entry from June 16, 2021 for 1.0 hours to “[r]eview file in preparation for deposition.: Review file; prepare to defend deposition of Plaintiff.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 47, Ex. 6.) This time entry does not pertain to drafting a “memo to file.” GM similarly cites to another time entry for 0.5 hours to “[r]eview file in preparation for Case Management Conference.” (Barry Decl., ¶ 47, Ex. 6, 8/19/2021 time entry.) The Court does not see how these are “clerical tasks,” as GM appears to assert.

JESUA OCHOA, Plaintiff, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	21STCV06266
	Hearing Date:	June 5, 2024
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO CIVIL CODE SECTION 1794(d)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50