Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 21STCV10768, Date: 2023-08-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV10768    Hearing Date: August 21, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

            Background

Plaintiffs Daniel Villa and Jasmine P. Sepulveda (jointly, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action on March 19, 2021 against Defendants BMW of North America, LLC (“BMW”) and SAI Long Beach B, Inc., dba Long Beach BMW (“SAI”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty, (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty, (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act – Section 1793.2, and (4) negligent repair, arising out of the purchase of a 2017 BMW 430GC. (Compl., ¶ 9.) 

On October 13, 2021, the Court issued an Order granting BMW’s motion for an order compelling arbitration and staying the action. The motion was also granted as to SAI’s joinder. The Court ordered that the entire action is stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiffs’ arbitrable claims. 

Plaintiffs now move for the Court to “lift the stay on this action or to reconsider its order granting Defendants BMW of North America, LLC…and SAI Long Beach C, Inc. dba Long Beach BMW…Motion to Compel Arbitration, which was issued by this Court on October 13, 2021.” BMW opposes.

Plaintiffs also move “per Code of Civil Procedure sections…1281.97 and 1281.98, for an order to lift the stay in this matter and allow Plaintiffs to proceed in Court.” BMW and SAI oppose.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court grants Plaintiffs’ “request for judicial notice in support of motion to lift stay or for reconsideration of order compelling arbitration.”  

Discussion

A.    Motion to Lift Stay of Action or for Reconsideration of Order Compelling Arbitration

Plaintiff’s first motion filed on May 26, 2023 requests that the Court reconsider its October 13, 2021 Order granting BMW’s motion to compel arbitration.   

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c), “[i]f a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.”

“A change of law under section 1008, subdivision (c), is always an appropriate basis, up until a final judgment is entered, for changing an interim order. An appellate decision published during an action’s pendency may be a change of law under section 1008, subdivision (c), and requires a trial court to reconsider its earlier ruling if the decision materially changed the law.”
(State of California v. Superior Court (Flynn) (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 94, 100 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) 

Plaintiffs assert that the Court should reconsider its October 13, 2021 Order under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c) in light of the Court of Appeal’s recent ruling in Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324.

The Court notes that the October 13, 2021 Order in the instant action provides, inter alia, as follows:

“This arbitration agreement is not materially different from the one examined in Felisilda. In this case, like the buyers’ claims in Felisilda, Plaintiffs’ claims against BMW and SAI ‘directly relate[] to the condition of the vehicle that [allegedly] violated warranties [Plaintiffs] received as a consequence of the sales contract.’ Because Plaintiffs ‘expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle — even against third party nonsignatories to the sales contract — [Plaintiffs are] estopped from refusing to arbitrate [their] claim against [BMW and SAI].’ As such, the Court must reach the same result here.” (October 13, 2021 Order at p. 6:7-14.) 

Ford Motor Warranty Cases involved “an appeal of an order denying the motion of defendant Ford Motor Company (FMC) to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims relating to alleged defects in vehicles it manufactured.” ((Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1329.) The Court of Appeal “agree[d] with the trial court that FMC could not compel arbitration based on plaintiffs’ agreements with the dealers that sold them the vehicles.” ((Ibid.) The Ford Motor Warranty Cases Court found that “[e]quitable estoppel does not apply because, contrary to FMC’s arguments, plaintiffs’ claims against it in no way rely on the agreements.” (Ibid.)

The Court in Ford Motor Warranty Cases “decline[d] to follow Felisilda.” (Ford Motor Warranty Cases, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1333 [emphasis omitted].) It noted, “[t]hat the Felisilda plaintiffs and the dealer agreed in their sale contract to arbitrate disputes between them about the condition of the vehicle does not equitably estop the plaintiffs from asserting FCA has no right to demand arbitration. Equitable estoppel would apply if the plaintiffs had sued FCA based on the terms of the sale contract yet denied FCA could enforce the arbitration clause in that contract. That is not what the plaintiffs did in Felisilda. The plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims against FCA in Felisilda were not based on their sale contracts with the dealers. We disagree with Felisilda that ‘the sales contract was the source of [FCA’s] warranties at the heart of this case.’ As we discuss further below, manufacturer vehicle warranties that accompany the sale of motor vehicles without regard to the terms of the sale contract between the purchaser and the dealer are independent of the sale contract.” (Id. at p. 1334 [internal citations omitted, emphasis in original].)

Plaintiffs assert that in light of Ford Motor Warranty Cases, “the Court should lift the stay of action or reconsider its decision granting the motion to compel arbitration.” (Mot. at p. 10:19-20.) Plaintiffs also indicate that here, “[a]lthough arbitration has been compelled, the Parties have not conducted any evidentiary hearings in arbitration. In the Arbitration proceedings, only the initiation, neutral appointment, and preparation have occurred. The evidentiary hearing [sic] set for September 25, 2023.” (Inscore Decl., ¶ 11.)

Plaintiffs cite to Malek v. Blue Cross of California (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 44, 50, where the Court of Appeal “determine[d] the consequences of failing to comply with the arbitration disclosure requirements of Health & Safety Code section 1363.1.” The Court of Appeal found that “Blue Cross’s enrollment form violated section 1363.1 because the arbitration provision was not prominently displayed immediately before the signature line. Despite these violations, the trial court initially concluded that section 1363.1 was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. section 1 et seq.) and granted Blue Cross’s petition to compel arbitration. Almost three years later, the trial court reconsidered its ruling based on our decision in Smith v. PacifiCare Behavioral Health of Cal., Inc. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 139 [113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140], cert. den. (2002) 537 U.S. 818 [154 L. Ed. 2d 23, 123 S. Ct. 92] (Smith), and thereafter denied the petition to compel arbitration.” (Id. at p. 50.) The Court of Appeal in Malek “conclude[d] that the Blue Cross enrollment form at issue here does not substantially comply with section 1363.1,” and “affirm[ed] the trial court’s order denying the petition to compel arbitration, along with its challenged orders vacating the arbitrator’s award and vacating its original decision to grant the petition to compel arbitration.” (Id. at pp. 50-51.)

In Malek, “Blue Cross contend[ed] that the trial court could not vacate its June order compelling arbitration until completion of the arbitration.” ((Malek v. Blue Cross of California, supra, at p. 59.) The Court of Appeal found that “[a]lthough Blue Cross attempts to distinguish our opinion in Blake v. Ecker, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 728, we find that decision controlling. In that case, like here, a change in the law required the trial court to reconsider its prior ruling compelling arbitration…Blue Cross’s distinction of Blake is based on the parties’ near completion of arbitration. The progress of the arbitration is not material when considering a change in the law affecting whether the arbitral forum was a correct one. Based on Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c), the trial court could reconsider its order to compel arbitration in light of our decision in Smith, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 139.”
(Id. at pp. 59-60.) 

In the opposition, BMW asserts that the motion for reconsideration is untimely. They contend that “[b]ased on a strict interpretation of the statute, any motion for reconsideration was required to have been filed within 10 days of the Order granting BMW NA’s MTCA - no later than October 23, 2023.” (Opp’n at p. 3:7-9.) BMW cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), which provides in pertinent part that “[w]hen an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.” (Emphasis added.)

But as set forth above, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c), “[i]f a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs cite to Int’l Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 784, 788, where the Court of Appeal noted that “we think subdivision (c) of section 1008 means exactly what it says--when a trial court concludes there has been a change of law that warrants reconsideration of a prior order, it has jurisdiction to reconsider and change its order.” BMW does not discuss Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c) in the opposition.

BMW also asserts that the motion should be denied because Ford Motor Warranty Cases did not overturn Felisilda. BMW asserts that “[w]hile Plaintiff’s Motion highlights the Ochoa Court’s disagreements with the Court’s reasoning in Felisilda regarding equitable estoppel and third party beneficiary theories, the Motion does not cite to any portion of the Ochoa decision or any legal authority establishing that Ochoa overturned or superseded Felisilda. Plaintiff’s Motion is void of any legal authority requiring this Court to retroactively reconsider its Order on the MTCA simply because a subsequent parallel (not superseding) decisions is published.” (Opp’n at p. 4:21-26, emphasis omitted.)[1]

In the reply, Plaintiffs counter that in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106-107, the Court of Appeal noted that “[u]nder Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c), if the court ‘at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion.’ This subdivision does not define what constitutes a ‘change of law,’ and its terminology gives the court very broad power. In addition, the court may consider a number of factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion, including the importance of the change of law, the timing of the motion, and the circumstances of the case.” (Internal citation omitted.)

Plaintiffs assert, inter alia, that the “circumstances of the case show that there has been a change in the law. Ochoa held against the rationale the Court adopted to grant the initial motion to compel arbitration in this case, that the manufacturer cannot invoke the arbitration provision pursuant to…the doctrine of equitable estoppel…A new opinion changing how this situation is dealt with and where a case is litigated constitutes a change in the law.” (Reply at p. 3:25-4:2.) As set forth above, Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c) “does not define what constitutes a ‘change of law,’ and its terminology gives the court very broad power.” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 106.)

BMW also asserts that Ford Motor Warranty Cases is factually distinguishable from the facts of this case. BMW asserts that “[s]ection 16 of Plaintiffs’ Lease Agreement explicitly acknowledges the existence of BMW NA’s warranty and incorporates it into its terms…” (Opp’n at p. 6:2-4.) BMW cites to Exhibit 3 to Plaintiffs’ RJN, which is a June 15, 2021 “Declaration of Ali Hosseinon in Support of Defendant BMW of North America LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay of Action.” Exhibit A to Ms. Hosseinon’s Declaration is a “BMW Financial Services NA, LLC – Lease Agreement.” (Plaintiffs’ RJN, Ex. 3, Ex. A.) BMW cites to Section 16 of this Agreement, which states, inter alia, “[t]he Vehicle is subject to the following express warranties If the Vehicle is new, the Vehicle is subject to the standard manufacturer’s new vehicle warranty The Vehicle is also covered by the following, if checked…” (Ibid.) Section 16 also provides “A LESSOR’S WARRANTY IS DISCLOSED ABOVE, LESSOR, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, (1) MAKES NO WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE VEHICLE OR ANY OF ITS PARTS OR ACCESSORIES AND (2) MAKES NO WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS OF THE VEHICLE FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I AM LEASING THE VEHICLE FROM THE LESSOR ‘AS IS’” (Ibid.)

But in Ford Motor Warranty Cases, the Court similarly noted that “[a]lthough the sale contracts contemplate the purchase of service, warranty, and insurance contracts relating to the vehicle sale, they do not contain comprehensive terms of any of these contracts. Not only do the sale contracts not contain any terms of warranty coverage, the dealer expressly disclaims any warranty. However, the dealer qualifies that this disclaimer ‘does not affect any warranties covering the vehicle that the vehicle manufacturer may provide.’” (Ford Motor Warranty Cases, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1330.) Plaintiffs assert that “[h]ere, the contract similarly provided no details on the manufacturer’s warranty, like the terms of the warranty, outside of acknowledging that there is a manufacturer’s warranty. While using marginally different language, this contract reaches the same outcome as that in Ochoa.” (Reply at p. 5:10-13.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have the better argument. The Court is not persuaded by BMW’s argument that Ford Motor Warranty Cases is distinguishable from the facts here.

Based on the foregoing and the recent decision of Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated grounds for the Court to reconsider its October 13, 2021 Order.  

B.    Motion to Lift Stay and Procced in Court

            On June 26, 2023, Plaintiffs filed another motion “per Code of Civil Procedure sections…1281.97 and 1281.98, for an order to lift the stay in this matter and allow Plaintiffs to proceed in Court.” (Mot. at p. 1:4-6.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97 provides as follows:

“(a)

(1) In an employment or consumer arbitration that requires, either expressly or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider, the drafting party to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration can proceed, if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date the drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel arbitration under Section 1281.2.

(2) After an employee or consumer meets the filing requirements necessary to initiate an arbitration, the arbitration provider shall immediately provide an invoice for any fees and costs required before the arbitration can proceed to all of the parties to the arbitration. The invoice shall be provided in its entirety, shall state the full amount owed and the date that payment is due, and shall be sent to all parties by the same means on the same day. To avoid delay, absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement stating the number of days in which the parties to the arbitration must pay any required fees or costs, the arbitration provider shall issue all invoices to the parties as due upon receipt.

(b) If the drafting party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in default under subdivision (a), the employee or consumer may do either of the following:

(1) Withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.

(2) Compel arbitration in which the drafting party shall pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs related to the arbitration.” (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs also seek relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

“(a)

(1) In an employment or consumer arbitration that requires, either expressly or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider, that the drafting party pay certain fees and costs during the pendency of an arbitration proceeding, if the fees or costs required to continue the arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date, the drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel the employee or consumer to proceed with that arbitration as a result of the material breach.

(2) The arbitration provider shall provide an invoice for any fees and costs required for the arbitration proceeding to continue to all of the parties to the arbitration. The invoice shall be provided in its entirety, shall state the full amount owed and the date that payment is due, and shall be sent to all parties by the same means on the same day. To avoid delay, absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement stating the number of days in which the parties to the arbitration must pay any required fees or costs, the arbitration provider shall issue all invoices to the parties as due upon receipt. Any extension of time for the due date shall be agreed upon by all parties.

(b) If the drafting party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in default under subdivision (a), the employee or consumer may unilaterally elect to do any of the following:

(1) Withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate

jurisdiction. If the employee or consumer withdraws the claim from arbitration and proceeds with an action in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, the statute of limitations with regard to all claims brought or that relate back to any claim brought in arbitration shall be tolled as of the date of the first filing of a claim in any court, arbitration forum, or other dispute resolution forum.

(2) Continue the arbitration proceeding, if the arbitration provider agrees to continue administering the proceeding, notwithstanding the drafting party’s failure to pay fees or costs. The neutral arbitrator or arbitration provider may institute a collection action at the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding against the drafting party that is in default of the arbitration for payment of all fees associated with the employment or consumer arbitration proceeding, including the cost of administering any proceedings after the default.

(3) Petition the court for an order compelling the drafting party to pay all arbitration fees that the drafting party is obligated to pay under the arbitration agreement or the rules of the arbitration provider.

(4) Pay the drafting party’s fees and proceed with the arbitration proceeding. As part of the award, the employee or consumer shall recover all arbitration fees paid on behalf of the drafting party without regard to any findings on the merits in the underlying arbitration.” (Emphasis added.)

For purposes of Sections 1281.97 and 1281.98, “drafting party” means “the company or business that included a predispute arbitration provision in a contract with a consumer or employee. The term includes any third party relying upon, or otherwise subject to the arbitration provision, other than the employee or consumer.” ((Id., § 1280, subd. (e).)

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he drafting parties, BMW of North America, LLC and Long Beach BMW, have both failed to pay fees or costs within 30 days after the due date.” (Mot. at p. 1:7-8.) Plaintiffs’ counsel states that “[o]ur office selected JAMS on behalf of Plaintiffs based on the lease agreement’s arbitration provision. We submitted the demand to JAMS on December 2, 2021.” (Rotman Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs’ counsel states that “[o]n May 25, 2023, JAMS issued Invoice No. 6678942 on Respondents BMW and McKenna BMW and Invoice No. 6678944 on Respondent Long Beach BMW with payments due upon receipt.” (Rotman Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. D.) Plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that “[n]o later than June 24, 2023, the invoices became more than 30 days overdue. As of the filing of this motion, Invoice No. 6678942 and Invoice No. 6678944 remain unpaid on the JAMS Access online portal.” (Rotman Decl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs’ instant motion was filed on June 26, 2023. 

Plaintiffs state that they accordingly “elect to withdraw from arbitration and seek an order lifting the stay so that they may proceed in Court.” (Mot. at p. 2:23-24.)

In its opposition, BMW asserts that the “[m]otion should be denied because the Arbitration was continued and the issue of whether BMW NA paid the arbitration fees is moot.” (Opp’n at p. 3:23-24.) BMW’s counsel states that “[o]n July 18, 2023, the parties participated in a conference call with the Arbitrator and discussed a continuance of the Arbitration. The Arbitration hearing was continued to April 8, 2024. It was not canceled or delayed as a result of BMW NA’s alleged non-payment of arbitration fees.” (Oaks Decl., ¶ 8.) But BMW does not appear to dispute that it failed to timely pay the requisite fees within 30 days after the due date, as Plaintiffs assert.

BMW also asserts that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97, subdivisions (a)(1)-(2) do not apply here because it governs the payment of “certain fees and costs before the arbitration can proceed…” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.97, subd. (a)(1).) BMW argues that “after Plaintiffs initiated the Arbitration, an initial invoice was issued, and BMW NA paid all of the required fees to permit the Arbitration to proceed.” (Opp’n at p. 4:11-14.) BMW does not appear to provide any evidence to support this assertion. In addition, as set forth above, Plaintiffs also seek relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Further, as discussed, BMW does not appear to dispute that it did not timely pay the fees due under JAMS’ May 25, 2023 invoice.

BMW also asserts that “Plaintiffs’ claim for relief under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98, subdivisions (a)(1)-(2) is procedurally defective because Plaintiffs failed to file the request with JAMS, as required by provisions of the arbitration agreement and the JAMS Comprehensive Rules Plaintiffs agreed to follow.” (Opp’n at p. 4:17-20.) To the extent BMW is asserting that JAMS’ Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures should supersede ¿Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97 and 1281.98, BMW has not provided any legal authority to support any such assertion.

            Lastly, BMW asserts that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 of the Code of Civil Procedure. BMW cites to Gallo v. Wood Ranch USA, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 621. But in Gallo, the Court of Appeal noted as follows: “[t]his appeal presents a question of first impression: Are [Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97, 1281.98 and 1281.99] preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. section 1 et seq.)? We hold that they are not because the procedures they prescribe further—rather than frustrate—the objectives of the FAA to honor the parties’ intent to arbitrate and to preserve arbitration as a speedy and effective alternative forum for resolving disputes. We accordingly affirm the trial court’s order vacating its earlier order compelling arbitration between the parties in this case.” (Id. at pp. 629-630 [emphasis in original].)

            BMW also cites to Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 174, where the Court of Appeal noted that “the procedural provisions of the [California Arbitration Act] apply in California courts by default. There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules…But the parties may expressly designate that any arbitration proceeding [may] move forward under the FAA’s procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law. Absent such an express designation, however, the FAA’s procedural provisions do not apply in state court.” (Internal quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted.)

BMW asserts that “[t]he arbitration clause agreed to by Plaintiffs expressly provides that state statutes would not govern over the Federal Arbitration Act: ‘Any arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.’” (Opp’n at p. 7:25-28.) The Court notes that BMW cites to “Plaintiffs’ RJN, Ex. 3, Ex. A” in support of this assertion (Opp’n at p. 8:1), but Plaintiffs did not appear to file any request for judicial notice in support of the instant motion. To the extent BMW is relying on Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice filed in support of Plaintiffs’ separate motion for reconsideration (discussed above), BMW has not cited to any legal authority demonstrating that this is permissible. In addition, the Court notes that the purported arbitration provision referenced by BMW does not expressly provide that any arbitration proceeding may move forward under the FAA’s “procedural provisions” rather than under state procedural law.

Lastly, in its opposition to the instant motion, SAI asserts that it is “not in material breach of the arbitration proceeding because Long Beach BMW has paid all the required fees to continue arbitration.” (Opp’n at p. 3:9-10.) SAI acknowledges that “[o]n May 25, 2023, an invoice was sent to Long Beach BMW in the amount of $39,233.33.” (Phan Decl., ¶ 6.) SAI’s counsel states that “[o]n July 18, 2023, a conference was held with Arbitrator Chapman where Arbitrator Chapman stated that she had a conflict for the evidentiary hearing held from September 25-28, 2023 and therefore the parties continued the hearing to April 8-11, 2024.” (Phan Decl., ¶ 7.) SAI’s counsel states that “[o]n August 2, 2023, JAMS sent correspondence regarding Long Beach BMW’s statement from July 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023 and there was a credit balance of $2,173.07.” (Phan Decl., ¶ 8.) But SAI does not appear to provide evidence demonstrating that it timely paid the May 25, 2023 invoice within 30 days.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated grounds for relief under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97 and/or 1281.98.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ May 26, 2023 motion to lift stay of action or for reconsideration of order compelling arbitration is granted.

Plaintiffs’ June 26, 2023 motion to lift stay and proceed in court is granted.

In light of the foregoing, the Court vacates its October 13, 2021 Order granting BMW’s motion to compel arbitration.  The Court sets a case management conference on October 17, 2023 at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50.

Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this Order. 

DATED:  August 21, 2023                            

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court